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CHAPTER I
A CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The American attitude toward the defense of Formosa 
and the offshore islands during the Quemoy crisis that 
erupted in September 1954 was intertwined with American 
policy toward China in general and the Nationalist Govern­
ment in Formosa in particular. The United States had tried 
to stay out of the civil conflict between the Nationalists 
and the Communists. Yet the sequence of events that developed 
in the Far East forced the United States to take a position 
in favor of the Nationalists on Formosa. The American policy 
toward Formosa, although it ran counter to the Communists, 
was not fully identified with the cause of the Nationalists.
A review of the divergent objectives of each of the three 
parties involved is the first point in order.
The American Attitude
Formosa^ was Chinese territory before it was ceded
"^The word Formosa is used throughout this paper to 
indicate Formosa and the Pescadores unless otherwise speci­
fied. It is to be noted that the Chinese, both the 
Nationalists and the Communists, always use the Chinese 
terms, Taiwan and Penghu, to denote these islands. The 
tendency of the western world has been to use the term 
Taiwan rather than Formosa since 1960. However, in order 
to follow the customary usage of western literature in the 
1950*s, the word Formosa is used throughout this paper.
1
2by treaty of Shimonoseki to Japan as a result of China*s
defeat in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895. During the
Second World War,, the: Cairo Declaration of December 1,
1943, stated that Formosa' should be returned to "the
2?Republic of China.." ' The. Potsdam Proclamation of July 26,
31945, reaffirmed the Cairo; Declaration and the instrument
4^of Japanese surrender: ' accepted the terms of the Potsdam
Proclamation.
After V—J day ,., General Order Number One of the
Japanese Imperial Headquarters issued under the direction of
General Douglas MacArthur,.. Supreme Commander of Allied
Forces in Japan,,- provided' for the surrender of the Japanese
forces in China and' Formosa to Generalissimo Chiang Kai- 
5shek. With the: assistance of the United States Navy, the 
Chinese forces landed on.Formosa in September 1945 and disarmed
r/
2Herbert Feis, Contest Over Japan (New York: Norton
& Co., 1967) ,- Appendix: X,. p. 155. The Chinese Nationalists 
often stress the significance of the use of "the Republic of 
China" in the Cairo Declaration. To them, this terminology 
carries a desirable, implication that Formosa should be re­
turned to no other: government of China than the Government 
of the Republic of China,., the Nationalist Government. Ob­
viously, in referring to: China as "the Republic of China," 
the framers of the Decl'aration merely used the official title 
of China in use after' the revolution of 1911.
3Ibid. , Appendix: IX,, p . 160.
^TlE.S. Department of State Bulletin, XIII, No. 324 
(September 9, 194.5;),,. p., 3.64.. Hereafter cited as D.S.B.
5Feis, Contest Over Japan, Appendix VI, p. 165.
3c
the Japanese troops on the island. After the Japanese were 
removed from Formosa, the Chinese Government took administra­
tive control of the area, and formally incorporated it as
the thirty-fifth Province of the Republic of China on ,t
7
October 25, 1950. In Chinese eyes, Formosa was restored
to China in accordance with the Cairo Declaration by virtue
8of the fact that they had regained control of it.
The end of the Second World War did not bring peace 
to Chipa. The struggle for national power between the 
Nationalist Party, which had constituted the legal govern­
ment of China, and the Communist Party, which had possessed 
an independent army, soon developed into a large scale armed 
conflict or, from the Nationalists' point of view, a com-
9
munist rebellion. £he China White Paper, published by the
Joseph W. Ballantine, Formosa, A Problem for United 
States Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Insti­
tution, 1952), p. 57.
7China Handbook, 1950 (New York: Rockport Press,
1951), p. 33.
8The Chinese Nationalist Government designated 
October 25 as "Taiwan Restoration Day." It is interesting 
to note that the Chinese Communists also claimed that Octo­
ber 25, 1945, was the date when China regained sovereignty 
over Formosa. For instance, in his telegram to the United 
Nations General Assembly on October 10, 1954, condemning 
"United States aggression against Chinese territory of 
Taiwan," the Red Chinese Premier Chou En-lai declared, "It 
is a fact that Taiwan was taken on October 25, 1945 by the 
Chinese government of that time." Important Documents Con- 
cerning the Question of Taiwan (Peking: Foreign Language
Press, 1955), p. 151.
9
A detailed study is Tang Tsou's America's Failure 
in China, 1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1963) .
4State Department in August, 1949, indicated that the 
American Government would not get involved in China.^
With vast territory under their control, the Communists pro­
claimed the establishment of the People*s Republic of China 
on October 1, 1949. Meanwhile, the Nationalists had re­
treated from mainland China and announced that the site of 
the Government of the Republic of China had moved to Formosa 
as of December 8, 1949.
At this time the United States continued to recognize 
the Nationalist Government on Formosa as the government of 
China, but anticipated the loss of Formosa to the communists 
soon.'*''*' The drastic change on the China scene necessitated 
the disclosure of American policy on what was expected to be 
the closing phase of a civil war. On January 5, 1950, 
President Truman issued a statement in which he stressed the
The official title of the White Paper is United 
States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the 
Period 1944-1949, Far Eastern Series No. 30 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949). In his "letter of
transmittal" to President Truman, Secretary Acheson said, 
"Nothing that this country did or could have done within the 
reasonable limits of its capabilities would have changed the 
result; nothing that was left undone by this country has 
contributed to ity" p. xvi. See also McGeorge Bundy, The 
Pattern of Responsibility (Cambridge, Mass.: The Riverside
Press, 1952), p. 191.
^ A  State Department Policy Information Paper of Decem­
ber 23, 1949, was leaked to the press from General MacArthur*s 
Headquarters in Tokyo on January 3, 1950. The text was later 
reprinted in Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings be­
fore the Committee on Armed Forces and Committee on Foreign 
Relations, U.S. Senate, 82 Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1951), Vol. 3, pp. 1667-69.
5fact that Formosa had been surrendered to Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek after V-J day and that for the past four 
years "the United States and the pther allied powers have
12accepted his exercise of Chinese authority over the island." 
This was interpreted as meaning "the United States Govern­
ment regarded Formosa as Chinese territory without qualifica- 
13tion." The President then went on:
The United States has ho predatory designs on 
Formosa or on any other Chinese territory. The 
United States has no desire to obtain special rights 
or privileges or to establish military bases on 
Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any inten­
tion of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in 
the present situation. The United States Govern­
ment will not pursue a course which will lead to 
involvement in the civil conflict in China.
Similarly, the United States Government will 
not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces 
on Formosa. In the view of the United States 
Government, the resources on Formosa are adequate 
to enable them to obtain the items which they might 
consider necessary for the defense of the island.
The United States Government proposes to continue 
under existing legislative authority the present 
ECA program of economic assistance.^
This statement was an American official declaration
of a hands-off policy toward the Nationalists on Formosa.
One week later, on January 12, Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, in an address before the National Press Club,
stated that the American "defensive perimeter" in the Western
12D.S.B., XXII, No. 550 (January 22, 1950), p. 79. 
13Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York; 
W. W. Norton & Co., 19 69), p. 351.
14D.S.B., XXII, p. 79.
6Pacific ran from the Ryukyus to the Philippines but it ex-
15eluded South Korea and Formosa. Thus, Formosa was written
off in the American policy planning both politically and
militarily in early 19 50. This cleared the way for the
Communists to "liberate" the island if they could manage
to cross the Formosa Strait. By June, 1950, the Communists
had virtually completed all preparation for an invasion of
16Chiang’s stronghold. Fortunately for the Nationalists, 
the outbreak of the Korean conflict on June 25, 1950, fore­
stalled a Communist attack on Formosa.
On June 27, 1950, two days after the North Korean 
Communists launched their attack on the Republic of Korea, 
President Truman issued a statement on the Korean situation, 
which also marked a changed American position on Formosa.
The President took the view that the occupation of Formosa 
by the Chinese Communist forces "would be a direct threat 
to the security of the Pacific area and to the United States
forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in 
17that area." He declared:
Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet 
to prevent any attack on Formosa. As corollary of 
this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government 
on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations 
against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see 
that this is done. The determination of the future
15Ibid., p. 116.
16Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (New York: 
Macmillan Co., 1960), p. 22.
17D.S.B., XXIII, No. 574 (July 3, 1950), p. 5.
7status of Formosa must await the restoration of 
security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with 
Japan or consideration by the United Nations.
The impact of the Korean conflict had led President 
Truman to reverse his position on Formosa. He was determined 
not only to prevent Formosa from falling into communist hands 
but also to assert that the status of Formosa was unsettled. 
In his message to Congress on July 19, 1950, the President 
spoke of his June 27 statement with regard to Formosa as a 
policy of neutralization. "The present military neutraliza­
tion," he stressed, "is without prejudice to the political
19questions affecting that island." The President made 
American intentions clear: "That Formosa not become em­
broiled in hostilities disturbing to the peace of the Pacific
and that all questions affecting it be settled by peaceful
20means as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations."
The neutralization of Formosa was a unilateral action 
taken by the United States, although the American Government 
did inform the United Nations on the same day of this course 
of action. In order to justify this action, it was desir­
able for the American Government to maintain the point that 
the status of Formosa was undetermined. This seemed to 
repudiate the Cairo declaration to which the United States
18t, . ,Ibid.
19Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Volume IT: Years of Trial
and Hope (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1956), p. 346.
20t, . .Ibid.
8had subscribed. President Truman wrote in his Memoirs
that when the Cairo Declaration was issued it had been antici
pated that China would be friendly to the United States, but
the situation had drastically changed--"China had not only
fallen into unfriendly hands but also was now viciously
21hostile to the United States."
Although the President himself did not express 
explicitly that the United States felt a custodial duty 
toward Formosa, it was spelled out by a ranking official of 
the State Department. In a statement delivered before the 
Political Committee of the United Nations on November 27, 
1950, John F. Dulles, then consultant to the State Depart­
ment, made this American attitude quite clear. He said:
Formosa is still affected with an international 
interest. It is a former Japanese colony in the 
process of detachment. The United States, certainly, 
is entitled to some voice in the determination of 
the future of Formosa, because, if it were not for 
the tremendous military effort and the great sacri­
fice which the United States made in that area of 
the world, none of us here, today, would be sitting 
around talking about F o r m o s a . 22
The American policy to neutralize Formosa was prompted 
by military considerations with an aim of preventing the 
armed conflict in Korea from spreading to other areas in 
Asia. It was a temporary measure which was supposed to be
21Truman, Memoirs, II, p. 408.
22Royal Institute of International Affairs,
Documents on International Affairs, 1949-1950 (London:
Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 681-82.
923terminated after the end of the Korean War. Washington, 
however, inevitably came to the aid of the Nationalist 
Government itself. At the time President Truman declared 
the neutralization of Formosa, he also made three decisions 
which were not made public: (1) to give extensive military
aid to the Nationalist Government, (2) to conduct a military 
survey by MacArthur1s headquarters on the needs of National­
ist forces, and (3) to make plans to carry out reconnaissance
flights along the China coast to determine the imminence of
24attack against Formosa. In July 1950 the United States 
Government assigned Karl L. Rankin as Minister and Charge
d*Affaires to Taipei, the provisional capital of the Republic
25 . . .of China. In May 1951 an American military mission was
established in Formosa.
At the beginning of the Eisenhower Administration, a
"new look" policy with regard to Formosa was pronounced in
the State of the Union Message on February 2, 1953. President
Eisenhower felt that President Truman*s order of neutralizing
23In his news conference on August 31, 1950, President 
Truman said, "Of course, it will not be necessary to keep the 
7th Fleet in the Formosa Strait if the Korean thing is 
settled." U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents 
of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1965), Harry
S. Truman, 1950, p. 607
24Truman, Memoirs, II, p. 34 9.
25After the recall of Ambassador John L. Stuart to 
Washington for consultation in 1949, the American diploma­
tic mission in China had been headed by a charge d ’affaires. 
Before Rankin*s appointment, the American Charge in Taipei 
was lower than the rank of a Minister.
10
Formosa had the undesirable effect of protecting mainland
China from attack. As the Chinese Communists were fighting
the United Nations forces in Korea, there was "no longer
any logic or sense in a condition that required the United
States Navy to assume defensive responsibility on behalf of
2 6the Chinese Communists." The President declared, "I am, 
therefore, issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no 
longer be employed to shield Communist China." He empha­
sized, "The order implies no aggressive intent on our 
part."27
The deneutralization of Formosa or the "unleashing"
of the Nationalists, as it was often called, caused much
alarm among the American allies in Europe, especially the
British. It was thought to presage an attempt to blockade
28the Chinese coast. However, the expression--"unleashing 
of the Nationalists"— was an overstatement in that it was 
neither in conformity with the factual situation which was 
prevailing in the Formosa Strait nor in line with the accord 
which was binding on the Nationalists. In point of fact, 
when the neutralization of Formosa had been in force, the 
Seventh Fleet had never tried to interdict the Nationalist
2 6President Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1953, p. 17.
^Ibid.
2 8Peter Calvocoressi, ed., Survey of International 
Affairs, 1953 (Oxford University Press, for the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1956), p. 189.
11
29hit-and-run raids on the mainland coast. In point of
written accord, when the Nationalist Government received
United States military assistance, it agreed to the terms
that all military material would be used for "internal
30security" or "legitimate self-defense."
Furthermore, as soon as President Eisenhower announced
the deneutralization of Formosa, American Minister Rankin,
who shortly became Ambassador, obtained a promise from
President Chiang that no major military action would be
launched against mainland China without consulting the
chief of the American military mission in Formosa. As a
matter of fact, this was only a precautionary measure because
the armed forces of the Nationalists were not capable of
engaging in more than commando raids on the Chinese mainland
31without American logistic and other support.
That the deneutralization of Formosa marked a change 
of China policy at the beginning of the Eisenhower Adminis­
tration was therefore more apparent than real. The American
29A spokesman for Admiral William M. Fechteler, Chief 
of Naval Operation, said that the U.S. Navy had never 
"blocked" any "sorties" of the Nationalist Chinese forces.
New York Times, February 4, 1953.
^Exchange of Notes between the United States Govern­
ment and the .Chinese Nationalist Government regarding U.S. 
Military Assistance for the Defense of Formosa on January 30, 
1951. D.S-.B. , XXIV, No. 618 (May 7, 1951), p. 747.
31Karl L. Rankin, China Assignment (Seattle: Univer­
sity of Washington Press, 1964), p. 155.
12
policy toward Formosa remained basically unchanged "owing
32to the tangible factors which continued*to govern." Presi­
dent Eisenhower wrote later that the "practical value" of 
the deneutralization of Formosa was to "put the Chinese 
Communists on notice that the days of stalemate were num­
bered; that the Korean Itfar would either end or extend beyond 
33Korea." He was convinced that it helped bring "that war 
34to a finish." This implied that if the Chinese Communists 
had not engaged in the Korean truce talks earnestly, the 
United States might have assisted the Chinese Nationalists 
in launching an attack on the mainland China. As the Korean 
truce was signed shortly afterward, in July 1953, there was 
no way to know how the Eisenhower Administration would have 
reacted if the situation had been otherwise. It could be 
suggested, however, that President Eisenhower was primarily 
interested in using deneutralization of Formosa as a bar­
gaining point to effectuate an early truce in Korea rather 
than to sponsor a Nationalist attack on mainland China as 
such.
The Nationalist Mission
When the Nationalists retreated to Formosa in December 
1949, they were not intending to make Formosa their perma­
nent domain. Two layers of government had been maintained,
32Ibid.
33Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953- 
1956 (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1963), p. 123.
34Ibid.
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a central government and a provincial government. The 
central government officials planned to move back to the 
Chinese mainland as soon as a counter-attack could be 
launched. The Nationalist Government believed that the 
Communist regime on the mainland would not last long. It 
was a "sacred" mission of the Nationalist Government to 
regain mainland China and to throw off the yoke of Com-
35munist tyranny that had been imposed on the Chinese people. 
The political slogan, "Return to the Mainland," was neces­
sary not only to bolster the morale of the armed forces and 
the 1,500,000 mainlanders who fled to Formosa before the 
Communist takeover but also to serve as a rallying cry to
solicit the support of the 10 million overseas Chinese, a
3 6majority of whom were in Southeast Asia.
The six months following the American statement of 
a hands-off policy on Formosa had been a period of uncer­
tainty and anxiety in Formosa. Although the outbreak of 
the Korean conflict changed the situation, the Nationalist 
Government received the American policy of the neutralization
35This writer resided in Formosa and worked with the• 
Nationalist Government for ten years; therefore, he is 
familiar with the political orientation of the Nationalists.
3 6The overseas Chinese numbered almost 10 million, 
and their distribution was as follows: Vietnam, 1,000,000
(5% of the local population); Cambodia, 300,000 (10%); 
Thailand, 3,000,000 (16%); Malaya and Singapore, 2,750,000 
(45%); Burma, 300,000 (1.5%); Indonesia, 2,000,000 (3%); 
Philippines, 300,000 (1.5%); Sarawak, 150,000 (25%); and 
British North Borneo, 75,000 (22%). James Reston in New 
York Times, April 2, 1954, p. 2.
14
of Formosa with mixed feelings. On the one hand, the United 
States Seventh Fleet was ordered to protect Formosa from 
communist attack so that the security of the island was no 
longer a problem. On the other hand, Washington claimed 
that the legal status of Formosa on which the Nationalist 
Government was dependent awaited an international settle­
ment. The Nationalist Government was unhappy about the 
latter aspect of the American policy announcement, but it 
did not take issue with Washington. Instead, the National­
ist Government tried to link its mission of regaining main­
land China with that of the United Nations effort to repel
37the North Korean Communist aggression against South Korea.
Immediately after the armed forces of the North Korean
Communist regime attacked South Korea with sweeping success,
the Chinese Nationalist Government offered 33,000 troops, to
be equipped and transported by the United States, for use
in Korea as a Chinese contribution to the common cause of
3 8anti-communist aggression. President Truman received the
Nationalist offer with favorable consideration initially
but had to decline it because of the undesirable complica-
39tions which might ensue. The role of Formosa during the 
Korean War was the first controversy that developed between
37This writer1s personal knowledge as a former 
official in the Chinese Nationalist Government.
3 8Truman, Memoirs, II, p. 342.
^ Ibid. , pp. 343-44.
15
40General MacArthur and President Truman. While the main
purpose of the Presidents order of neutralization was to
keep Formosa out of the Korean conflict, the General took
41the view that Formosa should take an active part m  it. 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had found an American spokes­
man for his cause in the person of General MacArthur, but 
it proved to be of no avail. It was the President, not 
the General, who decided American policy.
After the Chinese Communist intervention in the 
Korean War, the Nationalist Government renewed its attempt 
to be involved in the Korean conflict. The Nationalists 
proposed to make a landing on the South China coast as
counter measure to divert the Chinese Communist forces in 
42Korea. The American Minister, Karl Rankin, was responsive
to this idea and tried to present it to the State Department
on his consultation trip to Washington in February 1951.
Rankin found that only John F. Dulles, then consultant to
the Department of State, was in favor of "a policy of 
43action." During the remainder of the Truman Administration,
^ Ibid., pp. 354-58; see also John W. Spanier, The 
Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 71-77.
41This is the tenor of General MacArthur*s letter to 
the Veterans of Foreign Wars intended for delivery on 
August 17, 1950. When the text of this letter was made 
known in advance, President Truman was furious about it, 
and ordered MacArthur to withdraw it. The letter was re­
printed in Military Situation in the Far East,
pp. 3477-80.
4 7^Rankin, China Assignment, p. 91.
16
the American policy in regard to Formosa was to "quaran-
44tine the fighting in Korea, not to encourage its extension."
President Eisenhower's announcement of the deneutra­
lization of Formosa, February 1953, gave the Nationalist 
Government, not unnaturally, a hope that it was a first 
step toward active support of the Nationalist mission to 
regain mainland China. It was a source of satisfaction to 
the Nationalists. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek said that 
the "moral force" of Washington's new Formosa policy 
deserved the "unanimous support" of "all freedom-loving
peoples who realize the danger of Communist aggression and
45are prepared to resist it." A major part of the 
Nationalist strategy had been the attempt to tie up their 
mission to recover the Chinese mainland with other seemingly 
relevant events. This kind of maneuver on the part of the 
Nationalists had failed twice during the Truman Administra­
tion when they offered troops to fight in Korea and when 
they proposed to make a landing on the South China coast. 
Delighted with Eisenhower's deneutralization statement,
Chiang spoke his mind on February 4, 1953. He said, "Our 
plan for fighting communism and regaining the mainland will 
necessarily form, in my opinion, an important link in the 
general plan of the free world to combat world-wide
44Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 369.
45Quoted m  New York Times, February 4, 1953, p. 3.
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46communist aggression." In order not to cause alarm over 
this statement, he added, "The Republic of China will not
ask for aid in ground forces from any nation to achieve our
i „ 47 goal.
Although the Eisenhower Administration did not share 
the aspirations of the Nationalist Government, there were 
tangible signs to show that the American Government under 
the Republican Party was improving its relations with 
Nationalist China. In February 1953, American Minister 
Karl Rankin was reappointed as Ambassador to the Republic 
of China. This appointment of a diplomatic representative 
of the highest rank indicated that a great importance was 
attached to Nationalist China. After presenting his creden­
tials to President Chiang on April 2, Ambassador Rankin made 
a statement at his press conference in Taipei. In that 
statement, he quoted Secretary of State Dulles as saying 
that Americans "never acquiesced, never will acquiesce in 
the enslavement of other peoples. We do not accept or 
tolerate captivity as an irrevocable fact which can be 
finalized by force or by the lapse of time." Ambassador 
Rankin then went on to say, "The Government of China has 
dedicated itself to the liberation of the mainland from 
communism. Americans share Chinese hopes for the success
^ Ibid.
47Ibid.
18
48of this great enterprise." This statement gave the im­
pression that the Eisenhower Administration was going to 
adhere to the 1952 Republican platform, which had advocated
a policy of liberation, as opposed to the Truman policy
49of the containment of communism.
Meanwhile, only a few months after the Republican 
Party came to power, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
praised the Eisenhower Administration for improving rela­
tions with the Nationalist Government. In an address to 
the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington,
D.C., on April 18, 1953, the Secretary declared
We have vastly improved our relations with 
the Chinese National Government. Now we have 
an ambassador at Taipei, Formosa, the provisional 
capital. We are speeding the delivery of mili­
tary assistance, which was woefully in arrears. 
President Eisenhower has changed the instruc­
tions to the Seventh Fleet so that, while it is 
still instructed to defend Formosa, it is no 
longer instructed to protect the Chinese Com­
munists on the mainland.
In 1953 official American visitors to Formosa steadily 
increased in numbers. These American dignitaries included 
Vice President Richard Nixon; Admiral Arthur Radford, Chair­
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Walter Robertson,
48Rankin, China Assignment, p. 159.
49Coral Bell, Negotiation From Strength (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), pp. 71-72.
50Text of Secretary Dulles* address was recorded 
by the New York, Times, April 19, 1953, p. 84.
19
Assistant Secretary of State. It indicated, at least, a 
friendly gesture to the Nationalist Government in Formosa.
The American willingness to stress its improved relations 
with the Republic of China led the Nationalists to believe 
that someday they might win over the United States Govern­
ment to their mission of recovering the Chinese mainland.
The Communist Objective
To the Chinese Communists, the "liberation” of 
Formosa was to be the finishing touch to a long, drawn-out 
revolution. When President Truman announced the American 
hands-off policy toward Formosa on January 5, 1950, the 
Communists had reason to believe that the United States would 
stick to a policy of non-intervention in Formosa. However, 
within just six months, the same American President had 
drastically changed American policy because of the out­
break of the Korean conflict. The People's Daily (Peking)
on June 29 argued that the Korean situation could not justify
51the American action of neutralizing Formosa. The neutrali­
zation of Formosa frustrated any Communist attempt to 
assault Formosa. What enraged the Communists most was 
President Truman’s statement that the status of Formosa 
awaited a future international settlement.
In an official statement on June 28, the Chinese 
Communist Premier and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai declared
51Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China, p. 562.
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"The fact that Taiwan [Formosa] is part of China will remain
unchanged forever. This is not only a historical fact but
has been affirmed by the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam
Declaration and the existing conditions after Japan's 
52surrender." He charged that President Truman's announce­
ment and the actions of the United States Seventh Fleet
"constitute armed aggression against the territory of China
53and a total violation of the United Nations Charter."
The Communist denunciation of the American policy of
neutralizing Formosa did not rest there. On August 24,
Chou En-lai cabled to the Secretary General of the United
Nations and to the President of Security Council, accusing
the United States of "armed aggression" in Formosa. In
his cablegram, Chou En-lai reiterated that Formosa was an
integral part of China and that the United States failed in
redeeming its pledge professed in the Cairo and Potsdam
Declarations that Formosa would return to China. By
President Truman's June 27 order to the Seventh Fleet, Chou
said, the American Government decided to "prevent with armed
forces the liberation of Taiwan by the Chinese People's
54Liberation Army." He called upon the Security Council to
52Documents on International Affairs, 1949-1950, 
pp. 633-34.
53Ibid,
54Text in Important Documents Concerning the 
Question of Taiwan, pp. 21-22.
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condemn the United States for its "criminal" action and to 
seek the withdrawal of "all the United States armed invading 
forces from Taiwan and from other territories belonging 
to China.1 ^
The American Government immediately responded with a
public statement that "the United States would welcome
56United Nations consideration of the Formosa problem."
It was followed by a letter which American chief delegate 
to the United Nations, Warren Austin, addressed to the 
Secretary General of the United Nations on August 25. The 
letter set forth the American position in detail. It re­
futed the idea that the United States had ever "encroached
on the territory of China" or had "taken aggressive action
57against China." The letter stated, among other things, 
that the American action was "an impartial action" and was 
"designed to keep the peace and was, therefore, in full
5 8accord with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations."
It stressed that the American neutralization was made "with­
out prejudice to the future political settlement of the
59status of the island." The United States Government took
55Ibid.
56A statement released to the press on August 24,
1950. Text in D.S.B., XXIII, No. 583 (September 4, 1950),
« TOR
D.S.B., XXIII, No. 584 (September 11, 1950), p. 412.
p. 395.
57
58t, . Ibid.
Ibid.
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the position that the actual status of Formosa was "terri­
tory taken from Japan by the victory of the Allied forces 
in the Pacific" and that its legal status "cannot be fixed
6 0until there is international action to determine its future."
As further evidence to show that the American Govern­
ment had no aggressive intent on Formosa, Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson on September 21 took the initiative by 
asking that the "Question of Formosa" be placed on the
agenda of the current General Assembly session as an addi-
61tional item of "an important and urgent character." Subse­
quently the General Assembly adopted the American proposal.
As the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea on the side 
of the North Korean Communists became quite evident in 
November, the United States maintained that it was an in­
opportune time to discuss the long-range future of Formosa. 
Therefore, on November 15, the United States asked the
General Assembly to defer the consideration of the item on 
6 2Formosa. Later, that body adopted a British proposal to 
postpone the discussion of the Formosa question indefinitely.
Secretary Acheson first spoke of this matter during 
his address before the General Assembly on September 19.
He formally requested a discussion of Formosa by a note to 
the Secretary General of the United Nations on September 21. 
D.S.B., XXIII, No. 587 (October 2, 1950), p. 526 and No. 589 
(October 16, 1950), p. 607.
6 2D.S.B., XXIII, No. 596 (December 4, 1950), p. 911.
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However, the Security Council of the United Nations, 
after prolonged debates for a month;, passed a resolution 
on September 29 to: invite the Chinese Communists to be 
present to state their complaint against the United States 
for "armed aggression" of" Formosa. Accepting this invita­
tion, representatives of: the: Peking regime appeared before 
the United Nations. Yet their vociferous and intemperate
speeches, falsely accusing: the United States of aggression,
6:3?were to no avail.. Nevertheless, the intense reaction of 
the Chinese Communists: to: the American position that the 
legal status of Formosa was undecided proved to be one Of 
the irreconcilable issues between the two sides.
After President Eisenhower announced the deneutraliza­
tion of Formosa, Radio Peking said, "[President} Eisenhower 
boldly proclaimed not only the continued occupation of
Chinese Taiwan but [also! use of the Kuomintang [Nationalist
64Party] brigands for aggression against the Chinese people."
It stressed that this action "does nothing to frighten the 
victorious Chinese people:,,"1 but predicted, on the contrary, 
that an active support at Chiang Kai-shek regime would prove 
to be "a millstone around' the_ neck of the American aggres-
n 6 5sors.
summary of the Security Council's debates on the 
question of Formosa in: United Nations Bulletin, IX, No. 12 
(December 15, 1950) ,. pp.. 658-669, under the heading of "Korea 
Question Goes to Assembly after Council Fails to Act."
^Quoted in New York' limes, February 4, 1953, p. 4.
65ibid_
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The Eisenhower Administration's policy to deneutralize 
Formosa with unilateral American naval protection for the 
Nationalists served to aggravate the hostile attitude of the 
Communists toward the United States. An American-sponsored 
Nationalist attack on the Chinese mainland, in the eyes of 
the Communists, was no longer a remote possibility. After 
the Korean truce was reached in July 1953, the United 
States did not withdraw its Seventh Fleet from the Formosa 
Strait, as former President Truman had intended. The 
accessibility of Formosa to the Chinese Communists was as 
remote as ever. The United States continued to oppose the 
Communists' avowed objective of "liberating" Formosa.
CHAPTER II
NEW AGITATION AND EMBROILMENT
Nationalist Urging for Counter-Attack
In a statement during a military review in honor of 
Vice President Richard Nixon*s visit to Formosa in November 
1953, Generalissimo Chiang said that 1954 would be "the 
year of decision" while 1953 was "the final year" of 
preparation for a counter-attack against the Chinese 
.mainland.^
Indeed, the year 1954 saw increasing pronouncements 
of the Nationalist pledges to regain the mainland. In his 
New Year Message, President Chiang said that a counter­
attack against the Communist mainland, as a fight for freedom 
and light, would come "in the not distant future." He
emphasized, "The recovery of the lost territory must be
2
paid for with our own blood and flesh." This statement 
obviously was made to tell the world that he would not seek, 
foreign troops to achieve his mission.
On February 26, Premier Chen Cheng told the Legis­
lative Yuan (Chinese Parliament): "Our policy used to be
^New York Times, December 26, 1953, p. 2.
2Ibid., January 1, 1954, p. 12.
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defense of Taiwan and preparation for the mainland counter­
attack. However, our future program will center on how to
3
carry out the mainland recovery project.'1 He stressed,
"If we wait for three or five years the chances will become
slimmer and slimmer. By that time not only will we not be
able to attack but the enemy will be encouraged to attack 
4us." It w.as the first time that a "number-two" Nationalist 
official had expressed-the restless mood of the Nationalists 
in Formosa. To him the need for action was conditioned by 
several factors: the average age of the Nationalist soldiers
was near thirty years, and time was running out for these 
men to be of service in a large scale military operation. 
Furthermore, Generalissimo Chiang was approaching his 
seventieth year. He would not have many chances left to 
accomplish the self-imposed mission of regaining the main­
land during his lifetime.
In addition to these internal difficulties facing the 
Nationalists, Generalissimo Chiang had long held that the 
seizure of mainland China by the Communists was the root of 
all turmoil in Asia. On May 20, in his inaugural address 
as President for another six-year term, he traced the 
troubles in Korea and Indochina to the loss of the Chinese 
mainland to the Communists. He concluded: "It is therefore
obvious that the only way to eliminate this calamity of
3
Ibid./ February 27, 1954, p. 2.
^Ibid.
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mankind and to reestablish international peace is through the
5
discharge of our duty in the recovery of the mainland." He 
appealed to the free world to give the Nationalists a 
"reasonable amount of moral and material support" to fulfill 
their mission. He said, "We have confidence in our ability 
to retake the mainland and in the victory of our counter­
attack ." ^
Whether or not the Chinese Communists took seriously 
the Nationalist threat to launch a counter-attack on the 
mainland was difficult to assess, but they did feel the 
increase in Nationalist raids on Chinese coast in 1954.
The Communists saw fit to use this threat as an excuse for 
mistakenly shooting down a British commercial airplane over 
Hainan Island on July 26. In answer to a strong British 
protest against this incident, the Chinese Communists 
apologized and explained: "Aircraft of the remnant Chiang
gang in Taiwan have enlarged further their sphere of harass­
ment covering the coastal areas and islands of China. There­
fore, fighting is still taking place over the coastal areas
7
and islands of China."
5Ibid., May 21, 1954, p. 3.
^Ibid.
7Ibid., July 26, 1954, p. 3.
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American Determination to Resist Communist Expansion
The international scene in early 1954 was favorable
to the cause of the Nationalists,.as the United States was
alarmed by the surging Red tide in Indochina. The Chinese
Communists had intensified their support of the North
8Vietnamese Communists ever since the Korean truce. The 
communists1 successful inroads into Indochina were climaxed 
by the convocation of an international conference at Geneva 
in April 1954. The very fact that the Chinese Communist 
regime was invited to attend the Geneva Conference gave it
9
unprecedented prestige. This joyful mood was not concealed
when the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai,
addressed the Conference on April 28.^ Aside from the
situation in Indochina, Chou took the occasion for renewed
accusations against the "American occupation" of Formosa
ever since the outbreak of the war in Korea. He added,
11significantly, "This question is not yet settled."
The United States attended the Geneva Conference 
reluctantly and tried to ignore, rather than oppose, the
0
Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Affairs . 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966), pp. 241-43.
9 . .Richard P. Stebben, The United States m  World
Affairs, 1954 (New York: Harper & Brother, for the Council
on Foreign Relations, 1956), p. 247.
*^The introductory remarks of Chou's address. Text 
in New York Times, April 29, 1954, p. 4.
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12Chinese Communist presence at the meeting. Secretary
Dulles did not attend the Indochina phase of the Geneva
Conference and let Undersecretary of State Walter B. Smith 
13take over. Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chou En-lai,
on the other hand, played a leading role at the Conference
and the resulting Geneva Agreement was a de facto partition
14of Indochina, a great setback for the free world.
The United States had not been in a position to demand
a better bargain for the West and subsequently did not sign
the Geneva Agreement. After the Geneva Conference, the
American Government was determined to take positive steps
to make a regional collective security arrangement to resist
15further communist expansion in Asia. In addition to a
12During Secretary Dulles' attendance at the Geneva 
Conference, he did not speak a word to the Chinese Communists, 
and refused to shake hands with Chou En-lai. The Communists 
complained privately about these snubs. See Edgar Snow,
The Other Side of the River (New York: Random House, 1961),
pp. 94-95.
13The Geneva Conference consisted of two phases. The 
first phase (April 28 to June 10, 1954) dealt with unsettled 
problems on Korea. The second phase (June 11 to July 26, 1954) 
centered on securing a peaceful settlement in Indochina. The 
decision of Secretary Dulles not to attend the Indochina phase 
of the conference disappointed the western powers. See George 
McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United States in Vietnam 
(New York: The Dial Press, revised edition, 1967) , p. 60.
Secretary Dulles explained the American position with a 
statement on July 15. Text in Documents on American Foreign 
Policy, 1954 (New York: Harper & Brothers, for the Council
on Foreign Relations, 1955), p. 283.
14A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 304.
15After the Geneva Agreement on Indochina was signed, 
Secretary Dulles indicated the American attitude in his press
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proposed Southeast Asian defense pact, the United States
also gave active consideration to a mutual defense treaty
16which Nationalist China desired.
When President Eisenhower, in his news conference on
July 22, 1954, confirmed the press report that the United
States was prepared to negotiate a mutual defense treaty
with the Nationalist Government, it aroused furious reaction
from the Chinese Communists. Their first response came from
the New China News Agency, the official news agency of the
Peking regime, on July 25. The report said that "United
States plans for concluding a so-called American-Chiang
Kai-shek bilateral mutual security pact are adding to the
determination of the Coastal Defense Units of the Chinese
People's Liberation Army to maintain their vigilance and
17work for the liberation of Taiwan." In his report on 
foreign affairs at ,the Central People's Council on August 
11, the Red Chinese Premier and Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, 
gave a lengthy exposition on Formosa. Ife said that the 
United States was "seeking to extend armed intervention by
(cont'd) conference on July 23, 1954. "The 
important thing from now on," he said, "is not to mourn the 
past but to face the future opportunity to prevent the loss 
in northern Vietnam from leading to the extension of communism 
throughout Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific." D.S.B., 
XXXI, No. 788 (August 2, 1954), p. 163.
16Rankin, China Assignment, p. 186.
17American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of 
China Mainland Press, No. 855 (July 24-26, 1954), p. 4.
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more intensive use of the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek group,
fugitive on Taiwan, for carrying on a war of harassment and
18destruction against our mainland and coastal areas." He
said that the Chinese Nationalist Government "is further
reorganizing its armed forces and blustering about prepara-
19tions for an attack on the mainland." As negotiations 
were in progress "by the U.S. aggressive circles with the 
traitorous Chiang Kai-shek group for the conclusion of a 
so-called bilateral treaty of mutual security," Chou ex­
pressed the Communist opposition in most forceful terms.
He stated:
The liberation of Taiwan is an exercise of 
China's sovereignty and it is China's own internal 
affair: we brook no foreign interference. Any
treaties concluded between the United States Govern­
ment and the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek group en­
trenched on Taiwan would be illegal and without any 
validity whatever. If any foreign aggressors dare 
to prevent the Chinese people from liberating Taiwan, 
if they dare to infringe upon our sovereignty and 
violate our territorial integrity, if they dare to 
interfere in our internal affairs, they must take 
upon themselves all the grave consequences of such 
acts of aggression.^0
So far the United States had made no legal commitment 
to defend Formosa against communist attack. President Tru­
man's statement of neutralizing Formosa and President
18Documents on International Affairs, 1954 (London: 
Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of Inter­
national Affairs, 1957), p. 318.
19Ibid., p. 319.
20Ibid., p. 320.
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Eisenhower's subsequent pronouncement of deneutralization 
were executive orders which could be terminated at will by 
any future President. If the United States Government con­
cluded a mutual defense treaty with the Nationalist Govern­
ment, its commitment to defend Formosa would be much harder 
to break. Conversely, the Communist "liberation" of Formosa 
would be a more difficult task to perform, for any serious 
attempt to assault Formosa would mean a war with the United 
States. Naturally, the Chinese Communists employed all the 
expression of protest they could muster to forestall a mutual 
defense treaty between Washington and Taipei. In the mean­
time, the Communist military buildup along the South China
coast facing Formosa intensified, as if they were ready to
21carry out their professed aim of "liberating" Formosa.
The Difference Between Formosa and the Offshore Islands
Facing a mounting tension over Formosa, the American
attitude was a clear-cut one. In answer to a reporter who,
during a press conference on August 17, asked what would
happen if the Communists did attack Formosa, President
Eisenhower reminded his audience of the fact that the order
of the Seventh Fleet to protect Formosa from communist attack
was still in force. Therefore, he declared, "Any invasion
22of Formosa Would have to run over the Seventh Fleet." In 
21New York Times, August 15, 1954, sec. IV, p. 8.
22President Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1954, p. 718.
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spite of this firm American attitude, Radio Peking continued 
to propagate the shrill Communist cry to liberate Formosa.
When Admiral Felix B. Stump, Commander in Chief of
the United States Pacific Fleet, visited the Tachens, the
most easterly of the Nationalist-held offshore islands, with
four destroyers on August 19, the Communists gained new
accusations to level at the United States. - Radio Peking
declared that United States and Nationalist forces had
intruded into the Chinese seacoast and conducted "armed
23provocation" against the Chinese people. The Communists 
did not say what the provocation was as there could not 
actually have been any. Inasmuch as the United States 
recognized the Nationalist Government as the legal govern­
ment of China, it was not improper for its naval vessels to 
visit an island possession of a friendly government. How­
ever, a question came to the fore as to whether the Presi­
dent's order to defend Formosa included the Nationalist- 
held offshore islands.
In answer to a newsman's inquiry on that point in his 
press conference on August 24, Secretary Dulles said that 
the basic instruction to the Seventh Fleet was to defend 
Formosa, but the defense of the offshore islands "might from 
a military standpoint be so ultimately connected with the 
defense of Formosa that the military would be justified in
23New York Times, August 20, 1954, p. 3.
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concluding that the defense of Formosa comprehended a
24defense of those [offshore] islands." As a further ex­
planation, Dulles said that some of the offshore islands 
might have radar equipment and early-warning devices upon 
them that were related to the defense of Formosa. There­
fore, he maintained that whether or not to help defend the
25offshore islands "would be primarily a military decision." 
For the moment, the "buck" was passed, but the question had 
to be answered.
The Nationalists held more than thirty offshore 
islands after they retreated to Formosa from the Chinese 
mainland. These islands were strung out on a 350-mile belt
along the South China coast, and their proximity to the
\
mainland ranged from five to twenty miles. They could be 
roughly divided into four main groups, the Quemoy group in 
the south, the Tachen groups in the east, and the Matsu 
group and Nanki groups between the others. These islands 
commanded strategic positions in relation to the Communist 
ports on the mainland: Quemoy opposite the port of Amoy,
Matsu opposite the port of Foochow, Nanki opposite the port 
of Wenchow, and the Tachens opposite the port of Ningpo.
The Nationalists used the offshore islands as bases 
for commando-type raids on the mainland, spying activities,
24Ibid., August 25, 1954, p. 8.
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and leaflet-dropping. They were no less important as 
temporary stations for the Nationalist Navy while performing 
blockade duties on mainland ports. The Nationalist Govern­
ment proclaimed the Communist-held mainland ports closed 
after the retreat to Formosa. The Nationalist Government 
justified the blockade on the grounds that it was the legal 
government of China, and as such was within its rights. The 
blockade, however, was not strictly enforced partly due to
insufficient naval strength and partly because of political
2 6considerations. The Nationalist blockade, while it did 
not always prevent foreign vessels from sailing into and out 
of mainland ports, hampered the Communist coastal navigation 
to a degree. It also served as a reminder that the Communists 
were still not the complete masters of China. For these 
reasons, the existence of Nationalist-controlled offshore 
islands presented a problem to the Communists.
Since the American attitude toward the defense of 
the offshore islands was not clear, the Chinese Communists 
were prepared to take advantage of the situation. On August 
26, 1954, forty communist raiders struck on Quemoy island, 
the main island of the Quemoy group, but were repelled by 
the Nationalist garrison. On September 3, the Communists 
began the first of a series of heavy bombardments of Quemoy. 
Twice previously/ the communists had failed in major attempts
2 6This writer's personal knowledge, as a former 
official in the Nationalist Government, confirms the report 
in the New York Times, September 26, 1954, Sec. IV, p. 10.
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to seize the island. By shelling Quemoy heavily and suddenly, 
it appeared that a third adventure was in the making.
American Involvement in the Offshore Islands
Whether the United States should help the National­
ists defend the offshore islands posed a difficult question 
to Washington. The status of the offshore islands was 
different from that of Formosa. The Allied Peace Treaty 
with Japan, singed in September 1951, stated: "Japan
renounces all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the 
27Pescadores." However, the Peace Treaty designated no
beneficiary, and was purposely so arranged because there
28were two claimants to be the government of China. There­
fore, it might be said that the status of Formosa was still 
undetermined. The offshore islands, on the other hand, had 
been historically attached to China, and no questions arose
27Article 2, Session (b) of the Treaty. Text in 
U.S. Department of State, American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: 
Basic Documents (2 vols.; Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1957), I, p. 426.
2 8Speaking on behalf of the United States at the San 
Francisco Conference on September 5, 1951, John Dulles said: 
"Some Allied Powers suggested that article 2 should not 
merely delimit Japanese sovereignty according to Potsdam, 
but specify precisely the ultimate disposition of each of 
the ex-Japanese territories. This, admitted, would have 
been neater. But it would have raised questions as to 
which there are row no agreed answers. . . . Clearly, the
wise course was to proceed now, so far as Japan is concerned, 
leaving the future to resolve doubts by invoking international 
solvents other than this Treaty." D .S .B ., XXV, No. 638 
(September 17, 1951), pp. 454-55.
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29as to their status. As President Eisenhower wrote,
"If, therefore, the United States were to intervene in the 
contest over these [offshore] islands, this country tech­
nically would be participating in a Chinese civil war."^
The problem was further complicated by the fact
that the United States had become involved in the offshore
islands in a somewhat unconscious manner. As a result, a
certain moral commitment had developed. When the Korean
War broke out, General MacArthur took notice of the
Nationalist-held offshore islands. He commented that they
were important from the standpoint of an eventual landing
31on the mainland, but had no value to the United States. 
However, soon afterward the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) had established bases on some of the offshore islands, 
including Quemoy, under the cover name of "Western Enter­
prise, Inc.," to do "business." The Western Enterprise, 
Inc., was responsible, among other things, for organizing
29This was also the American attitude, which Secre­
tary Dulles stated on December 1, 1954, and later was 
repeated by a legal advisor of the State Department. See 
the State Department press release on December 1, 1954, in 
D.S.B.-, XXXI, No. 807 (December 13, 1954), p. 896; and Ely 
Maurer, "Legal Problems Regarding Formosa and the Offshore 
Islands,"in Ibid., XXXIX, No. 1017 (December 22, 1958), 
p. 1005.
30Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 461.
31Averell Harriman's memorandum to President Truman, 
reporting on his assigned trip to Tokyo to talk with General 
MacArthur in early August, 1950. It was partially reprinted 
in Truman*s Memoirs, II, p. 353.
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and equipping the Nationalist commandos to launch sporadic
32raids on the South China coast.
When an American Military Assitance and Advisory 
Group (MAAG) was established on Formosa in May, 1951, its 
mission of equipping and training the Nationalist forces 
was limited to Formosa, and did not extend to the offshore 
islands. This was consonant with the Seventh Fleet*s 
mission to shield Formosa, which likewise did not include 
the offshore islands. After the Eisenhower Administration 
took office, the change of high military command in Washing­
ton contributed to a gradual altering of the American mili­
tary policy toward Formosa. Admiral Arthur Radford,
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, was promoted to
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in May, 1953, and
thus became top military man in the Pentagon. Admiral Radford
was known to favor a hard line against the Chinese 
33Communists.
32This writer's personal knowledge confirms the 
report in Stewart Alsop's article, "The Story Behind Quemoy: 
How We Drifted Close to War," Saturday Evening Post,
December 13, 1958, p. 87.
33According to Norman Graebner, Radford had made no 
secret of his belief that the Red Chinese regime must be 
destroyed even if it required a fifty-year war to accom­
plish it. Norman A. Graebner, The New Isolation, A Study 
in Politics and Foreign Policy since 1950 (New York: The
Ronald Press Co., 1956), p. 155. Also, James Reston, "The 
United States Policy Formation," New York Times, September 12, 
1954, Sec. IV, p. 10.
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While the Nationalists had not been able to fortify
their military posts on the offshore islands without
American military aid during the Truman Administration,
the Communists had been stepping up their military buildup
in the coastal areas facing the offshore islands since the
34truce negotiations began in Korea. A military imbalance
between the two sides was developing. In early 1953, the
opinion of American military advisors on Formosa was that
if the Nationalists really wanted to hold the offshore
islands, they should improve the defense of the islands,
and that this could be done by moving in some American-
equipped and trained Nationalist units from Formosa without
35objection from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was 
tantamount to encouraging the Nationalists to put more of 
their military stakes on the offshore islands. The National­
ists were hesitant to do that.
.As this had been mentioned informally without any
action having been taken, Ambassador Rankin decided to "try
3 6to bring matters to a head." It is doubtful that he had 
received prior instructions from the State Department. On 
July 6, Rankin visited President Chiang to discuss the 
offshore islands. Chiang was particularly worried about the
34Rankin, China Assignment, p. 167.
35Ibid., p. 168.
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plight of the easternmost Tachen group, 200 miles away from
Formosa, because air support would not be immediately
available in case of communist assault. . Rankin comforted
him and remarked that similarly exposed islands, such as
Corregidor and Malta, had withstood months and years of
assault during World War II. Rankin stressed that a
37determined defense could help to deter aggression.
During the talk President Chiang asked Ambassador 
Rankin to transmit three requests to the State Department. 
First, that the United States give renewed consideration to 
integrating the offshore islands into the Formosa defense 
system. Second, pending such a decision, that the United 
States Government make public expression of American interest 
in the offshore islands so as to deter the Communists. Third, 
that the American Government provide the Nationalists with 
shallow draft naval craft to be used in the offshore islands 
area. Rankin consented to forward these requests, but told 
Chiang that it would be unwise to expect quick answers.
Rankin reminded him that the Communists might attack the 
offshore islands at any moment and that the Nationalists
3 8could not count on American assistance "on short notice."
This was to urge Chiang to come to a decision whether or not 
to strengthen the offshore islands defense with or without
37T, . .Ibid.
38Ibid., p. 169.
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later American assistance. Before Rankin left Chiang said
that he would follow the American military advice to improve
the defense of the offshore islands.
In early February of 1953 Ambassador Rankin commented
in a State Department policy review that if the Nationalist
armed forces "were intended for possible combat other than
in defense of Formosa," he was in favor of expanding
American military assistance to the offshore islands and
placing the responsibility for various anti-communist
guerrilla activities mounted from the offshore islands
39under the "purview" of MAAG. It is not known whether or
not Washington approved Rankin’s proposition that the possible
use of the Nationalist forces for other than the defense of
Formosa might be anticipated, but his recommended action
was carried out. Soon afterward, the offshore islands
became eligible to receive American military equipment, but
40little was available until 1954. The activities of Western 
Enterprise, Inc., on the offshore islands were gradually dis­
continued in early 1954. Meanwhile, officers and men of 
MAAG came to the islands to take an active part in preparing
39The State Department policy review toward the 
Nationalist China was sent to Ambassador Rankin near the 
end of the Truman Administration and he was requested to 
comment on it. Rankin, China Assignment, pp. 150-52.
40Thomas R. Philips (Brigadier General, U.S.A., Re­
tired), "Quemoy and Formosa As I Saw Them," Reporter,
April 21, 1955, p. 32.
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41defenses. The sudden Communist bombardment of Quemoy on 
September 3, 1954, dramatized the American involvement in 
the offshore islands. On the first day of heavy artillery 
barrage, two American senior officers of MAAG were killed 
on Quemoy.
American Response to Quemoy Shelling
At this time, President Eisenhower was vacationing in
Denver and Secretary Dulles was in Manila, negotiating a
Southeast Asia collective security treaty. Therefore, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington were the first to react
to the Communist bombardment of Quemoy. As they regarded
it to be a probable prelude to an invasion of Quemoy, the
Joint Chiefs immediately proposed that the Nationalist Air
Forces be permitted to take defensive action by bombing the
Communist military targets across from Quemoy. The President
42approved this recommendation. After the initial response, 
the Joint Chiefs deliberated on the strategic value of the 
offshore islands in relation to Formosa. They concluded 
that the offshore islands were not militarily essential 
to the defense of Formosa, and that the Nationalists could
43not hold the offshore islands without American assistance.
41Ibid. See also Alsop, "The Story Behind Quemoy,"
p. 87.
42Ibid. Also, Chalmers M. Roberts, "Battle on 'the 
Rim of Hell': President vs. War Hawks," Reporter, Decem­
ber 16, 1954, p. 12.
43Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 463.
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However, the Joint Chiefs, with the exception of 
General Matthew Ridgway, the Army Chief, recognized that 
the loss of the offshore islands to the Communists would 
have disastrous psychological consequences for the National­
ists. Therefore, Admiral Radford, the Chairman, supported 
by the Chiefs of the Air Force and Navy, proposed to order 
American naval and air forces to assist in the Nationalist 
defense of ten selected offshore islands, including Quemoy. 
The dissenting opinion of General Ridgway stated that the 
Joint Chiefs should not base their judgement on non-military 
considerations. From a military viewpoint, Ridgway believed 
that if the United States decided to defend the offshore 
islands, military action could not be limited to air and sea
operations alone, and consequently would spread to a full-
44scale war against Communist China. President Eisenhower
did not act on this three to one majority recommendation.
He decided to hold a National Security Council meeting at
Denver on September 12, with the return and participation
45of Secretary Dulles.
Secretary Dulles, after concluding the SEATO treaty 
in Manila, stopped at Taipei to confer with Generalissimo
44Ibid., and Harold H. Martin, Soldier: The Memoirs
of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956),
pp. 278-79.
45This decision of President Eisenhower was reportedly 
made at the suggestion of Walter B. Smith, his former mili­
tary subordinate and then Undersecretary of State. Alsop, 
"The Story Behind Quemoy," p. 87.
Chiang on September 9 before returning to the United States.
It was the first time that an American Secretary had ever
visited Formosa. Upon arrival at Taipei, Dulles said, "The
United States is proud to stand with those, who, having
passed through so many trials, are yet courageously sus-
46tained by a faith that will not be subdued. As to the
crisis developing in the Formosa Strait, Dulles said, "Red
China is now intensifying its military and propaganda
activity against Free China, but we shall not be intimi- 
47dated." He stressed, "Our Seventh Fleet orders issued
by the preceding Administration continue firm under the
4 8Eisenhower Administration." Dulles did not, however, specify 
whether the orders of the Seventh Fleet to protect Formosa ex­
tended to the offshore islands. During Secretary Dulles* 
five-hour visit in Taipei, the American military mission chief 
in Formosa, Major General William Chase, recommended to Dulles
that Washington announce American intentions to help the
49Nationalists defend the offshore islands.
On September 12, Secretary Dulles arrived at Denver 
to attend the scheduled National Security Council meeting, 
which was held for the ostensible reason of the President's, 
desire to hear Dulles' report on his Southeast Asia trip.
Before going to the Council meeting, Secretary Dulles had a 
press conference. With regard to the question whether or
4^New York Times, September 9, 1954, p. 3.
 ^^ Ibid.
4 8Ibid.
4^Rankin, China Assignment, p. 206.
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not the United States would defend the offshore islands, 
Dulles maintained his previous attitude that it was "a 
matter primarily for the military, at least in the first
instance, to recommend what is implicit in an effective
50 .defense of Formosa." The Secretary stated that during his
stopover in Taipei the Nationalists had neither asked nor 
had the United States promised to help defend the offshore 
islands.
The National Security Council meeting, in fact, 
centered on the discussion of the tension in the Formosa 
Strait. Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, asserted that now there were considerable military 
reasons for holding the offshore islands. The Chiefs 
except General Ridgway urged that the United States commit 
itself to defend the offshore islands and help the National­
ists bomb the mainland. President Eisenhower maintained 
that such action, if taken, would not be confined to Quemoy. 
The President tended to accept the dissenting view of 
General Ridgway as previously expressed. He said, "We're 
not talking now about a:limited, brush-fire war. W e 1re 
talking about going to the threshold of World War III. If
we attack China, we're not going to impose limits on our
51military actions, as in Korea." The President reminded
50New York Times, Spetember 13, 1954, p. 1.
51Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 464.
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his advisors, "If we get into a general war, the logical
enemy will be Russia, not China, and we fll have to strike
.-i „ 52there.
Secretary Dulles then described the complexity of
the offshore islands problem as he saw it. He explained
that the Communist bombardment of Quemoy was probing
American intentions and that it had to be stopped or the
United States would face disaster in the Far East. However,
he said that if the United States drew a line and committed
itself to defend the offshore islands, it might find itself
at war with Red China without allies. Faced with this
dilemma, Dulles advanced an alternate course of action. He
said, "We should take the offshore islands question to the
United Nations Security Council with the view of getting
there an injunction to maintain the status quo and institute
a cease fire in the Formosa Strait. Whether Russia vetoes or
53accepts such a plan the United States will gain." It was 
a means of wresting initiative from the Communists. The 
President accepted Dulles' recommendation.
While the National Security Council did not decide 
that the United States would help defend the offshore islands, 
Secretary Dulles, after the Council meeting, told newsmen,
"The defense of Quemoy is primarily related to the defense
52Ibid.
53t, . , Ibid.
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54of Formosa and it is being considered in that light." 
Meanwhile, the naval arm of the United States, the Seventh 
Fleet, had been intensifying its patrol in the Formosa 
Strait ever since the Communist shelling of Quemoy. The 
chief of American military mission on Formosa, Major General 
Chase, led a group of MAAG officers in a visit to Quemoy 
on September 11, showing keen American interest there. All 
these signs marked the beginning of a persistent United 
States attitude intended to keep Red China guessing as to 
American intentions in the defense of the offshore islands.
54New York Times, September 13, 1954, p. 2.
CHAPTER III
AMERICA IN THE MIDDLE
Artillery Coupled with Propaganda
After the start of the bombardment of Quemoy, the 
Communist propaganda drive to "liberate" Formosa reached 
a high pitch. A leading article in the People's Daily on 
September 5 proclaimed: "Taiwan compatriots! We have every
confidence that Taiwan will be liberated. Your distress 
will be over. Your days of freedom and happiness will 
arrive. Final victory is ours I I n  a foreign policy 
speech delivered before the National People's Congress on 
September 23, Chou En-lai told 1,200 delegates that the 
"liberation" of Formosa was an urgent task. He said, "As 
long as Taiwan is not liberated, China's territory is not 
intact. China cannot have a tranquil environment for peace­
ful construction and peace in the Far East and throughout
2the world is not secure." In the Communist drive for 
liberating Formosa, Chou stressed Peking's "indestructible"
^■Quoted in Richard L. Walker, China Under Communism,
The First Five Years (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1955), p. 319.
2Important Documents Concerning the Question of 
Taiwan, p. 148.
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friendship with the Soviet Union and its close ties with
3
other "people's democracies."
A closer tie, indeed, was fostered between the Soviet 
Union and the Chinese Communist regime in 1954. Nikita 
Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist 
Party, led an impressive Soviet delegation to Peking on 
September 28 to participate in the celebration of the fifth
anniversary of the Chinese Communist regime and to nego-
4tiate a series of agreements. In a speech delivered before 
a large crowd in Peking on September 30, Khrushchev ex­
pressed Soviet support of the objective of the Chinese 
Communists of "liberating" Formosa. He said, "The Soviet 
people deeply sympathize with the noble cause of the great 
Chinese people, support the Chinese people in their deter­
mination to liberate their suffering brothers from the 
oppression of the Chiang Kai-shek brigands on Taiwan, and
5
to eliminate the Chiang Kai-shek brigands on the Island."
On October 1, the Chinese Communist Defense Minister, 
Peng Teh-huai, echoed the Soviet support by issuing "an 
order of the day to all commanders and fighters of the 
Chinese Liberation Army" in which he declared:
^Ibid.
4
Seven Sino-Soviet accords and policy statements of 
significance were made during Khrushchev’s mission to Peking. 
Texts in Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents 
on International Affairs, 1954, pp. 321-27.
5
New York Times, October 1, 1954, p. 5.
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It is the glorious duty of the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army to liberate Taiwan. . . .
In order to liberate Taiwan . . .  I give 
you these orders: hold yourselves constantly
prepared for combat . . .®
The Sino-Soviet solidarity on the question of 
Formosa was further expressed in their joint declaration 
on October 12. It stated:
The overt acts of aggression committed by 
the United States against the Chinese People's 
Republic, and especially its continued occupation 
of a part of the CPR's territory, the island of 
Taiwan, and also the military and financial support 
it is sending the enemies of the Chinese people, 
the Chiang Kai-shek clique, are incompatible with 
the task of maintaining peace in the Far East and 
lessening international tension.^
All communist propaganda was aimed at depicting that 
American "occupation" of Formosa was the cause of tension 
in the Far East, and that consequently it endangered the 
peace of the world. As a part of this propaganda scheme, 
Chou En-lai sent a cable to the Secretary General of the 
United Nations on October 10, to renew his charge of United 
States "aggression of China's-territory of Taiwan," a 
repetition of his abortive attempt in August 1950. Chou 
urged the Security Council to stop "aggressive action by 
the United States in interfering with Chinese people's 
liberation of Taiwan and to call on the United States to 
withdraw all their armed forces and military personnel
Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 900 (October 1-3, 
1954), p. 8.
7
Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954, p. 326
51
g
from the island." He accused the United States of using 
the Nationalists to carry on a "war of harassment and 
destruction" against the Chinese mainland, as well as
9
piratical attacks on foreign ships trading with Peking.
The American chief delegate to the United Nations, 
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., at first refused to 
receive a copy of Chou’s cable, as he thought it was unduly 
circulated by the Secretary General.^  The Soviet delega­
tion promptly backed up the Communist move by calling upon 
the General Assembly on October 15 to place an additional 
item of American "aggression" against Communist China on 
the current agenda as an urgent matter. In its explanatory 
memorandum, the Soviets charged that the United States 
Seventh Fleet "are staging provocative naval demonstrations 
off the Chinese coast and providing cover for the Chiang 
Kai-shek warships and aircraft which are continuing acts 
of provocation against the People’s Republic of China.
Thus, it accused the United States of having converted
the area around Formosa into a "breeding ground for a new 
12war." The Russian delegate asked the General Assembly
g
The Times (London), October 15, 1954, p. 1.
^Ibid.
^ New York Times, October 15, 1954, p. 1.
■^Text of the Soviet memorandum in New York Times, 
October 16, 1954, p. 2.
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to pass the Soviet draft resolution to condemn the United 
States.
Ambassador Lodge promptly branded as a "plain lie"
the Soviet allegation that the United States was engaged
13in aggressive action "in Formosa or anywhere else."
Nevertheless, the General Assembly acceded to the Soviet
request and placed the item on the agenda. During the debate,
the United States Representative, C. D. Jackson, listed
seven major acts of aggression committed by the Chinese
Communists since 1950. He deplored that those who supported
Red China in the United Nations should have regarded a
posture of resistance as "aggression." "To bow to this
demand," Jackson said, "would be to adopt the principle that
self defense against communist attack is an international 
14crime." The Soviet draft resolution was overwhelmingly 
defeated, first, in the Political Committee and then in the 
plenary session of the General Assembly on December 10 and 
17, respectively.
Right Wing Republicans Impatient
Since the presidential election campaign of 19 52 
in the United States, the Republican Party had professed to 
discard the old policy of containment and to offer a new
^ Ibid. , p. 1.
14C. D. Jackson, "Soviet Propaganda Charges Against 
U.S. Effort to Deter Aggression in Asia," D .S .B ., XXXI,
No. 808 (December 20, 1954), p. 962.
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15policy of liberation. It was supposed to be a policy of 
action/ which would give "more bang for a buck." President 
Eisenhower’s order deneutralizing Formosa in February 1953 
appeared to be a start in that direction, but nothing 
followed. Republican Senator William F. Knowland of Califor­
nia had been an outspoken critic of American Far Eastern 
policy during the Truman administration and he felt free to
voice his opinion on Asian policy under the Eisenhower Adminis
16tration as well. In his Collier1s article of January 24, 
1954, Senator Knowland expressed what he thought would be 
a desirable China policy:
If we fail to take a strong stand behind
Chiang Kai-shekrs government and their claim to
their rightful homeland, we are in effect handing 
all of Asia to the Communist gang. We have lost 
ground to the Communists in Indo-China, and we 
allowed the Chinese Reds to stop us in Korea.
. . . One more defeat at the hands of the Communists
in Asia will spell disaster. . . . We must be pre­
pared, then, to go it alone in China if our allies 
desert us. '
Nevertheless, the United States tolerated the parti­
tion of Indochina in July 1954 without taking action. Now,
15Hans J. Morgenthau, "John F. Dulles," in An Un­
certain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the
Twentieth Century, ed. by Norman A. Graebner (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Co., 1961), p. 293.
16In a bitter memorandum of August, 1949, Senator 
Knowland and others termed the China White Paper "a 1,054- 
page whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which has 
succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of Soviet con­
quest." Quoted in Graebner, New Isolation, p. 45.
17William F. Knowland, "Be Prepared to Fight in 
China," Collier * s , January 24, 1954, p. 120.
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confronted with the Chinese Communist bombardment of Quemoy 
island with the possible attempt to seize it by force, the 
Administration took the less positive attitude of keeping 
Peking guessing as to American intentions. There were 
reasons to be alarmed at the unchecked communist expansion 
and challenge in Asia. Senator Knowland expressed his con­
cern over the situation in an article for Collierfs pub­
lished on October 1, 1954. The article carried the striking 
title: "We Must Be Willing to Fight Now." The highlights
of the article were made known in advance. Knowland warned,
"The free world must face up to this grim threat now, for
18tomorrow may be too late." He maintained:
We and our allies must, as quickly as possible 
draw a line in Asia and notify the communists that 
if they cross it, they must fight. The free nations 
should let Red China know that if she invades—  
directly, as in Korea or indirectly, as in Indochina-- 
any territory we have undertaken to defend, she 
must take the consequences not only on the violated 
land, but on her own mainland.
To avoid a Communist world, we of the United 
States and other free nations must be willing to 
fight now, if necessary.-*-^
Senator Knowland conceded, "It will not be easy to
draw a so-far-and-no-farther line against the Communists
20in Asia, but we must try to do so."
1 o
William F. Knowland, "We Must Be Willing to Fight 
Now," Collier's, October 1, 1954, p. 23.
19Ibid.
20Ibid.
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This kind of war-like pronouncement alarmed the
Democrats. Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee charged
pointedly that a 1 sinister group" including Senator Knowland,
apparently was trying to get the United States into a
full-scale war with Communist China. He said that the
21Administration must share "partial" blame for it. Adlai 
Stevenson, the titular head of the Democratic Party, also 
assailed the foreign policy of the Eisenhower Administra­
tion. He said that President Eisenhower and his advisors 
talked loudly of bipartisanship in foreign policy, but 
"they haven't been able to establish bipartisanship within 
the Republican Party." Stevenson singled out Senator
Knowland as the one who "takes a pot shot at the President's
22policy every few days."
Adlai Stevenson's estimation of Knowland*s behavior 
was accurate. Senator Knowland very soon formally ex­
pressed his dissatisfaction with the Administration's 
foreign policy when he interrupted the scheduled proceedings 
in the Senate and delivered his statement on November 15.
It was just one day before a meeting of senior members of
Congress in the White House at the invitation of President 
23Eisenhower. Senator Knowland warned that the Soviet Russia 
was "advancing the Trojan horse of coexistence" and that the
21New York Times, September 24, 1954, p. 17.
22Text in New York Times, October 10, 1954, p. 45.
^ I b i d . , November 16, 1954, p. 1.
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free nations might be "nibbled away" one by one under the
circumstances. As there was "clear and present danger,"
he proposed that Congress promptly summon the State and
Defense Departments officials and Joint Chiefs of Staff
for a full and critical review of the Administration’s
24foreign policy. Since the Democrats had won the mid­
term congressional election, Senator Knowland in effect 
assigned this task to the incoming Democratic Congress.
Secretary Dulles responded with a statement that 
he welcomed a discussion and review of foreign policy, but 
added: "I do not myself see any immediate emergency which
requires either that review or discussion should be on any
25different basis from what it normally is." As to the
situation in the Formosa Strait, Dulles said any communist
attempt to take Formosa would mean hostilities with the
United States. But he asserted that the United States would
not be drawn into any war except upon its own decision that
action was required, and that the United States wanted to
2 6maintain mobility of action in such a situation.
The President immediately, though indirectly, en­
dorsed the stand taken by Secretary Dulles. The White House 
Press Secretary, James Hagerty, said, "He [the President]
24Text in Ibid., November 16, 1954, p. 18.
25D.S.B., XXXI, No. 805 (November 29, 1954), p. 808.
2 6New York Times, November 17, 1954, p. 2.
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has often told me and said so publicly that he believes
we have one of the. wisest, most courageous and most dedicated
men in our history as Secretary of State--John Foster 
27Dulles." 7
In spite of the Administration's disapproving 
attitude toward his alarm. Senator Knowland said that he had 
no intention of resigning as Republican Senate leader be­
cause of his public difference with the President and
2 8Secretary Dulles over some aspects of foreign policy.
Soon afterward the President himself gave public indication
as to what his attitude would be toward dissidents in his
own party. In response to a newsman*s question whether
Senator Knowland*s opposition to the Administration on
several recent issues would be a threat to Republican
harmony in the new Congress, the President said, "I would
hope that the men with whom I have to work would not be
differing greatly from me in the main issues in which we
29have to work, or it would be extremely difficult."
The Communists * New Provocations
The Chinese Communists had kept the situation in 
the Formosa Strait tense by shelling Quemoy sporadically
2 8New York Times, November 21, 1954, p. 66.
29Transcript of the President*s news conference on
December 2, 1954, in President Eisenhower, Public Papers,
1954, p. 1078.
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after" commencing an intensive bombardment on September 3.
Tn spite' ocf the President's denial that the American Govern­
ment trad' prohibited the Nationalists from launching air 
raids against the mainland coastal area, the Nationalist
Government was strictly advised not to bomb the mainland to
30a degree more than justified as a defensive measure. In 
early November, the Communists shifted their target from 
Quemoy to. the Tachen group, the most weakly defended of 
the Nationalists' offshore islands. The Communists began 
to use airplanes to bomb the Tachen group in addition to 
artillery fire. The little war that developed in the Tachen 
area was highlighted by Communist torpedo boats which 
attacked and sank a Nationalist 1,800-ton destroyer. The 
Nationalist Foreign Minister George Yeh called this inci­
dent:,. which was a sneak attack during mid-night hours, a 
Communist "atrocity." He said, "This is a test of the moral
3:0The press declared on October 8, 1954, that the 
American Government had advised the Nationalists to halt 
air raid's on the mainland but officials in Washington re­
fused to confirm this report. This was the exact time that 
Ambassador Rankin made the suggestion to Washington that 
the MAAG. in Formosa should advise the Nationalist military 
authorities to restrain their air raids. There had been a 
difference of opinion between the Ambassador and the MAAG 
o il  the: matter. Cf. Rankin, China Assignment, p. 207. When 
President Eisenhower during a news conference on November 10, 
19:54., said that the United States Government did not "order" 
the Nationalist Government to halt air raids, it was true 
in. that sense. However, the Nationalists deferred to the 
American military opinion that it would be undesirable to 
raid the mainland more than was necessary as a necessary 
measure... President Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1954, p. 1034.
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position of a free nation, a test to find out how the United
31States and other nations will react to this atrocity."
This stirring remark caused no reaction from the United 
States.
As the bombardment of Quemoy, the renewed accusation
of American "aggression" in the United Nations, and the
attacks against the Tachen group had forced neither action
nor concession from the United States, the Chinese Communists
tried once more to irritate Americans by violating the most
treasured American value— the liberty of their fellow
citizens. On November 23, 1954, the Chinese Communists
announced that thirteen Americans had been indicted "for
having clandestinely crossed the Chinese border by plane to
32conduct espionage activity." In actuality, eleven of 
these men were crew members of a United States Air Force 
plane which had been shot down on January 12, 1953, in a 
leaflet-dropping operation over North Korea during the 
Korean War.^
According to the provisions of the Korean Armistice, 
all prisoners of war on both sides were to be repatriated
31New York Times, November 16, 1954, p. 7.
32"Judgement of the Military Tribunal of the Supreme 
People's Court of the People's Republic of China, November 23, 
1954," in Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954, p. 349.
33A statement by the U.S. Chief Delegate to the U.N., 
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., in the plenary session of the General 
Assembly on December 8, 1954, in ibid., p. 355.
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34not later than September 23, 1953, if they so desired.
Instead, the Chinese Communists retained these prisoners 
of war and sentenced them to imprisonment from four to ten 
years. On November 26, 1954, the American Government lodged 
a strong protest to the Chinese Reds through British diplo­
matic channels, as the United States did not recognize the 
Chinese Communist regime. The American statement told the 
Chinese Reds to bear in mind that "the long list of Chinese 
Communist outrages against American nationals, which the 
American people have borne with restraint thus far, is
significantly extended by the Chinese Communist announce-
35ment of November 23rd."
Senator Knowland was infuriated at the imprisonment 
of thirteen Americans on trumped-up charges of spying. On 
November 27, just one day after the State Departments note 
of protest, he held a press conference to advance his position 
on the matter without prior consultation with the State or 
Defense Departments. Knowland said, "If the Communists don't 
respond to our note and continue to hold our uniformed men 
in prison in direct violation of the Korean truce, with or 
without the support of the United Nations, we would be 
justified in clamping a tight blockade on China. We should
34Article III, Section 51 (a) of the Korean Armistice 
Agreement, Panmunjom, July 27, 1953. Text in Documents on 
International Affairs, 1953 (London: Oxford University Press 
for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956), 
p. 399.
^ D.S.B ., XXXI, No. 806 (December 6, 1954), pp. 856-57.
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serve notice on them that no vessel can get in or out of
3 6China until these Americans are released." He maintained 
that the United States should go it alone if her allies 
were not willing. Senator Knowland stressed, "We have the 
power to do this and the moral obligation to do it. Those 
associated with us in.the free world should cooperate but
37I don't think we should give them a veto on our actions."
The Eisenhower Administration, however, was not
inclined to take such drastic action against the Chinese
Communists. As the United States armed forces had been
in Korea to repel communist aggression under United Nations
command, it was deemed more desirable to seek the release
of the captives through the channels of the United Nations
rather than by taking unilateral action. In an address
delivered on November 29, Secretary Dulles said, "Our nation
has agreed with others, by the United Nations Charter, to,
try to settle international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace is not endangered.
Therefore, our first duty is to exhaust peaceful means of
sustaining our international rights and those of our citizens,
rather than now resorting to war action such as a naval
3 8blockade of Red China." This was an open rebuttal to
36New York Times, November 28, 1954, p. 1.
Ibid.
3 8Secretary Dulles' address delivered before the 4-H 
Congress in Chicago on November 29, 1954. D.S.B ., XXXI,
No. 807 (December 13, 1954), p. 890.
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Knowland*s proposal. As Secretary Dulles conceived it, the
Chinese Communists were trying to provoke the United States
into taking hasty action. He stressed, "Our nation will
react, and react vigorously, but without allowing ourselves
to be provoked into action which would impair the alliance
39of free nations."
President Eisenhower also counselled the American 
people to be patient, but he stressed that American re­
straint should not be interpreted "as appeasement or any
40purchase of immediate favor at the cost of principle."
The President reminded the American people that these
American airmen had been held by the Communists for two
years, so their timing of the announcement was a "deliberate"
act. The Communist intention, as he saw it, was "to goad
us into impulsive action in the hope of dividing us from our 
41allies." "The hard way," the President said, "is to have
courage to be patient, tirelessly to seek out every single
avenue open to us in the hope even finally of leading the
other side to a little understanding of the honesty of our 
42intention." The President disapproved of a naval blockade
40A statement issued at the White House on December 2, 
1954, in President Eisenhower, Pub1ic Papers, 1954, p. 1074.
41Ibid., p. 1075.
42Ibid., p. 1076.
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of mainland China as a means of hastening the release of 
the American airmen. Of this he said, "It is possible that 
a blockade is conceivable without war. I have never read 
of it myself.
As might be expected, the American protest of un­
lawful imprisonment of its airmen was outrightly rejected 
by the Chinese Communists. On December 4, the United States 
called on the General Assembly of the United Nations to
act "promptly and decisively" to bring about the release of
44the eleven flyers and all other captured personnel. The
sixteen nations who had contributed forces to the United
Nations effort in Korea gave solid support to the American
appeal. On December 10, the General Assembly overwhelmingly
passed a resolution condemning "the trial of prisoners of
war illegally detained after the date fixed by the Korean
armistice," and asked the Secretary General to make "con-
45tinuing and unremitting" effort to obtain their release.
Immediately afterward the Secretary General, Dag 
Hammarskjold, cabled Chou En-lai expressing his wish to 
visit Peking to discuss the matter of the imprisonment of 
American airmen. The Communist response was delayed for one
44United States note to the Secretary General of the 
U.N. on December 4, 1954. Text in New York Times, December 5, 
1954, p. 3, and in D.S.B., XXXI, No. 807 (December 13, 1954), 
p. 892.
^5Text in D.S.B., XXXI, p. 893.
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week. On December 17, Chou sent two cables to the Secre­
tary General. In the first cable Chou agreed to his visit
46to Peking to discuss "pertinent questions." In his
second cable, however, Chou denied that the United Nations
was competent to "interfere in China's conviction of full-
47proved United States spies." This demur, in fact, 
destroyed the whole basis on which the Secretary General's 
visit was projected. Nevertheless, Secretary General 
Hammarskjold journeyed to Peking in early January 1955, 
only to return empty-handed.
Conclusion of Mutual Defense Treaty
After the signing of a mutual defense treaty with
the Republic of Korea in October 1953, the United States
arranged mutual defense treaties with all its allies in
48the Western Pacific except Formosa. It was not due to
American lack of awareness of a missing link in the island
chain of the United States defense in that area, but due
to difficulties involved in the treaty negotiations. The
initial discussion on the matter had been made in December
19 53, and the main hurdle was the territorial scope of
49application with regard to the treaty.
^Text in New York Times, December 18, 1954, p. 3. 
47Ibid.
4 8Up to that time, the United States had concluded 
mutual defense treaties with the Philippines on August 30, 
1951; with Australia and New Zealand on September 1, 1951; 
and with Japan on September 8, 1951.
^Rankin, China Assignment, p. 195.
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There were two aspects to the question. In respect
to the "present" territory, the Nationalists desired to
include the offshore islands in addition to Formosa and the
Pescadores, but the United States would not agree. With
regard to the "lost" territory, mainland China, the
Nationalist Government suggested a clause corresponding
to that in the Sino-Japanese peace treaty of 1952, which
applied ". . . t o  all the territories which are now or
which may hereafter be, under the control" of the Nationalist 
50Government. This meant that the Nationalist Government 
would reserve its right to recover the mainland by launching 
a counter-attack whenever feasible. Washington tended to 
regard such a provision as too sweeping under the circum­
stances. And yet.if the territorial application was limited 
to Formosa and the Pescadores, it would be tantamount to
recognizing communist control of the Chinese mainland as
. 51permanent.
Anxiously seeking an American treaty commitment to 
defend Formosa, the Nationalist Government was willing to 
make concessions on some principles which it had cherished.
50In view of the fact that there were two claimants 
for the government of China, the San Francisco Peace Con­
ference invited neither to sign the peace treaty with Japan. 
However, by terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan 
was at liberty to choose one of them to sign a separate 
peace treaty. Japan decided to sign a bilateral peace 
treaty with the Chinese Nationalist Government on April 28, 
1952.
51Rankin, China Assignment, pp. 195-96.
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In June 1954 the Nationalist Government indicated that it
would agree to obtain the prior approval of the American
Government before undertaking any important military action
against mainland China so as to facilitate the treaty 
52negotiations. When Secretary Dulles visited Taipei on
September 9, 1954, he talked with Generalissimo Chiang about
53the treaty but the matter was still unsettled. After the
decision of the National Security Council on September 12
to bring the offshore islands question to the United Nations,
Secretary Dulles contacted the western powers behind the 
54scenes. In the meantime, Dulles sent Walter Robertson, 
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, to Taipei on 
October 14 to explain this American move. Chiang was 
bitterly opposed to the idea of a cease-fire through the 
United Nations, as it would mean the acceptance of a two- 
China concept. Chiang argued that the Nationalist Govern­
ment did not even have an American written agreement to
55defend Formosa.
The result of Robertson's visit was that the cease­
fire proposal in the Formosa Strait was shelved temporarily
52Nationalist Foreign Minister George Yeh told 
Ambassador Rankin on June 28, 1954. Rankin, China Assign­
ment , p . 197.
53Ibid., p. 207, and Merlo J. Pusey, Eisenhower the 
President (New York: Macmillan Co., 1956), pp. 162-63.
54Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 464.
55Chalmers M. Roberts, "Strong Man from the South," 
Saturday Evening Post, June 25, 1955, p. 109.
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while the negotiations on the mutual defense treaty moved
56at a quicker tempo. While attending the General Assembly 
annual meeting in New York, the Nationalist Foreign Minister 
George Yeh was responsible for negotiating the treaty with 
Washington, At one point during the negotiations, Secre­
tary Dulles was willing to include Quemoy and Matsu, the
offshore islands, under the American defense commitment,
57but President Eisenhower struck that out. The mutual
defense treaty was initialed on November 23, 1954 (the
same date that the Chinese Communists announced the spy
charges against the thirteen Americans), and was formally
signed in Washington on December 2.
The treaty consisted of a preamble and ten articles,
and the heart of the treaty was its provision on the
treaty area. It was so defined that "in respect to the
Republic of China, it was Taiwan and the Pescadores," but
it could extend "to such other territories as may be
58determined by mutual agreement." As to the American
defense commitment, it was the same as that stipulated in
other mutual defense treaties: "each party would act to
meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional 
59processes." The treaty would remain in force indefinitely
5 6Ibid., and Rankin, China Assignment, pp. 213-14.
57John R. Beal, John Foster Dulles: A Biography (New
York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp. 226-27.
CO
Article VI of the treaty. Text in D.S.B., XXXI,
No. 807 (December 13, 1954), p. 899.
59Article V of the treaty.
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bait: either party could terminate it one year after giving
. . 60notice.
After the signing of the treaty, Secretary Dulles 
Held a: press conference. He emphasized that the signifi­
cance of the treaty was to "put to rest once and for all 
rumors and reports that the United States will in any manner 
agree: to the abandonment of Formosa and the Pescadores to 
Communist c o n t r o l . " I n  the meantime, Dulles said that 
"technical sovereignty" over Formosa and the Pescadores had 
never been settled because the peace treaty with Japan
merely provided for a Japanese renunciation of its title
6 2and" right to those islands. When questioned about the 
offshore islands, he answered:
The position on the offshore islands is un­
affected by this treaty. Their status is neither 
promoted by the treaty nor is it demoted by the 
treaty. . . . The injunction to our armed forces
is to defend Formosa and the Pescadores. Now, 
whether or not in any particular case the defense 
of these offshore islands by reason of the nature 
of those islands or by nature of the attack against 
them is such that it is deemed part of the defense 
of Formosa, that would be a matter which on the 
first instance at least the military people would 
advise, and the president would probably make the 
final decision.
It was the familiar tactic of keeping the enemy 
guessing. In case of communist attack on Formosa henceforth,
^Article X of the treaty. 
61D.S.B., XXXI, No. 807, p. 898. 
^ Ibid. , p. 896 .
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Secretary Dulles indicated that the United States would take
retaliatory action which did not necessarily mean a
general war. He said, "It is a retaliation of sufficient
severity to make it clear that the aggressor cannot gain
64by his attack more than he loses." This was a distinctly
65modified version of Dullesr theory of massive retaliation.
While the treaty itself did not impose restrictions 
on the Nationalist initiative to launch attacks on main­
land China, restrictions were established in the form of an 
exchange of letters between Secretary Dulles and Nationalist 
Foreign Minister George Yeh on December 10. That exchange 
of letters set forth a policy:
In view of the * . . fact that the use of force
from either of these areas [under Chinese Nationalist 
control] by either party affects the other, it is 
agreed that such use of force will be a matter of 
joint agreement, subject to action of an emergency 
character which is clearly an exercise of the in­
herent right of self-defense. ^
Furthermore, it provided that the Nationalist mili­
tary "elements," pertaining to troops and armament received 
under the American assistance program, "will not be removed 
from the territories described in Art. VI [Formosa and the
^^Ibid., p. 898.
6 5Secretary Dulles 1 theory of massive retaliation 
was first expounded in his address delivered before the 
Council on Foreign Affairs on January 12, 1954. It was 
somewhat revised in his article on "Policy for Security 
and Peace" in Foreign Affairs, XXXII, No. 3 (April, 1954).
66Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954, p. 363.
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Pescadores] to a degree which would substantially diminish
the defensibility of such territories without mutual agree- 
67ment." With these double restrictions imposed upon the 
Nationalist Government and with an American military mission 
in Formosa on hand to guard against any possible unilateral 
action by the Nationalists, the Nationalists hope to launch 
a counter-attack on the Chinese mainland was, to all 
intents and purposes, ended. Thus, the Nationalists were 
”re-leashed" for good, if.they had ever been for a moment 
"unleashed" by the Eisenhower Administration. So far. as the 
American Government was concerned, nothing was left to be 
desired in its mutual defense treaty with the Chinese 
Nationalist Government. The exchange of letters was kept 
secret for a month, and was made known to the public on 
January 13, 1955.
In an effort to seek some sort of American commit­
ment to help defend the offshore islands, Nationalist 
Foreign Minister George Yeh proposed during a visit to the 
White House on December 20 that American assurance to pro­
vide the "logistic support" for the defense of the offshore 
islands would be "good psychological warfare." President
Eisenhower refused it, saying, "It would be a mistake to
6 8expand the treaty at this time." Obviously the Nationalist
68Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 466.
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Government did not derive full satisfaction from the scope 
and limitation of the mutual defense treaty, but it finally 
secured an American written commitment to defend Formosa.
The Sino-Soviet Reactions
In spite of the defensive nature of the mutual
defense treaty which was concluded between the American
Government and the Nationalist Government, the Chinese
Communist Foreign Minister Chou En-lai issued a lengthy
statement denouncing the treaty on December 8, 1954. He
distortedly interpreted the mutual defense treaty as an
aggressive move by the United States. Chou said, "By this
treaty, the United States Government attempts to legalize
its armed seizure of China’s territory of Taiwan, and with
Taiwan as a base, to extend its aggression against China
69and prepare a new war." He stressed:1
To liberate Taiwan and liquidate Chiang Kai-shek 
clique is a matter which falls entirely within the 
scope of China’s sovereignty and internal affairs 
and no interference by any foreign country will be 
tolerated. Threats of war cannot shake the deter- _ 
mination of the Chinese people to liberate Taiwan.
Chou warned that if the United States did not withdraw
its armed forces from the Formosa area, "it must take upon
71itself all the grave consequences."
69Extracts from Chou En-lai’s statement in Documents 
on International Affairs, 1954, p. 330.
70Ibid.
71Ibid., p. 331.
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The Soviet Government supported the Chinese Com­
munists in denouncing the mutual defense treaty. A state­
ment issued by the Soviet Foreign Ministry on December 15 
said that the Soviet Government "shares the position" 
formulated in Chou En-lai*s statement of December 8 that 
the treaty was "an interference in the internal affairs of
China, an attempt on her territorial integrity and places
72in danger the security of China and peace in Asia." The 
statement also said that the Soviet Government "fully 
supports" the demand of the Chinese Communists for the with­
drawal of American troops from Formosa and the Formosa
Strait and for the cessation of "the aggressive actions
73against the Chinese People*s Republic." The Soviet state­
ment, however, did not say what kind of support Russia 
would extend to the Chinese Communists in case a head-on 
armed conflict developed in the Formosa area between the 
United States and the Chinese Communists.
Thereafter the Communists continued to denounce the 
mutual defense treaty. On December 25, the National Committee 
of the Chinese People*s Political Consultative Conference 
issued a declaration in which it proclaimed:
The attempt by the aggressive circles in the 
U.S. to occupy Taiwan and extend aggression against 
China by means of their treaty with Chiang Kai-shek 
can only strengthen the Chinese people *s determination
7 2The Times (London), December 16, 1954, p. 8.
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to liberate Taiwan and^gut an end to the Chiang
Kai-shek traitor gang.
The United States Government considered communist 
denunciations of the mutual defense treaty too absurd to 
rebut. However, the communist charges that the American 
Government's signing of a treaty with the Nationalists was 
"an interference in the internal affairs of China" appeared 
to be plausible. Since there were two claimants to be the 
government of China, it could logically be construed as an 
act of American intervention in the Chinese civil war to 
sign a treaty with the Nationalist Government. Even so, it 
was not illegal for a state to intervene in a civil conflict. 
According to international law, historically it had not been 
forbidden a state to aid the legally recognized government 
of another state to put down insurrection, although Some 
recent authorities said that it was desirable to avoid 
doing s o . ^
Perhaps it was for this reason that the United 
States, since President Truman's order to neutralize For­
mosa in June 1950, had avoided expressing any American action 
regarding Formosa as an intervention in the Chinese civil 
war on the side of the Nationalists. The United States 
policy stressed the theme that sovereignty over Formosa had
74 ^Important Documents Concerning the Question of
Taiwan, pp. 174-75.
75Claude S. Philips, Jr., "The International Legal 
Status of Formosa," Western Political Quarterly, X, No. 2 
(June, 1957), pp. 284-85.
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never been settled, as the peace treaty with Japan in 
1951 conferred its title to no one. Though a valid argu­
ment, it was a two-edged sword. On the one hand, any action 
by the Chinese Communists to invade Formosa would constitute 
an attempt to seize by force a territory which did not 
belong to them. Such an action would contravene the prin­
ciples of international law and the explicit provisions of
7 6the United Nations Charter. In that case, there would be
ample justification to call for international action. On
the other hand, the United States Government had concluded
a mutual defense treaty with the Nationalist Government
which also had no clear legal title to Formosa. One critic
asserted, "We have a solemn compact with a government-in-
the-sky, a government with no legitimate site on the main-
77land or in Formosa." In this respect, the American
Government inevitably found itself in an awkward predica­
ment. It was even more embarrassing to the Nationalist 
Government in that it had nothing more than prescriptive
7 8"squatter's rights" to Formosa, as some scholars maintained.
7 6Article I, section 1, of the United Nations Charter 
provides, "The purpose of the United Nations are: . . .  to 
take effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of the threats to the peace, and for the suppression
of acts of aggression or the breaches of the peace. . . ."
7-7Herbert Elliston, "Question on the Formosa Treaty," 
Washington Post & Times Herald, February 9, 1955. Reprinted , 
in the Congressional Record, 84th Congress, 1st session, V. 
101, Part 2, p. 3519.
"7^ 0. Edmund Clubb and Eustace Seligman, The Inter­
national Position of Communist China (New York: Oceana
Publications Co., 1965), p. 29.
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An Issue in British Politics
1 ‘ ' - »P..V I—  " " I ■■■ » —     ■
The British Government recognized the Chinese Com­
munist regime in January 1951, marking a basic departure 
from the American policy. It was the Labor Government 
under Prime Minister Clement Attlee that extended this 
recognition to Peking. Prime Minister Attlee was eager to 
have the American Government follow suit. During his visit 
to Washington in early December 1950 after the Chinese 
Communists had joined in the Korean conflict, Premier Attlee
79advocated the admission of Red China into the United Nations.
He believed that withdrawing from Korea and Formosa, and 
giving the Chinese seat in the United Nations to the Com­
munists "would not be too high price" in order to avoid an
80all-out war with Communist China.
After the Korean armistice was concluded, and Attlee 
had become the leader of the party in opposition as a 
result of the Laborite defeat in the 1951 election, he did 
not hesitate to air openly his differences with the United 
States policy toward the Chinese Communists. While the 
Geneva Conference on Indochina was going on, Attlee, in the 
House of Commons, reopened the debate on the question of 
admitting Peking on July 14, 1954. "As far as Formosa and 
Chiang Kai-shek are concerned," he said, "the island should 
be placed under the control of the United Nations, and
79Truman, Memoirs, II, p. 406.
80Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 4 81.
76
81Chiang and his associates should be pensioned off."
Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in responding, took a
restrained position and maintained that it was not an
82opportune time to force the issue.
In the late summer of 1954 Attlee visited the Soviet
Union and mainland China. After arriving in Hong Kong from
Peking on September 2, he confirmed the news report that
Mao Tsu-tung had asked for British Labor Party support in
83securing a change of American policy on Formosa. On the
rest of his tour, Formosa was Attlee*s favorite topic.
While in New Zealand, Attlee told the reporters that he
"definitely" disapproved of the United States Seventh
Fleet’s role in protecting the Chinese Nationalist area of
Formosa; but he added, "That is a matter for the United 
84States."
Upon returning to London on September, 22 after his
round-the-world tour, Attlee said, "I think the sooner we
get rid of Chiang Kai-shek and his troops the better it 
85will be." On the eve of the Labor Party annual conference
81Excerpts from the debates in the House of Commons 
on July 14, 1954, in New York Times, July 15, 1954, p. 2.
8 2The substance of Prime Minister Churchill’s de­
fense, Ibid.
8 3New York Times, September 3, 1954, p. 1; and The 
Times (London), same date, p. 6.
84New York Times, September 15, 1954, p. 3.
8 5The Times (London), September 23, 1954, p. 6.
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held on September 27 at Scarborough, Attlee urged that 
Formosa be "reunited" with China and suggested that Chiang 
Kai-shek and his immediate adherents be retired to "a safe
Q g
place." The Soviet newspapers Pravda and Izvestia gave
87simultaneous coverage of Attlee’s speech.
As to the incumbent British Conservative Government’s
attitude, it had watched the events closely since the
Communist bombardment of Quemoy, and had established close
contact with the American Government. The Conservative
Government was worried lest a situation develop in the
Formosa Strait that would result in a further increase of 
8 8tension. When the mutual defense treaty between the
United States and Nationalist China was being negotiated,
the British Government had been kept informed of its general 
89lines. After the treaty was signed, the British Govern­
ment gave limited approval. On December 8, Foreign Secre­
tary Anthony Eden told the House of Commons: "Her Majesty’s
Government are satisfied that its object is to place rela­
tions between the United States Government and the National­
ist Chinese on such a basis as will result in a close degree
8 6New York Times, September 28, 1954, p. 2.
87Current Digest of the Soviet Press, VI, No. 39
(November 10, 1954), p. 17.
8 8The Times (London), December 2, 1954, p. 8; and 
New York Times, December 3, 1954, p. 3.
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90 . . .of consultation." He also said that the British policy
toward the offshore islands had been "to urge upon all 
concerned the danger of fighting and the importance of
91lowering tension and the avoidance of precipitate action."
So far this Conservative Government position satisfied the 
Laborites.
However, a dispute arose in London when Anthony
Nutting, Britain's Minister of State and chief United
Nations delegate, declared during a television appearance
in the United States that in the event of a communist attack
on Formosa, Britain would be "involved" as a member of the
United Nations. What Nutting said precisely in the National
Broadcasting Company television program, "Meet the Press,"
on December 12, 1954, was as follows:
Well, a communist Chinese attack on Formosa, 
of course, is an attack upon a member of the United 
Nations and would no doubt call for collective 
action by the United Nations, in which we would, 
of course, be involved, as a member of the U.N.
We are under an obligation to take action through 
the United Nations when a member of the United 
Nations is attacked, and we certainly took action 
pretty quickly, led by the United States, when 
Korea was attacked.
90The Times (London), December 9, 1954, p. 3. There 
is a Parliamentary session in The Times, which daily prints 
th^ major dialogues occurring in the Parliament the previous 
day.
92The transcript printed in "How Britain Feels About 
Backing U.S. on Formosa," U.S. News and World Report, 
December 24, 1954, p. 56.
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Nutting was perfectly correct in stating Britain's 
obligations under the United Nations, but he might have 
found a different way of saying it. The Laborites, there­
fore, immediately seized the opportunity to attack the
93Government, and demanded an official clarification.
On December 20 simultaneous debates on the question 
of Formosa were held in both chambers of the British Parlia­
ment. The Laborite attacks centered on two main points: 
the nature of Britain's commitment to the defense of Formosa 
and the status of Formosa.
In the House of Commons, Attlee, taking the lead, 
demanded that some statement should be made to correct 
the implication that Britain was bound to come to the aid 
of the United States "in the event of an attack on her
when engaged in a possible intervention in a civil war in 
94China." R. H. Turton, Parliamentary Under Secretary of
State, replied that no such statement would be made, for what
Nutting had said was a "perfectly factual situation of those
95who are members of the United Nations and who are not."
The Laborites argued that Formosa was not a sovereign state, 
and was not a member of the United Nations; therefore,
Britain had no obligation on that score. Attlee wanted to 
make it "perfectly clear" that "action of the United States
93The Times (London), December 14, 1954, p. 4.
94Ibid., December 21, 1954, p. 9.
95TV. ,Ibid.
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in Formosa is not an action of the United Nations" and that
"this country had no participation in it."96
In answer to a question about the present international
status of Formosa, the Marquis of Reading, Minister of
State, replied in the House of Lords that it was "somewhat
97difficult in international law." He explained that Japan 
had renounced sovereignty over Formosa in the peace treaty, 
but no beneficiary had been designated. Therefore, he said, 
"This Government does not regard it [ [Formosa] as forming 
part of the Chinese People's R e p u b l i c . W i t h  regard to 
Formosa, Reading stressed, "The Government has no obligation 
other than that arising out of our membership of the United 
Nations. "99
What the debates in the British Parliament indicated 
was that any move by the British Government toward a 
firmer support of the position of the United States on 
Formosa would court strong Laborite opposition.
The Chinese Communists tried to threaten the British 
Government for its support of the United States on the 
Formosa question. In a speech made in the People's Political 
Consultative Conference on December 21, Chou En-lai said that 
Britain was "vigorously following . . . dangerous" American
96Ibid. 
97Ibid. 
98Ibid. 
"ibid.
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policy on "certain major issues." Referring to the mutual 
defense treaty between the United States and Nationalist 
China, Chou said that Britain1s attitude had encouraged 
what he called the "seizure" of Formosa. He declared, "This 
contravenes the;obligation undertaken by the British Govern­
ment in many solemn international agreements and impairs 
the relations between China and Britain.
The British Government might ignore the threat from 
Peking, but it could ill afford not to be mindful to the 
clamors from the Laborites, especially as the next general 
election would be held in the spring of 1955. Aside from 
other considerations, domestic politics would require the 
British Government to chart a cautious course for its 
Formosa policy.
^ ^ ew York Times, December 27, 1954, p. 1.
CHAPTER IV
NATIONAL UNITY DISPLAYED: FORMOSA RESOLUTION
ADOPTED AND MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY RATIFIED
A Communist Show of Force
Following a well-publicized protest of the Mutual 
Defense Treaty signed on December 2, 1954, between the 
United States and the Chinese Nationalist Government,
Peking decided to force America’s hand by attacking the 
offshore islands, which were not specifically protected by 
the treaty. On January 10, 1955, the Chinese Communists 
employed one hundred airplanes of various types to raid 
the Tachen island group. One week later, on January 18, 
the Chinese Reds overran Yikiang Island in the Tachen group 
by amphibious assault with air support. It was the first 
time that the Chinese communists had made territorial gain 
in the Formosa Strait in the months of tension since the 
Quemoy bombardment on September 3, 1954.
Washington's initial reaction to this Communist 
military conquest was indifference. Secretary Dulles, 
after conferring with the President, held a news conference 
on January 18 to discount the importance of the loss of 
Yikiang to the Communists. He said that the Tachen islands 
to which Yikiang Island belonged were "not in any sense
82
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essential to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores 
which we do regard as vital to us."  ^ When a newsman asked 
about the possibility of a Nationalist-Communist cease-fire 
in the Formosa Strait, the Secretary replied that a cease­
fire would be in line with the broad policies of the United 
States and the United Nations in seeking peaceful solutions 
to controversial problems. Yet he also said that it was 
easier to discuss such matters in principle than it was to 
work them out in practice. Dulles expressed the view that 
the American Government would not object to a cease-fire 
arranged by the United Nations, but that he would not
initiate such a move without the concurrence of the Chinese
2Nationalist Government.
The next day, January 19, President Eisenhower in 
his news conference also said that the Tachen islands were
3
not "a vital element" in the defense of Formosa. His 
attitude, toward a cease-fire in the Formosa area was warmer 
than that of Secretary Dulles. He declared, "I should like
to see the United Nations attempt to exercise its good
4 .offices.1 However, he added, "Whether the United Nations
^New York Times, January 19, 1955, p. 3.
^Ibid.
3
Transcript of the President's news conference on 
January 19, 1955, President Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1955,
p. 186.
^Ibid.
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could do anything in this particular place, I don't know
because probably each side would insist that it was an
internal affair; although from our view point it might be
5
a good thing to have them take a look at the problem."
An Attempt to Draw A Line
Despite a seemingly indifferent attitude, the Adminis­
tration decided to reappraise its policy toward the offshore 
islands. After the capture of Yikiang Island, the Chinese 
Communists made it clear that this was a first step toward 
the "liberation" of Formosa. On January 19, the Jen Min Jih 
Pao (People's Daily) declared, "The victory shows that the 
Chinese people are unshakable in the determined will to
g
fight for the liberation of Taiwan."
Meanwhile, the Chinese Nationalist Government had
asked for American military assistance, particularly air
support, to help defend the rest of the Tachen islands.
Ambassador Rankin forwarded the Nationalist request and
recommended "most sympathetic considerations" on both politi-
7cal and psychological grounds. He believed that the loss 
of the Tachens "would, by undermining confidence in United 
States strength and determination, have a most unfortunate
g
effect on Chinese and Asian opinion."
^Ibid., p . 187.
^Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 972 (January 20, 
1955), p. 3.
7
Rankin, China Assignment, p. 220.
^Ibid.
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Thus far, American policy toward the offshore islands, 
as determined in the National Security Council meeting on 
September 12, 1954 in Denver, had been simply to take the 
question of a cease-fire to the United Nations without 
making a decision as to an American commitment, if any, to 
defend the islands. The cease-fire idea ran aground after 
Generalissimo Chiang rejected it during Assistant Secre­
tary of State Robertson1s visit to Taipei in October 1954.
As luck would have it, Communist military action against 
the offshore islands was limited to the artillery bombard­
ment until the seizure of Yikiang Island by a show of force.
As the President wrote, "The time had come to draw the
i • „ 9line.
On January 20, 1955, the second anniversary of 
General Eisenhower's term as President, a National Security 
Council meeting was held in the White House. During the 
meeting, Secretary Dulles said, "It is unlikely any of the 
offshore islands can be defended without large-scale 
American armed help. But we all agree that we cannot 
permit the Communists to seize all the offshore islands. 
Therefore, he proposed, "We must modify our policy: we
should declare that we will assist in the evacuation of 
the Tachens, but, as we do so, we should declare that we
9
Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 466.
1QIbid. , p. 467.
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will assist in holding Quemoy and Matsus [sic] as long as 
the Chinese Communists profess their intention to attack 
Formosa.11^  President Eisenhower approved the Secretary fs 
proposal and ordered implementation of this policy— an effort 
to hold a desirable line. However, as later development 
showed, this "line" had not been drawn explicitly.
A Request for Congressional Sanction
In order to implement the policy of drawing a line 
and holding it, it was necessary to serve a clear warning 
to the Chinese Communists. The policy might have run the
risk of war but not necessarily so. Herein lay a favored
idea of Secretary Dulles. In a speech delivered before the 
American Legion Convention at St. Louis on September 2,
1953, Dulles said:
The Korea War began in a way in which wars
often begin— a potential aggressor miscalculated.
From that we learn a lesson which we expect to 
apply in the interests of future peace.
The lesson is this: If events are likely
which will in fact lead us to fight, let us make 
clear our intention in advance, then we shall 
probably not have to fight. ^
In the present crisis in the Formosa Strait, Dulles 
conceived of issuing the warning in the form of a joint 
congressional resolution, authorizing the President to 
take whatever military measures became necessary to defend 
Formosa. In this connection, the Mutual Defense Treaty
12P .S .B ., XXIX, No. 742 (September 14, 1953), p. 339.
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signed with Nationalist China on December 2, 1954, obviously
could not meet the exigencies of the present situation. In
the first place, the Senate had not yet ratified the 
13treaty. In the second place, while the treaty area was 
confined to the American defense of Formosa and the Pesca­
dores only, the Administration intended to assist the 
Nationalists in evacuating their forces from the Tachens 
and to help defend Quemoy and Matsu.
A Presidential request for congressional sanction
in advance to employ American forces was an "unprecedented"
14move in the American history in peacetime. It was a
difficult undertaking by its very nature. What appeared to
be more difficult was that a Republican President had to
deal with a Democratic-controlled Congress. In order to
ensure bipartisan support of the President’s projected
request, Secretary Dulles, experienced in handling party 
15politicians, engaged in a series of consultations with
13The President sent the treaty to the Senate for 
ratification on January 6, 1955.
14Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report (New York: Harper
& Row, 1961), p. 129.
15John Dulles served for a short time as Senator from 
New York, an appointee of Governor Thomas Dewey to fill the 
unexpired term of Senator Robert F. Wagner, Sr. Dulles 
demonstrated his skill in dealing with congressional poli­
ticians during his assignment of negotiating a peace treaty 
with Japan and facilitating its ratification by the Senate. 
See Bernard C. Cohen, The Political Process and Foreign 
Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement (Prince­
ton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
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Democratic and Republican congressional leaders, particularly 
foreign policy leaders.^
Initial Congressional Response
Senator Walter George, Democrat from Georgia and
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was
highly pleased with Dulles1 approach to bipartisanship by
17prior consultation before high policy was made. But
some other Democrats were not so pleased. Senator John
Sparkman, Democrat from Alabama and also a member of the
Foreign Relations Committee, saw no reason for the White
House to seek congressional sanction. He said that the
President "has all the power in the world" to order the
18Seventh Fleet into action. Senator Mike Mansfield of 
Montana, another Democratic member of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, also said that the President could act without 
congressional authorization but that he apparently wanted 
"political protection." He recalled that former President 
Truman was bitterly criticized for his decision to send 
American troops into Korea without prior consultations with 
Congress.
16New York Times, January 21, 1955, p. 1, and see also 
Malcolm E. Jewell, Senatorial Politics and Foreign Policy 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962), pp. 129-30.
17New York Times, January 21, 1955, p. 3.
1 R
Ibid., p. 2.
19Ibid., p . 3.
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The Republican leaders generally expressed support 
for the President’s. intended action. Yet there were a 
few who, as was: the- case with several Democrats, felt that 
it was not quite necessary for the President to seek con- 
gressional authorization to take actions consistent with the 
executive powers-vested: under the Constitution. Representa­
tive Joseph. Martin,, the- House Republican floor leader, said 
that in hxs apihiron,. the: President had all the authority 
he needed ta appose: a: Communist attack on Formosa with United 
States Armed Eo:rce:s~,. "but he wants the support of Congress 
so the world' wiil'lL know that, in the defense of that area, 
America stand's united '. " ^
Eisenhower 1s Message to: Congress
Qn. January 274 , the President’s Message was trans-
222mitted to Congress. In it, he said that Formosa and the 
Pescadores "should:, remain in friendly hands," because "in 
unfriendly hand's" they "would seriously dislocate the 
existing, even' ifrunstable, balance of moral, economic 
and military farces: upon which the peace of the Pacific 
depends.*" He recounted'a series of "provocative" political 
and military actions. hy_ the Chinese Communists "establishing
2.032bxd.,,.. January 23, 1955, p. 1.
^Republie an - Senate leader Knowland had urged the 
President to deliver the message in person, but Eisenhower 
decided not to: present.it in that fashion in order to avoid 
any implicatfions- that.it was a "war message." Arthur Krock 
in New York Times, January 25, 1955, p. 24.
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a pattern of aggressive purpose . . . the conquest of
Formosa." The President noted that the Communists had
climaxed their military action with the recent conquest of
Yikiang Island, and said that the situation "poses a
22serious danger."
Under the circumstances, Eisenhower proposed two 
courses of action. The first was a call to the United 
Nations to take proper steps to deal with the situation 
in the Formosa area. He said:
We believe that the situation is one for 
appropriate action of the United Nations under its 
charter, for the purpose of ending the present 
hostilities in that area. We would welcome assump­
tion of such jurisdiction of that body.
The President pointed out, "The critical situation
has been created by the choice of the Chinese Communists,
not by us. Just as they created the situation, so they can
end it if they so choose."
The second was an appeal to Congress for support
and special authorization of power. The President urged
that it was necessary for "the Congress to participate now,
by specific resolution . . .  to improve the prospects for
peace." He continued:
I do not suggest that the United States enlarge 
its defensive commitments beyond Formosa and the 
Pescadores . . . But unhappily, the danger of armed
attack directed against that area compels us to 
take into account closely related localities and 
actions, which, under the current conditions,
^Text of the Presidents Message in New York Times, 
January 25, 1955, p. 3. The quotations that follow are also 
from the Message; therefore, no additional footnotes are used 
until the end.
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might determine the failure or the success of 
such an attack.
The President emphasized that the authority thus 
requested from Congress "would be used only in situations 
which are recognizable as parts of, or definite preliminaries 
to, an attack against the main positions of Formosa and 
the Pescadores." In asking for a congressional resolution, 
the President explained that "the authority for some of 
the actions" required "would be inherent in the authority 
of the Commander-in-Chief," but he urged Congress to "make 
clear the unified and serious intentions" of the United 
States.
In sum, the President believed that a congressional 
resolution would reduce the possibility of the Chinese Reds 
"misjudging our firm purpose and national unity" to the 
extent of precipitating "a major crisis." While stressing 
his desire for peace, President Eisenhower declared, "The 
United States must remove any doubt regarding our readiness 
to fight, if necessary . . . ."^
Formosa Resolution Presented to Congress
As soon as congressional clerks finished reading the 
Presidents Message in both Houses, identical resolutions 
carrying the Presidential wishes were presented. As a 
matter of fact, the resolution was drafted by the Administra” 
tion and approved by key leaders of both parties, including
23The end of quotations from the Presidents Message.
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24Senators George and Knowland. The resolution contained
the following authorization:
The President . . .  is authorized to employ 
the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems 
necessary for the specific purpose of securing and 
protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed 
attack, this authority to include the securing 
and protection of such related positions and terri­
tories of that area now in friendly hands . . .
There was no specific line of defense drawn in 
the resolution. In an early draft of the resolution, the 
Administration had established a line which the United 
States would defend, including Quemoy and Matsu, as Secre­
tary Dulles had proposed and the President approved in the 
National Security Council meeting on January 20. However, 
after a final conference between Eisenhower and Dulles,
such a specific line was deleted from the resolution in 
2 6final form. There were at least two good reasons for 
this decision. For one thing, any line specifically in­
cluding the offshore islands, such as Quemoy and Matsu, which 
had always been Chinese territory, would have entangled 
the United Nations in a jurisdictional squabble in its 
effort to secure a cease-fire in respect to the offshore
24Roberts, "Strong Man from the South," p. 110; and 
also New York Times, January 23, 1955, p. 3.
25Text m  New York Times, January 25, 1955, p. 3.
The italics are mine. These words became the focus of 
controversy during the congressional debates.
2 6Administration sources confirmed this deletion.
New York Times, February 1, 1955, p. 6.
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islands. For another, it would have indicated to the 
Chinese Communists that whatever was not specifically pro­
tected would become easy prey.
Prompt House Action
On January 24, the same day that the President's
Message was transmitted to Congress, Dulles and Admiral
Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. After the House
hearing, Dulles told the reporters: "In my opinion, if the
resolution is passed, it will decrease the risk of general
war in that area [the Western Pacific]. If it is not passed,
27it will increase the risk of war." Later that day, the
House Foreign Affairs Committee under the Chairmanship of
James Richards, Democrat from South Carolina, unanimously
approved the resolution by a vote of 28 to 0. In recommending
that the House adopt the measure, the Committee Report
stated that the primary objective of the resolution was to
deter further Chinese Communist aggression, and that it was
impractical to list individual islands to be defended. As
the present activities of the Chinese Communists toward the
offshore islands were "part of the progressive chipping away
of the free world," the Report stressed, "Failure to act now
2 8. . . offers a risk as great, if not greater, than action."
^ Ibid. , January 25, 1955, p. 1.
^U.S., Congress, House, Authorizing the President to 
Employ the Armed Forces of the United States for Protecting 
the Security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and Related Positions 
and Territories of that Area, H.R.Rept. 4, 84th Cong., 1st 
sess., p . 4.
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On January 25, the resolution was therefore placed 
on the House floor for debate under a "closed" rule which
29limited debate to two hours and did not permit amendment. 
Speaker Rayburn and his associates in the Democratic hier­
archy of the House, including floor leader John McCormack
of Massachusetts, stood in line with the Republican
30leadership m  supporting the resolution.
McCormack urged bipartisan support for the President
so that "a Republican administration with a Democratic
31Congress does not mean a divided nation." Foreign Affairs 
Committee Chairman Richards said that the joint congressional 
resolution sought by the President was by no means a 
declaration of war. "All we are doing," he stated, "is
32stating clearly and firmly the policy of our Government."
Speaker Rayburn, while strongly supporting the President,
agreed with some of his Democratic colleagues that this
33resolution "should not be taken as a precedent."
After a brief, controlled debate under the "closed" 
rule, the House adopted the resolution virtually without
29U.S. Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates 
of the 84th Congress, First session, V. 101, Part I (January 5- 
February 9, 1955), p. 659.
30New York Times, January 26, 1955, p. 2.
31Congressional Record, V. 101, Part I, p. 659.
32Ibid., p. 664.
33Ibid., p. 672.
95
34objection that same day by a vote of 409 to 3. The three
dissenting votes were cast by Graham Barden, Democrat of
North Carolina; Eugene Siler, Republican of Kentucky; and
Timothy Sheehan, Republican of Illinois. In explaining
his vote, Barden said that the debates had been inadequate,
and that what the House had done would permit the President
to take the nation to war without a formal declaration by 
35Congress. Siler said that he opposed the resolution
because he had promised the mothers among his constituents
that he would not help engage their boys in war on foreign 
36soil. At the other extreme, Sheehan held that the resolu­
tion did not go far enough. He said that the United States 
should draw a line of demarcation against Communist Russia 
and declare that any warlike actions on the part of her
satellites would cause Washington to retaliate against 
37Moscow.
Senate Committee Actions
In the Senate, a joint session of the Foreign Rela­
tions and Armed Services Committees heard Secretary Dulles
34At the beginning of the first session of the 84th 
Congress, the Democrats controlled the House by a margin of 
231 to 203, with one seat vacant due to the death of a mem­
ber. Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly News Features, 1955), XI (1955), p.
35New York Times, January 26, 1955, p. 2.
36Ibid.
37Ibid.
16.
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testify on January 24. Senator George, who acted as the
Chairman of the joint session, issued a summary of what had
happened during the hearing. "The Secretary warned,"
Senator George said, "it might not be possible to hold
Formosa and the Pescadores if we sit idly by while all the
other Nationalist islands are taken; although neither would
3 8it be necessary to defend all of these islands . . . ."
Despite the sense of urgency with which Secretary
Dulles appealed to the members of the two Committees, many
Democrats were not convinced. They had misgivings, but
most of them chose to express them in private. Senator
Mansfield was one of the few who spoke out. He said, "The
Senate is confronted with a highly unusual resolution with
the implication that immediate action is essential. If
there is an impending crisis why did not the President come
in person to present the facts to Congress? Crises in
39foreign relations do not arise overnight." He held,
"Congress has the high sworn obligation to examine this
resolution as it would any similar resolution— that is, in
40an independent light." While most Republicans voiced 
approval of the President's proposal, some among them 
joined Mansfield in urging close congressional examination 
before acting.
o o
Ibid., January 25, 19 55, p. 3. 
39Ibid.
^9Ibid.
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Attempts at Amending
The next day> January 25, the Senate Foreign Relations 
and Armed Services Committees, again sitting jointly, con­
ducted a long interrogation in secret session of all members 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When asked if the Joint Chiefs 
were unanimous in support of the President's Formosa policy, 
Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, reportedly 
answered in the affirmative. However, General Ridgway,
Army Chief, stated in effect that he was not consulted"
during a recent discussion of the Formosa problem among the 
41Joint Chiefs. Radford told the Committees that he did not
rule out the possibility of striking against the Chinese
mainland or in defense of the offshore islands but he felt
that this would entail the use of air and sea power. Ridgway
held that such moves would eventually lead to the use of
ground forces, which had been overextended in America's
42worldwide commitment. As a result of the testimony, some 
Senators feared that the consequences of granting vast yet 
undefined power to the President would result in a war of 
unlimited scale. Ironically, the remarks of the Joint Chiefs 
helped generate a movement aimed at amending the Presidential 
request.
41Ridgway was out of Washington at the time but a 
deputy participated in the discussion. Later, the General 
claimed that his deputy was not authorized to speak on his 
behalf. "General Wasn't Consulted— Ridgway versus Radford at 
Hush Hearing," Washington Daily News, January 27, 19 55. Re­
printed in the Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 1, pp. 844-45.
^ Ibid. , p. 844.
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On January 26, before the joint committee could vote
on the resolution, there were two attempts at limiting the
President's authority to use American armed forces in the
Formosa area, but each was rejected by a.vote of 20 to 8 .
The first to be defeated was an amendment introduced by
Senator Hubert Humphrey, Democrat of Minnesota. He wanted
to strike out the phrase that would extend the President's
authority in protecting Formosa and the Pescadores "to
include the securing and protection of such related terri-
43tories of that area now in friendly hands." The second
rejected amendment had been offered by Senator Estes Kefauver,
Democrat of Tennessee. His motion, which emphasized the
United Nations as the ultimate and appropriate authority
both to arrange a cease-fire and to settle the status of
Formosa, would have given authority to the President pending
44effective United Nations action. Finally, the joint
committee adopted the resolution by a vote of 27 to 2, with
Senators William Danger, Republican of North Dakota, and
Wayne Morse, Independent of Oregon, casting the negative 
45votes.
Initial Senate Floor Debates
When the joint committee passed the resolution without
43New York Times, January 27, 1955, p. 2; also Con­
gressional Record, V. 101, Part 12 (Daily Digest), p. D26.
44Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 12, p. D26.
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amendment on the morning of January 26, Senator George,
acting as chairman of the two committees, did not intend
to press the Senate for action on the same day, but some
46Senators desired to commence debate immediately. While 
most recognized the need for firm American commitment to 
the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, some Senators 
questioned the desirability of extending the President’s 
authority to the "related positions and territories," 
pertaining to the offshore islands. Since American defense 
of the offshore islands was contemplated by the language of 
the resolution, the possibility of a preventive war appeared 
to be in the offing. There was also concern that the role 
of the United Nations was not sufficiently stressed. The 
two abortive attempts at amending the joint resolution in 
committee reflected the trend of the opposition. On the 
Senate floor these views were reiterated and there were 
renewed attempts at amendment. The voices of opposition 
were few but intensive.
Senator Russell Long, Democrat of Louisiana, held 
that if the President were to take full advantage of the 
authority in the resolution as presently worded, it could 
lead to an all-out war with Red China. He stressed that the
46New York Times, January 27, 1955, p. 3.
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American people had not been informed of the implications of
this joint resolution by which American commitments "are
being extended far beyond anything any of us have realized
47prior to this time."
Senator Morse, the most vehement opponent of the
resolution throughout the three-day debate, said, "One of
the effects of the resolution will be to seal the lips of
the elected representatives with respect to the course of
action the President may take . . . .  What the President is
asking for is a predated authorization of anything he may
48do under the resolution." Taking note of the unsettled
status of Formosa, Morse asserted that the responsibility
for protecting Formosa belonged to the United Nations.
Therefore, he maintained that "stronger language and more
specific language than is contained either in the message
49or the resolution" should be expressed by Congress.
Senator Kefauver urged, "We must guard against 
becoming involved in a large-scale war; not in defense of
Formosa and Pescadores, but in defense of the offshore
50 . . . .islands." He saw the need for soliciting allied support of
the American position, and argued, "We cannot convince the 
47Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 1, p. 735. 
48Ibid., p. 738.
4^Ibid., p. 741.
^8Ibid., p. 763.
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world that the Communist attacks on the offshore islands are
primarily designed in preparation for armed attacks on 
51Formosa."
Expressing a mood of dilemma. Senator Humphrey said,
"The resolution is not one which we are permitted to design;
it is one which we are permitted to accept or reject; and
to reject it would be to undermine the Presidents authority
52completely and totally."
White House Reassurances
In view of the fact that members of the Senate had 
expressed misgivings of various kinds and had created an 
atmosphere which was not conducive to prompt passage of the 
resolution, the Administration decided to reassure the public 
in general and Congress in particular. On January 27, after 
President Eisenhower had a conference with his top civilian 
and military advisers, the White House Press Secretary, James 
Hagerty, issued a statement saying:
The President made it clear that these United 
States forces were designed purely for defensive 
purpose and that any decision to use United States 
forces other than in immediate self-defense or in 
direct defense of Formosa and the Pescadores would 
be a decision which he would take and the responsi­
bility for which has not been d e l e g a t e d . ^3
51tIbid.
52Ibid., p. 768.
5 Text in D.S.B., XXXII, No. 815 (February 7, 1955), 
213; and New York Times, January 28, 1955, p. 1.
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The purpose of emphasizing the purely defensive role 
of the United States forces in the Formosa area was to end 
talk on Capitol Hill that the resolution authorizing the 
defense of Formosa was in any sense authority to carry on a 
preventive war. It also served notice that American mili­
tary forces would not be sent to the Formosa area to help 
the Nationalists reconquer the Chinese mainland. ' By stress­
ing the President's sole responsibility to decide whether 
or not the American forces should be used in other than in 
immediate self-defense or in direct defense of Formosa and 
the Pescadores, the statement reassured Senators who had 
feared that some impetuous American military commanders or 
line officers might "pull the trigger."
Senator George 1s Speech
Senator Walter George, after reading the White House 
statement, gave an eloquent speech to the Senate, rallying 
both the Democrats and Republicans to stand against any 
alteration of the text of the resolution. He said, "I 
believe that President Eisenhower is a prudent man. I
54believe what he says, and I am willing to act upon it."
He asked, "If the Congress of the United States is willing
to withhold moral support from the President . . . what is
55the alternative?" In concluding his speech, George 
especially admonished the junior Democrats:
^ Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 1, p. 820.
55Ibid., p. 819.
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I hope no Democrat will be heard to say that 
because the President . . . came to Congress he is
thereby subject to criticism. He chose a courageous 
course, a course which would be taken only by a 
prudent man who knows the pitfalls along the course 
and who knows the horrors of w a r . 56
After strong reassurance from the White House and
Senator George*s persuasive speech, efforts in the Senate
to limit the President's authority under the pending joint
resolution weakened. Sortie in the Democratic group, however, v
remained adamant. Senator Herbert Lehman of New York said,
"My alternative is to confine our defense commitment to
57Formosa and the Pescadores." He still insisted that
Congress should not give the President authority to "engage
in unspecified and indefinite acts which might even be beyond
58his constitutional powers." Senator Morse said that the
White House statement only confirmed that American forces
might be employed in actions "over and beyond the immediate
defense of Formosa and the Pescadores." Morse proclaimed
that he could not support such possible use of American 
59power.
Senate Dissenters Entrenched
On January 28, Senator George again took the floor 
to urge prompt approval of the joint resolution. He contended
~*8Ibid. , p. 821.
57Ibid., p. 826.
58Ibid.
^8Ibid., p. 841.
104
that adoption of the measure would have a restraining effect
6 0upon the Chinese Communists. As a United Nations effort
to arrange a cease-fire was going to begin soon, he
stressed the need for the Senate to complete the legisla-
61tion before the United Nations took action. He said,
"At the beginning of that debate there should be a position
of strength, and not vacillation, on the part of the United 
62States." He also pointed out that while the Communists 
were speeding up their military preparedness, the National­
ists were holding military planning "in suspension" until
63the American attitude was made clear.
The objections from Senators Lehman, Morse and Langer
persisted. Lehman was not satisfied with the White House
statement. The President, he asserted,
. . . has not reassured me concerning his intentions
with regard to the Quemoy group, the Matsu group, 
and the Tachen group. . . .  He has not indicated 
to me any reason why the blank-check language 
should be contained in the resolution. Nor has he 
explained why there should be no reference to the 
United Nations in the resolution. 4
Langer warned in simple terms of a possible danger
in the resolution. As he declared,
60 TV.Ibid.
61The Security Council of the United Nations was 
scheduled on January 31 to debate the Chinese coastal 
islands situation.
6 2Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 1, p. 929.
63T,. ,Ibid.
^Ibid. , p. 926.
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It is simply a question of whether the Senate, 
in advance, is going to authorize our President to 
send forces into the mainland of China or whether 
it is not. If the President were to send such 
forces into the mainland of China, it would be an 
act of war. ■
Morse reiterated the theme of a preventive war, 
which, he thought, was implicit in the resolution. "One 
of the most dangerous implications of this resolution," he 
asserted, "is that for the first time in our history we now 
enunciate a threat of aggression against a nation not now 
at war with us."^ In his final remarks, Morse said:
If it is unity the President wants . . . we
can have unity because we are in complete union on 
the proposal that we should defend to the limit 
Formosa and the Pescadores. However, we are not 
in agreement that we should defend Quemoy and 
Matsu, because we fear that would lead to World 
War III.67
Some Senators had misgivings but were reluctant to 
vote against the resolution. Mansfield expressed this 
view when he said:
Whatever the faults of the joint resolution 
in its origin and content, however, I do not see 
how it can be rejected . . . An adverse vote at
this time, a failure to uphold the President, can 
only be interpreted throughout the world as a 
faltering in our resolve, with disastrous consequences 
to peace and to the free nations.6**
65Ibid., p. 940.
66Ibid., p. 956.
67Ibid., p. 973.
68Ibid., p. 975.
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Senate Action Completed
Inasmuch as there were a few Senators who persisted 
in their opposition to grant the Presidents request without 
restriction, the Senate had to take a formal vote on their 
attempts at amendment.
First to be defeated, by a vote of 83 to 3, was an 
amendment which Langer offered to forbid the sending of 
American forces into the Chinese mainland or nearer than 
twelve miles from the Chinese coast except to help evacuate 
Nationalist forces in that area. The only Senators who
69voted for this limitation were Langer, Morse, and Lehman.
The Senate also rejected, by a vote of 75 to 11, a
substitute resolution proposed by Kefauver to declare it
to be the sense of Congress that the President had authority
to employ armed forces to defend Formosa and the Pescadores,
pending effective action by the United Nations. This was
the measure which had been voted down in the Foreign Relations
Committee. After the defeat of his motion, Kefauver declared
that he would vote for the joint resolution despite the
70misgivings he had expressed.
The Senate then defeated, by a vote of 74 to 13, a 
third amendment, which Humphrey originally proposed but 
which Lehman took over after the Minnesota Senator decided
69Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 12 (Daily Digest), 
p. D31; and New York Times, January 29, 1955, p. 3.
70Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 1, p. 991.
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not to press it. The Lehman amendment would have eliminated
a phrase in the joint resolution authorizing protection of
related positions and territories in the Formosa area.
Humphrey, while voting for this amendment, declared his
intention of supporting the joint resolution in advance.
He said, "Even though the amendments which I hope will be
accepted should be defeated, I would still feel that I owed
the obligation to the Chief Executive, in view of his commit-
71ments, to go along with him."
Finally, the Senate, on January 28, adopted the joint
resolution without alteration, and by an almost unanimous
72vote of 85 to 3. The only three dissenting votes were
73again cast by Lehman, Morse, and Langer.
Mission Accomplished
On January 29, President Eisenhower signed the joint 
resolution into law. It was officially designated Public 
Law No. 4. In a brief statement during the ceremony of 
signing the congressional resolution, the President spelled 
out the essence of the Administration's policy. He said,
^ Ibid. , p. 939 .
72Senate Democrats initially had a one-vote margin 
over Republicans, 48 to 47, with Wayne Morse as an independent, 
at the first session of the 84th Congress. The margin was 
increased to two when Morse announced on February 17, 1955, 
that he had joined the Democrats. Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac, XI (1955), p. 16.
73Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 12, p. D31; 
and New York Times, January 29, 1955, p. 1.
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"We are ready to support a United Nations effort to end
the present hostilities in the area. We are also united
in our determination to defend an area vital to the
74security of the United States and the free world." The 
Congressional approval of the Formosa Resolution clearly 
indicated to the Chinese Reds that the United States was 
prepared for the best or the worst— peace or war.
The President expressed his gratification at the 
"almost unanimous vote" in both houses of Congress in 
passing the desired resolution. As a matter of fact, it 
was the result of no small effort on the part of the Adminis­
tration. Prior consultation with both Democratic and 
Republican leaders in Congress had won bipartisan support 
in principle before the Presidents request was formally 
delivered. Close watchfulness of the mood of Congress and 
timely reassurance from the White House further consolidated 
the Administration's position. The President's Message 
itself was a double manoeuvre. On the one hand, the pro­
nouncement of American determination to stand fast and 
prepare to fight if necessary suited the tastes of right- 
wing Republicans. On the other hand, Democrats could lean 
on the appeal to the United Nations for action which would 
lead to a cease-fire and peace.
74President Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1955, p. 215.
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The interplay of these factors during an international 
crisis quite effectively muffled the usual divisiveness in 
Congress. Nevertheless, the voice of dissent, though 
feeble, could still be heard distinctly. Although it was 
not disputed that Formosa should remain in friendly hands 
with American commitments for its defense, there was no 
consensus as to the wisdom of possible American defense of 
the offshore islands. Many a congressman was reluctant to 
do anything which might increase the risk of war with the 
Chinese Communists.
Mutual Defense Treaty in the Spotlight
After the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed with the 
Chinese Nationalist Government on December 2, 1954,
President Eisenhower on January 6, 1955, transmitted the 
treaty to the new Democratic-controlled Senate for ratifi­
cation. In the message of transmittal, the President had 
said that the document was "defensive" in purpose and was 
designed to "deter any attempt by the Chinese Communist
regime to bring its aggressive military ambitions to bear
75against the treaty area." He explained that the treaty 
reinforced "the system of collective security in the Pacific 
area" when taken in conjunction with similar treaties al­
ready concluded with Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Australia,
76and New Zealand.
75President Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1955, p. 31. 
76Ibid.
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Further, the President stressed in his January 24
Message to Congress that the Formosa Resolution was no
substitute for the Mutual Defense Treaty. He said, "Present
circumstances make it more than ever^important that this
basic agreement should be brought into force, as a solemn
evidence of our determination to stand fast in the agreed 
77treaty area."
Background for Bipartisan Support
Behind the official actions, the Eisenhower Adminis­
tration, in fact, had made calculated moves to ensure that a 
mutual defense treaty with Nationalist China would meet 
with a minimum of resistance in the Senate. On October 19, 
1954, when the treaty was being negotiated and before the 
mid-term congressional elections, the Administration sent 
Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, 
to see Senator George at his home in Vienna, Georgia. At 
that meeting, Robertson informed the Senator, a senior 
ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
of the Administration's intention to sign a mutual defense
treaty with the Nationalist Government, and secured George's
78promise of support in advance.
77Ibid., p. 211.
7 8James Reston, "Democrats and the Islands," New
York Times, April 5, 1955, p. 4.
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After Congress reorganized in January 1955 with the
Democrats in control, Senator George, to the satisfaction of
the Eisenhower Administration, assumed the chairmanship of
79the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, He came to be an
adamant supporter of the bipartisan approach to American
foreign policy as urged by President Eisenhower in the
State of the Union Message to the Congress on January 6 ,
801955. With the immense influence as a senior Democratic
leader in Congress and Chairman of the powerful Foreign
Affairs Committee, George was destined to exert his influence
81in supporting the Administration's foreign policy. After
79When the new Congress convened, Senator George was 
the ranking member of both the Senate Finance Committee and 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He could be chair­
man of either Committee. Partly because of his primary 
interest in foreign policy and partly because of promptings 
from the President, the Senator chose the Foreign Relations 
Committee. Roscoe Drummond, "Preeminent Senator of 1955,"
New York Herald Tribune, May 1, 1955. Reprinted in the 
Congressional Record, V. 101 (Appendix), p. A1426.
80Foreign Affairs portion of the Message in American 
Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, I, p. 104.
81Roscoe Drummond reported that it was indisputable 
among the press corps in Washington that Senator George "is 
the second most powerful and most influential man in Washing­
ton— second only to the President himself." Drummond's 
article reprinted in Congressional Record, V. 101 (Appendix), 
p. A1426. A New York Times correspondent described Senator 
as "not merely a partner in bipartisanship but its ambulant 
embodiment." New York Times Magazine, March 13, 1955, p. 12. 
Another news watcher observed, "His [George's] is the strong­
est foreign-affairs voice Capitol Hill has heard since the 
passing of Michigan's Arthur Vandenburg." Martin S. Hayden, 
"Senator George Is Most Powerful Single Solon," North America 
Alliance release dated February 27, 1955. Reprinted in the 
Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 4, pp. 5355-56.
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the passage of the Formosa Resolution, the next task for 
George was to secure ratification of the Mutual Defense 
Treaty with Nationalist China.
A Disturbing Source: Cohenfs Memorandum
Although the Mutual Defense Treaty with Nationalist
China, signed on December 2, 1954, was not the first of its
kind which the United States had concluded with friendly
nations in the Pacific, some Democrats viewed it in a
different light. On January 11, 19 55, the Democratic
National Committee began to circulate among Senate Demo-
82crats a private memorandum on the subject prepared by 
Benjamin Cohen, once a prominent member of President Franklin 
Roosevelts "braintrust" and a legal counselor of the State 
Department under the Truman Administration. Cohen contended 
that ratification of the treaty would constitute for the 
first time formal recognization of Nationalist China’s claim 
to Formosa and the Pescadores, a step which the United 
States had been careful to avoid thus far. "What we recog­
nize as territories of Chiang's China," he said, "other 
countries, including our allies which recognize Mao’s China,
may feel compelled to recognize as territories of Mao's 
83China." Therefore, an attack on Formosa by the Chinese 
02Reprinted in Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 1, 
pp. 1396-97.
^^Ibid., p. 1396.
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Communists would not, as Cohen expressed it, be "international
aggression on their part but civil war in which the right
and purpose of other nations forcibly to intervene would be
84open to serious doubt."
Although the memorandum did not question the vital 
importance to the United States of having these islands 
remain in friendly hands or the policy of defending them 
from unprovoked Communist attack, Cohen doubted the wisdom 
of the treaty on still further grounds. He observed, "It is 
not at all clear that' any attempt by the Republic of China 
to extend its effective control and jurisdiction from For­
mosa to the mainland of China would be contrary to article I
85of the mutual defense treaty. . . . "  Another basic point 
of objection, according to Cohen, was that the treaty area 
could be extended to other territories than Formosa and the 
Pescadores by "mutual agreement." He asserted, "The provi­
sion is a dangerous and unprecedented delegation of the
86treaty-ratifying power of the Senate."
While the Democratic leaders in the Senate, including 
Walter George, were not pleased with the circulation of the 
memorandum by the Democratic National Committee without their 
prior knowledge and consent, many a Democrat took it as a
84t, .Ibid.
85Ibid., p. 1397.
86T4 . .Ibid.
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87guide in studying the implications of the treaty. When 
Secretary Dulles testified before the Senate Foreign Rela­
tions Committee on February 7, he explained the treaty pro­
visions in detail, as well as a significant-restraint put 
on the Chinese Nationalist Government by virtue of his sub­
sequent exchange of letters with the Nationalist Foreign 
Minister. Nevertheless, some Senators still entertained 
doubts along the line suggested in the Cohen memorandum.
Senate Committee "Understandings"
In the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Morse
wanted to put into the treaty a reservation which would
have deleted the provision that the territory covered by
8 8the document could be expanded by mutual agreement.
Senator Humphrey proposed a similar but less fundamental
reservation by attaching to the resolution of ratification
an understanding that the "mutual agreement" with regard to
the extension of the treaty area should be construed as
89requiring the advice and consent of the Senate. Whatever 
form the reservations took, they indicated a desire to put 
in plain English that American commitment under the treaty
87Reston, "Democrats and the Island."
88Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 12 (Daily 
Digest}/ p. D54, and New York Times, February 9, 1955, p. 1.
89To alter the text of a treaty by deleting or 
adding a language would require renegotiation of the treaty; 
to introduce language of an explanatory nature in the 
resolution of ratification would not.
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would be limited to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores 
and nothing else. It was exactly the same thing attempted 
in the debates on the Formosa Resolution.
On February 8, the Foreign Relations Committee de­
feated the Morse reservation by a vote of 11 to 2, and 
Humphrey1s compromise reservation by a vote of 9 to 5. In 
view of the element of dissatisfaction with some provisions 
of the treaty, the Committee majority under the chairman­
ship of Senator George sought to placate the opposition 
after rejecting their proposals. The Committee drafted 
three "understandings," in the spirit of the Cohen memoran­
dum, but none of which was to be in either the treaty text 
or the Senate resolution of ratification. These "under­
standings," to be incorporated into the Committee report of 
the treaty to the Senate, stated:
1) That the obligations of the parties . . . apply
only in the event of external armed attack; and
that military operations by either party from 
the territories held by the Republic of China 
shall not be undertaken except by joint agree­
ment.
2) That the 1mutual agreement* referred to . . .
shall be construed as requiring the advice and
consent of the Senate of the United States.
3) That nothing in the treaty shall be construed
as affecting or modifying the legal status or
sovereignty of the territories to which it 
applies.
90U.S., Congress, Senate Executive Report No. 2,
84th Cong., 1st sess. Reprinted in American Foreign Policy, 
1950-1955, I, pp. 961-63.
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Senator George made it known that this arrangement 
was agreeable to Secretary Dulles as well as to the majority 
of the Committee. The proponents took the view that while 
not legally binding on the Administration, the "under­
standings" would have a morally binding force as an expression
91of fixed Senate attitude. After the "understandings" were 
accepted, the Committee approved the treaty by a vote of 
11 to 2, with Senators Morse and Langer casting the negative 
votes.
Legal Point of Opposition
The next day, February 9, the treaty was placed 
before the Senate for ratification. Senator George first 
took the floor to explain the difference between the Formosa 
Resolution and the Mutual Defense Treaty, urging prompt 
action by the upper house. He said, "The essential dif­
ference is that by treaty the United States undertakes an 
international obligation, whereas by Public Law No. 4
[Formosa Resolution] our action was unilateral and volun- 
92tary." It was precisely the solemn international obliga­
tion in the treaty that triggered a legal argument. What 
was at issue was whether or not the Chinese Nationalist 
Government could sign a treaty relative to territories over 
which the sovereignty was unsettled.
91New York Times, January 9, 1955, p. 1.
92Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 1, p. 1381.
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Secretary Dulles had acknowledged publicly on the
occasion of the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty with
Nationalist China that "technical sovereignty" over Formosa
93and the Pescadores had never been settled. With this in 
mind, Senator Morse, speaking against ratification, said 
that the document was hardly a treaty; rather, it was a
94military alliance with a faction in the Chinese civil war.
Senator Lehman then observed that the three "understandings"
in the Committee Report declaring that the treaty neither
intended to determine the status of Formosa nor to envisage
American assistance in offensive military actions by the
Nationalists were inadequate. These "understandings," he
said, lacked the force of law and merely expressed the inter-
95pretation of the Foreign Relations Committee. Senator 
Kefauver added that "I do not see how this treaty accomplishes 
anything not accomplished by the joint resolution we have
already passed, and it has many foggy, if not evil, impli-
96 'cations." He maintained, "If we limit our position to
the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, without a treaty,
then we have a sound right . . . to call upon all our allies
97for their help in the event of war."
93Supra, Chapter III, footnote No. 62.
94Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 1, p. 1398.
95Ibid., p. 1406.
9®Ibid./ p. 1413.
118
Ratification of the Treaty
Subsequently, Senator Morse renewed his effort to
modify the treaty in spite of the fact that such attempts
had failed in the Foreign Relations Committee. The Senator
proposed two amendments and two reservations on the Senate
floor. The first amendment, rejected 57 to 11, would have
added a sentence to the effect that the treaty did not affect
or modify the legal status or sovereignty of Formosa and the
Pescadores. The second amendment, defeated 60 to 10, was
to eliminate the sentence which provided that the treaty
area might be extended by mutual agreement. Two reserva-
98tions of the same intent were rejected by voice vote.
i
Senator Morse undauntedly tried to carry his viewpoints
but the odds were against him.
Although the few voices of opposition were negligible,
their arguments that the Chinese Nationalist Government
lacked the sovereign power to sign a treaty and that the
three "understandings" to be read with the treaty were
extra-legal were never dealt with squarely. One observer
commented that the Administration probably knew that they
99already had the votes. Indeed, the votes were over­
whelmingly in favor of the treaty. After defeating the 
amendments and reservations proposed by Senator Morse, the
98Ibid., p. 1415.
99Richard H. Rovere, Affairs of State; The Eisenhower 
Years (New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1956), p. 254.
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Senate on the same day, February 9, ratified the treaty by a 
vote of 65 to 6 at the end of one day's debate.
U.S. in a Position of Strength
With the passage of the Formosa Resolution and the 
ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Nationalist 
China, the United States had built up a position of strength 
ready to deal with any move by the Chinese Reds in the. 
Formosa area even though the line of defense was not 
specifically drawn due to strategic and political reasons. 
While there was no doubt of American determination to stand 
firm in the area, the Administration deliberately kept its 
attitude vague toward the offshore islands. In this sense, 
it continued the policy of keeping the enemy guessing while 
retaining maximum flexibility.
CHAPTER V
CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS AND POWER ALIGNMENTS
Cease-Fire Efforts Renewed
As previously mentioned in Chapter III, Secretary 
Dulles had' contacted the British and other allies behind 
the scenes in an attempt to promote a United Nations cease­
fire in the Formosa Strait in the autumn of 1954. This 
attempt for a cease-fire was given up when Assistant Secre­
tary of State Robertson was unable to persuade the National­
ist Government to accept it.• Yet when tension flared to a 
new height due to the assault and capture of Yikiang Island 
by the Chinese Communists in January 1955, the United States 
revived the cease-fire plan without regard to Nationalist 
feelings. As soon as President Eisenhower publicly 
announced his willingness to see the United Nations attempt 
to improve the situation in the Formosa area, both the 
British and New Zealand Governments welcomed the move. Sir 
Leslie Munro, chief delegate of New Zealand to the United 
Nations, declared that his Government would take the initia­
tive to bring the matter to the United Nations.^
~hsTew York Times, January 20, 1955, p. 1.
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Prospect Unpromising
The Chinese Communists, as well as the Nationalists, 
strongly disapproved of United Nations action in the Formosa 
Strait. On January 24, the same date that President 
Eisenhower’s Message embodying an appeal to the United 
Nations was sent to Congress, Chou En-lai, the Chinese 
Communist Premier and Foreign Minister, issued a statement 
that categorically repudiated the idea of a cease-fire. He 
declared:
The Government of the People’s Republic of 
China cannot agree to a so-called cease-fire with 
the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique repudiated 
by the Chinese people.
The so-called cease-fire between the People's 
Republic of China and the Chiang Kai-shek clique 
that the United States Government and its followers 
are trying to engineer is in actuality interven­
tion in China's internal affairs and alienation 
of China's territory.^
Chou quoted Article 2, paragraph 7 of the United 
Nations Charter, barring the world organization from inter­
vening in "matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state." He contended that under this 
clause, "neither the United Nations nor any foreign
country has the right to intervene in the Chinese libera-
3 . . .tion of Taiwan." In quoting that clause, it was interesting
to note that Chou omitted the remaining part which added:
". . . but this principle shall not prejudice the application
o
Text in Ibid., January 25, 1955, p. 4.
^Ibid.
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of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” Though rather
ambiguous, Chapter VII permitted the Security Council to
enforce "action with respect to threats to the peace,
4breaches of the peace and acts of aggression."
New Zealand's Proposal Introduced in the U.N.
Despite the Chinese Communist refusal to consider 
a cease-fire, New Zealand asked the Security Council to take 
up the question of the offshore islands on January 28.
The New Zealand delegate, Leslie Munro, who was currently
5
serving as President of the Security Council, as a formality
addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council,
calling attention to the fact that:
The occurrence of armed hostilities between 
the People's Republic of China and the Republic of 
China in the area of certain islands off the coast 
of the mainland of China has made it clear that a 
situation exists the continuance of which is likely 
to endanger the maintenance of international peace.®
Munro's letter did not mention Formosa and the
Pescadores, but it showed the clear intention of the Western
powers to ask the United Nations to seek a termination to the
hostilities in the offshore islands. In. a news conference
on the same day, the New Zealand delegate indirectly replied
4Text of Article VII, Charter of the United Nations.
5
Council members assumed the Presidency of the 
Security Council in rotation according to alphabetical order.
^Text in D.S.B ., XXXII, No. 816 (February 14, 1955),
p. 253.
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to Chou*s argument that the United Nations had no right to 
question the situation in the Formosa area. He said, "We 
are approaching the .subject of these islands not on con­
siderations of jurisdiction but simply on the consideration 
that we desire the fighting to be stopped, and we are of the 
opinion that there is no question of Article 2 (7) [domestic 
jurisdiction clause]." Under the proceedings of the 
Security Council, if a party involved in an issue under 
discussion in the Council was not a member of the United 
Nations, that party would be invited to attend the meeting 
to state his case. Therefore, the Security Council was 
expected to invite the Chinese Communists to send a representa­
tive to attend the upcoming Council debates, as it had done 
in November 1950.
Simultaneous British Effort
The British, fearing that the Chinese Communists 
would not attend the Council meetings, asked the Soviet 
Government to help persuade Peking to accept the Council's 
invitation. On the same day that the New Zealand delegate 
brought the question of the coastal islands to the Security 
Council, Sir William Hayter, British Ambassador to Moscow, 
visited the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslay Molotov, 
and advised him that the British Charge d*Affaires in Peking 
was informing the Chinese Communist Government of New
7
New York Times, January 29, 1955, p. 2.
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Zealand's move in the United Nations. Hayter told the
Soviet Foreign Minister that the British Government hoped
they would have the cooperation of the Soviet Government
in the Security Council and that, in particular, Russia
would "urge on the Chinese Communists very strongly that
they accept the Security Council invitation to attend the
8Council when it is made."
The immediate Soviet response was not very cooperative 
Molotov extemporaneously remarked that the British Govern­
ment "avoided all reference to the real reasons for the
' 9
tension in the area of Taiwan." He asserted, "these 
reasons lie in the gross interference of the United States 
in China's internal affairs, in the desire to wrest Taiwan 
from China. Molotov said, "If the United States ceased
its aggressive actions in the Taiwan area, this would help 
to reduce international tension."^ Furthermore, he indi­
cated to the British Ambassador that if Britain did not 
support the American "aggressive actions" in the Formosa 
area, the United States would not undertake them. Molotov's
8The Times (London), January 29, 1955, p. 6.
9Current Digest of the Soviet Press, VII, No. 4 
(March 9, 1955), p. 33.
^ Ibid.
11TV • TIbid.
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remarks obviously were no expression of appreciation for
12British efforts at conciliation.
Soviet Cease-Fire Plan
On January 30, the Soviet Union delivered to the
United Nations a cease-fire plan of its own for the
Formosa area. The Soviet delegate urged the Security Council
to consider what it called "U.S. acts of aggression against
the Chinese People's Republic in Taiwan and other islands 
13of China." The accompanying draft resolution accused the
United States of "aggression" and demanded that American
forces be withdrawn from the Formosa area. The text of the
Soviet draft resolution was similar to the one that was
brought before the Council in November 1950.
The new version differed from that of the previous
mainly in its final paragraph which read:
[The Soviet Union] urges that no military action 
should be permitted in the Taiwan area by either 
side, so that the evacuation from the islands in 
this area of all armed forces not controlled by ^  
the People's Republic of China may be facilitated.
12According to the Soviet version of the Molotov- 
Hayter meeting, the British Ambassador told the Soviet 
Foreign Minister: "It would be rather dangerous if the
Chinese [Communist] Government proceeded on the assumption 
that the United States will in no circumstances assist their 
Nationalist allies in the area of those [offshore] islands." 
The warning, however, was not mentioned in a public statement 
released by the British Embassy in Moscow. Cf. The Times 
(London), January 29, 1955, p. 6, and Current Digest of the 
Soviet Press, VII, No. 4 (March 9, 1955), p. 33.
^■^Text in New York Times, January 31, 1955, p. 3.
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The Russians, in effect, asked the Security Council 
to request the Chinese Nationalists to evacuate their troops 
from the offshore islands, and to guarantee them safe 
conduct.
Meanwhile, in a, formal reply to the British request 
for Soviet cooperation in the United Nations, the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry issued a statement which put the blame on 
the United States for the tension in the Formosa Strait.
"The Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Repub­
lics hold," it declared, "that the cause of the situation 
that has arisen lies in the fact that the United States, 
with the aid of Chiang Kai-shek, several years ago seized
the island of Taiwan and the Penghu [the Pescadores], which
15belongs to China, and several other Chinese islands."
U.N. Invitation Issued
On January 31, the Security Council voted nine to 
one, with the Soviets opposed, to consider the fighting in 
the Chinese coastal islands as "a situation threatening 
international peace and security." In a subsequent vote of 
nine to one, with Nationalist China opposed, the Council 
invited Peking to take part in the forthcoming Council debates. 
T. F. Tsiang, the Nationalist chief delegate to the United 
Nations, said that it would be an "insult" to the Chinese
15Current Digest of the Soviet Press, VII, No. 5 
(March 16, 1955), p. 24.
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people to allow the presence of representatives of Communist 
China in the United Nations or elsewhere and that the invita­
tion would increase the prestige of the Peking regime in 
the Far East."^
The United States voted in favor of inviting the 
Chinese Communists to participate in debating the coastal 
islands question. However, Ambassador Lodge made clear 
that his vote for the invitation had no bearing upon the 
United States opposition to the seating of Red China in 
the United Nations, nor did it imply any change in the
17
American refusal to recognize the Communist regime.
The Soviet request, condemning what was termed "acts 
of aggression" by the United States against Communist China, 
was placed on the agenda as a second item, not to be con­
sidered until action of the item concerning the coastal
islands had been concluded. The vote was ten to one, with
18Nationalist China casting the negative vote.
Peking 1s Negative Response
As soon as the New Zealand cease-fire move was made 
known, the Chinese Communist press vehemently denounced the 
effort. The People's Daily, in an editorial on January 29, 
said:
M V , ,
New York Times, February 1, 1955, p. 4.
17Text of Lodge's statement m  D .S .B ., XXXII, No. 816 
(February 14, 1955), p. 253.
18New York Times, February 1, 1955, p. 1.
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There is no cease-fire to discuss. To have a 
cease-fire with the Chiang Kai-shek nest of traitors 
is to sell out the interests of the Chinese people.
This cease-fire plot contravenes the United 
Nations Charter and constitutes an intervention in 
China*s internal affairs. ^
On January 31, the People^ Daily added that, "The
proposal of New Zealand is absolutely unacceptable to the
Chinese people. The Chinese people are determined to
liberate their coastal islands, Taiwan and the Penghu 
20islands." The formal Communist reply came three days 
after the Security Council extended its invitation. On 
February 3, Chou En-lai issued a statement in which he set 
forth three conditions to be fulfilled if the United Nations 
expected Communist participation in the Council meetings.
He declared:
The Government of the People's Republic of 
China holds that [1] only for the purpose of 
discussing the resolution of the Soviet Union and 
[2] only when the representative of the Chiang 
Kai-shek clique has been driven out from the Security 
Council and [3] only when the representative of the 
People's Republic of China is to attend in the name 
of China, can the People's Republic of China agree 
to send a representative to take part in the dis­
cussion of the Security Council.
By demanding conditions impossible for the United 
Nations to accept, Peking virtually rejected the United Nations
19Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 977 (January 29- 
31, 1955), p. 2.
20 Ibid., No. 97 8 (February 1, 1955), pp. 1-2.
21Text in New York Times, February 4, 1955, p. 2.
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invitation. Chou, however, did not rule out the possibility
of international settlement of the problem through other
channels. In concluding his statement, Chou said:
All genuine international efforts to ease and 
to eliminate the tension created by the United 
States in this area and in other areas of the Far 
East will receive the support of the People's 
Republic of China.
The Chinese Communists might have remembered their
experience in participating in the debates of the Security
Council on the question of Formosa in November 1950. It
was futile for them to expect any gains in that world body
so long as the United States and other Western powers
23commanded the votes. On the other hand, Peking had 
scored a tremendous success in the 1954 Geneva Conference 
leading to the partition of Indochina. It was highly 
probable that what the Communists had in mind was another 
Geneva-type conference.
U.N. Action Suspended
The State Department, regretting Communist China's
abrupt rejection of the Security Council invitation, said,
"It is for the Security Council, which is constantly striving
24for peace, to consider this rejection. . . ." Meanwhile,
23Until the early 1960's when a host of newly- 
independent African nations were admitted into the United 
Nations, the American Government had nothing to worry 
about so far as votes of support were concerned.
24Text in New York Times, February 4, 1955, p. 2.
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the State Department indicated its distaste for another
Geneva-style meeting. As Henry Suydan, press officer of
the Department, observed, "I find it difficult to imagine
that anyone who participated in that experience would wish
25to repeat it." Confronted with the prohibitive price 
demanded by the Chinese Communists, the Security Council 
decided without a vote on February 14 to suspend its efforts 
to proceed with the New Zealand proposal. At the same time, 
the Council voted down, ten to one, the Soviet motion that 
it take the Russian item calling for the ouster of American
26and other non-Communist forces from all the Chinese islands.
Taipeifs View on a Cease-fire
President Eisenhower's expression of hope in a news 
conference on January 19 that the United Nations would look 
at the situation in the Formosa Strait was interpreted 
in Nationalist China as a cease-fire move by the world 
organization itself. Taipei was unhappy about a cease­
fire, but there was no immediate official comment. On 
January 19, China News, an English language daily whose 
publisher had close connections with government circles, 
said that free China would fight to the very end "against
25Ibid., February 5, 1955, p. 1.
^ T h e  debates of the Security Council on the offshore 
islands question were summarized in a report in the United 
Nations Review under the heading of "China Hostilities, 'Ag­
gression* Charge Before Council," I, No. 9 (March 1955),
pp. 1-6.
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such a presumptuous idea as a cease-fire" with the Com- 
27munists. The next day, January 20, China News reported
that "both official and private sources" regarded the idea
28of a cease-fire as "inconceivable and arbitrary." The
papers quoted these sources as saying that Nationalist
China would "never recognize an artifically fixed line that
would "even hint at recognition of the status quo created
29by the Communist rebellion as it exists today." The
English daily also reported a Nationalist source as saying,
"A cease-fire involves a preliminary step to acceptance of
the two Chinas theory." "Such an idea," it continued,
"affects our sovereignty and will meet with basic opposi—
,.30tion.
Although a cease-fire would seem to have been to the 
Nationalists* advantage, considering their weak position 
on the offshore islands, their opposition, although less 
articulate, was no less intense than that of the Com­
munists. The reason for the Nationalists* objection must 
be viewed in the light of their political ideology. In 
spite of the fact that the Chinese mainland was under Com­
munist control, the Nationalist Government considered itself
27New York Times, January 20, 1955, p. 3.
2 8Ibid., January 21, 1955, p. 2.
29Ibid.
30T, .Ibid.
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to be the only legal government of China, Although its
domain consisted only of Formosa, the Pescadores, and some
offshore islands, the Nationalist Government insisted that
31it was still "suppressing a rebellion." Following this 
line of thinking, the Nationalists naturally opposed any 
proposal that would help consolidate in law the actual 
existence of two Chinese governments.
On Saturday, January 22, it was publicly known that 
the President's Message requesting Congressional sanction 
to use American forces in the defense of Formosa was scheduled 
to be delivered to Congress on the following Monday. Nation­
alist Foreign Minister George Yeh, after a talk with Assis­
tant Secretary Robertson on Saturday morning, encountered 
questioning from newsmen who gathered in the State Depart­
ment. He spoke in a dour and impatient manner: "We feel
that anything which would suggest two Chinas would be
32objectionable, period, period, good-by."
After President Eisenhower's message went to Congress,
there was no official comment in Taipei. However, China
News, on January 25, summed up various local reactions in an
editorial declaring that the message had been received there
33with "mixed feelings of gratification and disappointment."
31This continues to be the position of the Nationalist 
Government up to the present, although it has been soft- 
pedalled in recent years. (Personal knowledge of this writer.)
32New York Times, January 23, 1955, p. 3.
33Henry R. Lieberman, "Silent on U.S. Statement," 
in Ibid., January 26, 1955, p. 6.
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It was understandable that Eisenhower's message was a source
of gratification because he was asking Congress for advance
sanction to use American forces to defend Formosa and other
related areas. On the other hand, President Eisenhower,
while making no specific mention of defending the offshore
islands, clearly indicated that he felt American forces
would have to be ready to assist the Nationalist Government
to "redeploy" their forces in some of these islands if the
34Taipei Government "should so desire." This reference 
was obviously to the Tachen Islands which the Administration 
had declared were not vital to the defense of Formosa. Conse 
quently, the Nationalists were also disappointed in the 
President's message.
Evacuation of the Tachens and Nanchi
As previously mentioned, American Ambassador Rankin
had given Generalissimo Chiang some encouragement to fortify
the Tachens in 1953 in the wake of American military opinion
in Taipei favoring such a measure. However, it was decided
at the National Security Council meeting on January 20,
1955, that American forces should assist the Nationalists
35to evacuate their forces in the Tachens. Later, Joseph 
Alsop, who knew that it was a reversal of the Administra­
tion's policy, commented, "Just two years ago the shoe was
3 6on exactly the other foot."
34President Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1955, p. 209. 
^ Supra, Chapter IV.
^Joseph Alsop, "We Pushed Chiang Into Tachens,"
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After the decision made at that National Security 
Council meeting, Washington began trying to persuade Taipei 
to evacuate the Tachens. The Nationalist Government did 
not budge until February 5, after the Communists had rejected 
the Security Council’s invitation to take part in the dis­
cussion of a possible cease-fire. The Nationalists were
more worried about a cease-fire move initiated by the United
37Nations than they were by a retreat from the Tachens, 
which, by their own estimate, were difficult to defend. If 
a cease-fire were to materialize under the auspices of the 
United Nations, it would be an international recognition of 
two Chinese governments. The potential political, moral 
and psychological impact of such an undertaking would be 
more disastrous than the loss of the Tachens. It would, 
among other things, destroy the Nationalist hope with its 
rallying cry, "Return to the mainland!", upon which the 
raison d 'etre of the Nationalist Government was mainly 
dependent.
The Nationalist Government, having learned that the 
Communists also repudiated a two-China concept, acquiesced 
in United States pressure and accepted American naval 
assistance as of February 6 to evacuate its forces and 
civilian population from the Tachens. During the Tachens
(cont’d) Washington Post & Times Herald, February 
13, 1955. Reprinted in Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 13 
(Appendix), p. A876.
3 7 tRankin, China Assignment, p. ^223.
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evacuation, the United States employed seventy^-five vessels
of several different types, an impressive show of American
military might in the Western Pacific. Notwithstanding the-.
emphatic Communist warnings that any provocation would lead
3 8to a major conflict, the evacuation was uneventful. Ob­
viously, the Chinese Communists did not intend to precipitate 
a direct confrontation with the United States, especially
e
since the Defense Department had indicated that American
forces would defend themselves if attacked during the
39evacuation operation.
After Washington informed Taipei, on February 22, that
the United States would not help defend Nanchi, an island
group about 150 miles north of Formosa, the Nationalist
Government decided to evacuate the islands and completed
40the operation without American aid. With the evacuation 
of the Tachens and Nanchi, the Nationalist-held offshore 
islands were reduced to Quemoy and Matsu. However, these 
were considered strategically important because they com­
manded vessel movement in and out of the Ports of Amoy and
38An American naval plane was shot down by Communist 
coastal gunfire, but the flyer was rescued by American ves­
sels. President Eisenhower treated the incident lightly 
during a news conference on February 9, 1955. President 
Eisenhower, Public Papers, 19 55, p. 262.
39New York Times, February 7, 1955, p. 1. President 
Eisenhower personally approved the Defense Department’s 
directive to the American forces assigned to the Tachen 
evacuation. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 469.
40Rankin, China Assignment, p. 223.
136
Fuchow on the mainland. Thereafter international discussion 
af~ the Nationalist offshore islands pertained only to 
Quemoy and Matsu.
Nationalists Firm on Quemoy and Matsu
In a statement on February 8 , Generalissimo Chiang
personally criticized the United Nations move toward a
cease-fire and the two-China scheme. He stated that a
cease-fire would threaten the sovereignty of the Nationalist
Government and contended that it would whet the Communist
appetite for further aggression. He repudiated the two-
China idea and called it "ridiculous.1 Chiang said, "I
would like to ask those people holding such a view whether,
if unhappily Soviet Russia should invade their countries and
install Quisling [puppet] regimes on their soil, they would
still be prepared to swallow the reality of having their
41countries cut into halves?" He quoted a teaching of
Confucius: "Do not do unto others what you do not like
42done unto yourself." Then Chiang observed, "This is a
principle of behavior not only between men but also between 
43countries." The Generalissimo believed that the Communist
occupation of the Chinese mainland was the result of Soviet
intrigue in China over the past forty years and that the
44Peking regime was a puppet of Moscow.
_ _
New York Times, February 11, 1955, p. 3.
42_, . j Ibid.
43Ibid.
44Chiang Kai-shek*s version of the Communist victory 
in China was expressed in detail in his book, Soviet Russia 
in China (New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1957).
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After the evacuation of the Tachens, Chiang expressed
the Nationalists* determination to hold on to Quemoy and
Matsu at all cost. In one of his rare press conferences,
on February 13, President Chiang declared, "They [Quemoy
and Matsu] constitute parts of the bastion where our people
and government are withstanding the aggression of the' inter-
45national Communist bloc." He stressed, "In no case
46would they be abandoned to the enemy." Chiang reiterated
Nationalist opposition to the idea of two-Chinas: "It
goes without saying that the Republic of China can not
renounce the sacred mission of liberating the compatriots
47
on the mainland." While the Nationalists and the Com­
munists were opposing each other on all other counts, they 
agreed on at least one thing: both rejected a cease-fire
arrangement.
Soviet Proposal for an International Conference
As soon as the Chinese Communists had rejected the 
invitation of the Security Council to take part in the 
discussion of the hostilities in the Formosa Strait, Soviet 
Foreign Minister Molotov proposed in a conversation with 
British Ambassador Hayter on February 4, that a ten-power 
international conference settle the matter. The proposal,
45New York Times, February 14, 1955, p. 1.
46t. . ,Ibid.
47fibid.
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however, was kept secret until February 12 when Radio Moscow
broadcast its contents. The Soviet proposal stated that
the unwillingness of the United States and Britain to
consider the "just and lawfully"-made demands of Peking had
rendered it impossible "lawfully and impartially" to discuss
48the Formosa Straits problem in the Security Council. Conse­
quently, Moscow maintained that it was necessary to act 
to reduce tension in the area through other channels.
According to the Soviet proposal, the ten powers 
would consist of the United States, Communist China, Britain, 
the Soviet Union, France, India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan 
and Ceylon. Among them, Britain, India and the Soviet 
Union would be the sponsors of the conference. The Russians
suggested that the conference be held in either Shanghai or 
49New Delhi. It was interesting to note that the five 
Asian nations included were those which already recognized 
the Peking regime. The very composition of the conference 
indicated that such a meeting, if it were to be convened, 
would be predominantly pro-Communist China.
Britain objected to the fact that the Soviet proposal 
would exclude Nationalist participation. Commenting on the 
proposal, the British reply noted, "A conference that did
48Text m  Documents on International Affairs, 1955 
(London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute
of International Affairs, 1958), p. 451.
49Ibid., p . 452.
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not include both of the two parties most directly concerned
50could not have a useful result." It further observed,
"The position of the United Nations should not be over- 
51looked." As the Soviet proposal was not addressed to the
United States, Washington made no official comment but
52fully agreed with the British position on the matter.
British Views on the Offshore Islands
The British Government's attitude toward the hos­
tilities in the Formosa Strait became increasingly clear 
after President Eisenhower's January 24 message to Congress, 
seeking advance congressional authorization to use American 
forces in the defense of Formosa and related areas. This 
was in large part due to the fact that the Labour Party was 
forcing the Government's hand more than ever. Dissatisfied 
with American policy as indicated in Eisenhower's message to 
Congress, the Labour leader, Clement Attlee, on January 2 6 
in the House of Commons asked Foreign Secretary Eden to 
report on the situation in the Formosa Strait.
Speaking in defense of the American position, Eden 
pointed out that President Eisenhower was careful to say that 
he did not suggest enlarging the American defensive commit­
ment beyond Formosa and the Pescadores. At the same
^ Ibjd. , p. 454.
51T, . ,Ibid.
52New York Times, February 13, 1955, p. 1.
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time, the Foreign Secretary balanced his statement by 
saying:
On the other hand, Her Majesty1s Government 
also understand that in the matter of the coastal 
islands the Chinese [Communist] Government cannot be 
expected to act in such a way as might seem to 
prejudice what they regard as their rights.
The British Government saw a significant difference 
between Formosa and the offshore islands and was forced to 
spell it out in a subsequent exchange between the Opposi­
tion and the Government. Attlee asserted that "in the 
matter of Formosa and the offshore islands" there was an 
intervention in the Chinese civil war on the part of the 
United States. Aneuran Bevan, leader of Labour radical 
wing, claimed that both Formosa and the offshore islands 
belonged to the Peking regime. Eden replied that he was 
surprised to hear the Labourite utterance that Formosa and 
the offshore islands should be treated in the same category. 
He stated bluntly:
Formosa has never in this century been a part 
of China . . . whereas the offshore islands have
always been regarded by us as part of China.54
The Labourites were not satisfied with Edenfs
statement. Attlee insisted that although Formosa was seized
by Japan, it was declared during the War to be an integral
part of China, and that Chiang Kai-shek's deposition did not
53The Times (London), January 27, 1955, p. 6.
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alter this fact. Eden, throughout the debate, held fast
to his position that the status of Formosa was not comparable
55to that of the offshore islands.
Peking likewise did not relish Eden*s distinction 
between Formosa and the offshore islands. The People1s 
Daily., in an article on January 29, rebutted the British 
Secretary*s statement, saying:
The purpose of Eden *s attempt to represent 
Taiwan as not being part of China is to dismember 
China and bring into being a so-called "two Chinas" 
idea . . . This is a most unfriendly attitude on
their part to the Chinese people. The Chinese 
people absolutely will not tolerate it.^^
Relevance of the Cairo Declaration
Obviously the Labourite claim that Formosa belonged
to China was based on the Cairo Declaration of December
1943 to which the British Government had subscribed. The
question of the Cairo Declaration, therefore, was addressed
to Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the British signatory
to the Declaration, in the House of Commons on February 1.
Churchill said that the Cairo Declaration "contains merely a
statement of common purpose," and since it was made "a lot
57of things have happened." He concluded, "The position of
55Ibid.
56Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 977 (January 29
31, 1955), p .  12.
57
New York Times, February 2, 19 55, p. 1; and The
Times (London), February 2, 1955, p. 8.
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Formosa has become an international one in which a number
58of other nations are closely concerned." This was in 
harmony with the American viewpoint on the status of Formosa. 
The Chinese Communists, unable to tolerate any suggestion 
that Formosa was a problem of international concern, im­
mediately accused Churchill of a "dishonest repudiation of
59the Cairo Declaration."
On February 4, the Labourites in the House of 
Commons renewed interrogation on the question of Formosa, 
particularly its present status. In a written statement, 
Foreign Secretary Eden replied:
The arrangement made with Chiang Kai-shek to 
put him there was on a basis of military occupation 
pending further arrangement, and did not, of itself, 
constitute the territory Chinese.
Formosa and the Pescadore Islands are, there­
fore, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, terri­
tory the de jure sovereignty over which is uncertain 
or undetermined. 0
In this statement, Eden also declared that the offshore 
islands presently under the. Nationalist control were an 
"undoubted part of the territory of the People's Republic 
of China." But he added:
Any attempt by the Government of the People's 
Republic of China, however, to assert its authority 
over these islands by force would . . . give rise
to a situation endangering peace and security, which 
is properly a matter of international concern.^
^ New York Times, February 3, 1955, p. 6.
6'0'The Times (London), February 8, 1955, p. 11. 
61Ibid.
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Thus, it became clear that while the British position
on the status of Formosa was in line with the thinking of
the United States, its professed attitude that the offshore
islands formed part of the territory of Peking went too far
for Washington to accept. Since the British Government did
not favor the Chinese Communists taking the offshore islands
by force, the logical conclusion was that the Nationalists
should surrender them to the Reds. This was what the
Labourites asked Foreign Secretary Eden to say explicitly
in the House of Commons on February 7. Nevertheless, the
Foreign Secretary refused, at least at the moment, to make
utterance on that count. Eden said, "I think we should do✓
62far better to try to get agreement between all concerned."
Eisenhower-Churchill Correspondence
Since the crisis in the Formosa Strait began in 
September 1954, the United States had kept its principal 
ally, Britain, informed of American policy in that area. In 
addition to formal diplomatic contacts, President Eisenhower 
had maintained personal correspondence with British Prime 
Minister Churchill. In a letter to Churchill of February 10, 
1955, Eisenhower explained the great psychological and 
political significance which the Nationalists attached to the 
islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and pointed out that the aban­
donment of these outposts would endanger the very existence
^ I b i d . , February 8, 1955, p. 11.
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of the Nationalist regime in Formosa. Consequently, Eisen­
hower believed that "certain assurances with respect to the 
offshore islands" would have to be given to Taipei, but
they "must be less binding on us than the terms of the
63Chino-American [sic] treaty." Eisenhower told Churchill
what the Administration would do in the event of a Communist
attack on the offshore islands:
We must make a distinction'— (this a difficult 
one)-— between an attack that has only as its objec­
tive the capture of an off-shore island and one 
that is primarily a preliminary movement to an 
all-out attack on Formosa.
Churchill replied, however, that there was "no
decisive relationship" between the offshore islands and the
defense of Formosa, and that the Nationalists' purpose for
holding the offshore islands was "as a bridgehead for an
6 5invasion of Red China." He was inclined to think that 
the Chinese Communists would be satisfied to get the off­
shore islands and would no longer harbor serious intentions 
to attack Formosa. Eisenhower could not agree with him on 
these points. He wrote again to Churchill on February 19, 
explaining all the painstaking efforts made by the Adminis­
tration to restrain the Nationalists from offensive military 
actions against the Chinese mainland. Eisenhower told him 
that a Nationalist retreat from Quemoy and Matsu would not
^Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 471. 
6.4 T .^.-Ibid.
65Ibid., p. 472.
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solve the real problem, which was the Communist determina­
tion to conquer Formosa. In addition to being a futile 
attempt at solving the real problem by retreating from 
Quemoy and Matsu, Eisenhower said, "This retreat, and the 
coercion we would have to exert to bring it about, would 
undermine the morale and the loyalty of the non-Communist 
forces on Formosa."^
Anglo-American Differences Crystalized
Apparently, Eisenhower could not persuade Churchill 
to accept his viewpoints on the offshore islands. Churchill 
made public the attitude of the British Government in a 
statement to the House of Commons on February 23. In that 
statement, he said:
There is no question of our being involved 
militarily or indeed of our being needed in the 
defense of the coastal islands. We should be careful 
of what advice we should offer to our friends and 
allies upon it. . . . This is especially true at
a time when the Chinese communists keep stridently 
asserting that the islands are to be regarded as a 
stepping stone to the seizure of Formosa itself 
• . •  •
While Churchill publicly announced that the British 
Government had nothing to do with the offshore islands, he 
was careful not to say what advice on that matter he had 
given to Eisenhower for the sake of Anglo-American unity.
Yet through secret diplomacy the British Government urged
^ Ibid. , pp. 473-74.
6 7The Times (London), February 24, 1955, p. 12.
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Washington to accept the principle of a Nationalist with­
drawal from Quemoy and Matsu. During the SEATO Council 
meeting in Bangkok shortly afterward, British Foreign 
Secretary Eden championed this policy in his talks with
go
Secretary Dulles. The Secretary was instructed to tell
his British counterpart that the United States "did not
intend to blackmail Chiang into an evacuation of Quemoy and
Matsu as long as Chiang deemed their possession vital to
the spirit and morale of the Formosan garrison and popula- 
69tion." There was no progress toward Anglo-American policy 
coordination on the offshore islands issue.
Sino-Sovie^ Solidarity
While the United States could not see eye to eye 
with its major ally, Britain, on the question of the off­
shore islands, the Soviet Union had been ^ giving the Chinese 
Communists unfailing support through diplomacy and propa­
ganda. These manoeuvers were evidenced by the Soviet version 
of a cease-fire and the proposed ten-power international 
conference for the benefit of Peking. The avowed Soviet 
support was not affected by the power reshuffle in the 
Kremlin on February 8, 19 55. On the same day that Marshall 
Nikolai A. Bulganin became the new Soviet Premier, Foreign
^®Beal, John Foster Dulles, p. 227.
69Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 475.
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Minister Molotov made a policy statement before the Supreme 
Soviet to reiterate the Soviet policy on Formosa. He 
declared:
The position of the Soviet Union in this 
question is clear and well known: we consider the
question of Taiwan is an internal affair of China, 
while the aggressive action of the United States and 
its threats of war we consider as an aggression 
which must be unconditionally condemned by the United 
Nations, if it values its authority.
Premier Bulganin, in his first speech to the Supreme Soviet
on February 9, also accused the United States of following
an "aggressive" policy in Asia. He said, "They are setting
up military blocs, organizing military provocation against
the Chinese People's Republic and intervening in her internal 
71affairs." Bulganin stressed that Communist China "can
count upon the help of its faithful friend, the great Soviet.
72people" and "that help will be forthcoming when needed."
The Soviet message of February 14, on the occasion of the 
fifth anniversary of the Sino—Soviet Treaty of Friendship 
and Mutual Assistance, emphasized that the "inviolable 
friendship" between the Soviet and Chinese people was of
73"permanent significance today," especially in the Far East.
70New York Times, February 9, 1955, p. 6.
71Text in New York Times, February 10, 1955, p. 4.
72Ibid.
73Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 987 (February 
14, 1955) , p. 3.
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Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist leadership played 
up the significance of the Soviet support. Mao Tse-tung, 
in one of hi3 rare public appearances, spoke briefly but 
emphatically at a reception in the Soviet Embassy on 
February 14, held in observance of the Sino-Soviet Treaty.
He declared:
. . . With the great cooperation between China
and the Soviet Union there are no aggressive plans 
of imperialism which cannot be smashed. They will 
certainly be thoroughly smashed. Should the 
imperialists start a war of aggression, we, together 
with the people of the whole world, will certainly 
wipe them out clean from the surface of the globe I ^
On the same occasion, Chou En-lai charged the United
States with "stepping up aggression and war provocation
75against the Chinese people in the area of Formosa." Chou's 
speech also stressed that the Sino-Soviet alliance would 
serve as a deterrent against "aggressive" American action.
The Chinese Communist military high command likewise 
harped on Sino-Soviet unity in the event of an "aggressive" 
war launched by the United States. On February 22, Peng 
Teh-huai, Communist Defense Minister, in a rally honoring 
Soviet Red Army Day at Port Arthur, the joint-controlled 
naval base in Manchuria, declared:
74Ibid., No. 988 (February 15, 1955), p. 1.
^ I b i d . , p . 3.
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If anyone should dare to launch an aggressive 
war, our countries will support each other at all 
times. We warn the United States aggressive clique 
not to make a miscalculation, otherwise nothina but the 
most deplorable and ignominious end awaits it.
By repeatedly stressing Sino-Soviet solidarity to
warn the United States not to attempt an "aggressive war,"
Peking intimated that, if attacked, it would rely upon an
invocation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and
Alliance of February 14, 1950. Article I of that treaty
provided:
In the event of one of the high contracting 
parties being attacked by Japan or states allied 
with it, and thus involved into a state of war, 
the other high contracting party will immediately 
render military and other assistance . . . ^
Washington's Appraisal of the Treaty
The treaty provision appeared to be defensive in 
purpose, and it was aimed at "Japan or states allied with 
it." During the discussion of the Formosa Resolution, the 
Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, and 
no doubt the Administration as well, had studied the implica­
tions of the Sino-Soviet treaty and the possibility of Red 
China enlisting Soviet assistance under the treaty provi­
sions. The Senate joint committee in its report on the 
Formosa Resolution to the Senate stated that the United
^ Ibid., No. 993 (February 22-23, 1955), p. 6.
77Text in Documents on International Affairs, 1949- 
1950, p. 542.
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States was not to take aggressive action, but that the
language of the Sino-Soviet treaty was open to wide interpre- 
78tation. At the same time, the Administration indicated
to the committee that it doubted very much whether the
terms of the treaty would be invoked "even if further
difficulties should arise between the United States and
79Communist China." This conviction of the Administration, 
which was probably derived from intelligence studies, was 
also expressed in Eisenhower's letter to Churchill of 
February 10, 1955. As the President said, "I do not believe 
that even if we became engaged in a serious fight along the
coast of China, Russia would want to intervene with her
. 80own forces.
A Stalemate
Although the Chinese Nationalist Government was 
opposed to inviting the Peking regime to participate in the 
Security Council’s discussion of the hostile situation in 
the Formosa Strait, the objection was overruled by a 
majority of the Council members. The failure of the Security 
Council to deal with the Formosa situation was mainly due to
7 8' U.S., Congress, Senate, Authorizing the President
to Employ Armed Forces of the United States for Protecting 
the Security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and Related 
Positions and Territories, S. Rept. 14, 84th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1955, pp. 7-8.
Ibid.
80Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 471.
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the Communist rejection of its invitation to come to the 
Council for peaceful discussion. Britain’s simultaneous 
move to solicit the Soviet cooperation in furtherance of a 
desirable settlement was also of no avail. The Soviet Union 
took advantage of the disappointing development to propose 
a ten-power international conference to take up the off­
shore islands question. Britain and the United States 
gave chilly responses to the Soviet proposal because the 
proposed conference would exclude the participation of 
the Chinese Nationalist Government, which was one of the 
two contesting parties in the dispute. There was no 
immediate prospect for a peaceful Solution to the inflammable 
situation in the Formosa Strait.
Meanwhile, the Nationalist Government was forced to 
withdraw from the Tachens and Nanchi, the far-flung offshore 
islands, in addition to having been restrained from taking 
offensive military actions against the Chinese mainland by 
the treaty agreements with the United States. This retreat 
from two exposed positions and a de facto cease-fire on the 
part of the Nationalists were helpful in the reduction of 
causes of conflict with the Communists. However, the 
Nationalist Government avowed no further retreat and was 
determined to entrench in the remaining offshore islands 
of Quemoy and Matsu. The British sought to have the 
Nationalists withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu, but the United 
States would not coerce Taipei to do so. Therefore, London
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made it known that the British Government would have no 
part in an offshore islands war if the United States became 
involved in one. Likewise, Russian rhetoric notwithstanding, 
the Eisenhower Administration concluded that the Soviet 
military would not come to the aid of the Chinese Reds if 
Peking precipitated a direct confrontation with the United 
States in the Formosa Strait.
The conciliatory role that the British had tried to 
play on the Formosa question led only to vituperation from 
Peking. Whenever the British Government made statements 
relating to differences in the legal status of Formosa and 
the offshore islands, the Red Chinese regime rewarded her 
with instant and vigorous denunciation. Peking's position 
that Formosa and the offshore islands were "China's in­
ternal affairs" seemed to preclude reconciliation. After 
much noise and confusion, the situation had reached a 
stalemate on the international scene while the power align­
ments had become clear.
CHAPTER VI
A WAR OF NERVES
A Broken Promise
Before Congress adopted the Formosa Resolution on 
January 28, 1955, Secretary Dulles met with Nationalist 
Foreign Minister George Yeh and assured him that President 
Eisenhower would issue a statement that would in effect 
guarantee the American defense of Quemoy and Matsu as soon 
as the Resolution was passed. However, the President refused 
to comply with Dulles’ promise. Assistant Secretary Robert­
son informed Yeh on February 10, 1955, that there had been 
"a little misunderstanding between the State Department and 
the White House" on the matter.'*' Yeh produced the minutes
Joseph Alsop, "The Real Quemoy Story," Washington 
Post & Times Herald, February 16, 1955, reprinted in the 
Congressional Record, Vol. 101, Part 13 (Appendix), p. A946. 
This story was subsequently repeated by Marquis Childs, "Un­
happy Choices Confront Ike, 1 Washington Post, September 1, 
1958, p. 16; Joseph Alsop, "Quemoy: We Asked For It," New
York Herald Tribune, September 3, 1958, p. 18; and Christian 
Science Monitor, October 9, 1958, p. 1.
In addition,•Karl Rankin, former American Ambassador 
to Taipei, had an interesting passage in his book, China 
Assignment: "In March, 1956, Secretary Dulles again made a 
brief stop in Taipei . . .The Secretary took full and personal
responsibility for misunderstandings that had arisen during 
the previous year over the offshore islands. He was too 
generous . . .", p. 253.
Although the manuscripts of John F. Dulles have been 
deposited at the Princeton University Library, an important 
part of the Dulles collection still has a United States
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of the meeting, a copy of which Dulles had given him, but 
to no avail.
Foreign Minister Yeh was most unhappy to receive this 
news in his farewell visit to the State Department before 
leaving for Taipei on February 11. When asked by a newsman 
whether he had received a pledge of United States military 
assistance for Quemoy and Matsu, he replied that Washington 
had promised to help the Nationalists defend related posi­
tions and territories. "Did that mean Quemoy and Matsu?"
another reporter queried. "Of course," Yeh replied, "the
2pledge includes all the offshore islands."
Yeti's remarks aroused immediate reactions from Demo­
crats in Congress. Senator George said he understood that 
the Administration had made no pledge to defend Quemoy and 
Matsu. But he was sympathetic in attitude, taking the view 
that Yeh had said what he did for "home consumption" and
that he was trying to "keep up the courage and morale of
3the people" on Formosa. Those Democrats who had opposed
(cont'd) Government security classification and
will not be opened until the original files in the State 
Department on this period are made available to the general 
public. Louis L. Gerson, John Foster Dulles, Vol. XVII of 
The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, 
edited by Robert H. Ferrell (New York: Cooper Square Pub­
lishers, Inc., 1967), p. 362.
2
New York Times, February 11, 1955, p. 1; Congressional 
Record, V. 101, Part 2 (February 10 to March 14, 1955), p. 1463.
3New York Times, February 12, 1955, p. 3.
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the Formosa Resolution were not as calm in their reactions.
"I should like to know who is lying," Senator Morse said,
"if the Nationalist Chinese have a Foreign Minister in this
country who is issuing such a lie, he should be repudiated
4by this Administration." Senator Lehman said that Yeti's
statement "may be prophetic of serious difficulties to 
5
come." Senator Humphrey announced that he intended to
request "a firm declaration of policy from Secretary Dulles
on the question of the offshore islands."^
The State Department was also unhappy about Yeh's
statement and suggested to him that he should clarify his
TVprevious remarks. So, the next day, February 11, the 
Nationalist Foreign Minister denied having used the word 
"pledge," and revised his comment on whether the Administra­
tion would defend Quemoy and Matsu under the Formosa Resolu­
tion. Yeh said, "I would not eliminate that possibility.
But it is a United States resolution. It is for the United
8States to decide." This incident reflected congressional 
sensitivity lest the Administration should commit itself to
4
Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 2, p. 1473.
5
, New York Times, February 12, 1955, p. 3.
6Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 1 .
^Ibid., p . 3.
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the specific defense of the offshore islands under the 
Formosa Resolution.
American Intentions Clarified
Thus, Secretary Dulles, in his address before the
Foreign Policy Association in New York on February 16, made
a special point of stressing that the United States "has
no commitment and no purpose to defend the coastal positions 
9as such." However, he did not suggest that the Nationalists 
should surrender the islands to the Communists. He pointed 
out that it was the Chinese Communists who had "linked the 
coastal positions to the defense of F o r m o s a . D u l l e s  
maintained that the United States "shall be alert to subse­
quent Chinese Communist actions, rejecting for ourselves 
any initiative of warlike deeds."^
At the same time, Dulles expressed the hope that the 
Chinese Communists would forbear using force to achieve 
their "goals." It was the first such expression he had used 
since the Chinese Reds rejected the Security Council's 
invitation. He said:
It is hardly to be expected that the Chinese 
Communists will renounce their ambitions. How­
ever, might they not renounce their efforts to 
realize their goals by force?^-^
9D.S.B., XXXII, No. 818 (February 28, 1955), p. 329.
^ Ibid. , p. 330.
i:LIbid.
12x, . jIbid.
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In this connection, Dulles held that Communist
rejection of the United Nations invitation uhas not ended
13the responsibility of that body." The President sup­
ported Dulles on this count by saying that the United
States was on record as seeking "every possible means for
14a cease-fire with justice to everybody in that region."
Surprised Reactions from Congress
Dulles* address, declaring that the Administration
had no intention to defend the offshore islands "as such,"
likewise caused immediate congressional reactions. It was
generally interpreted as suggesting that the offshore islands
might be traded for a cease-fire agreement in the light of
his call to the Chinese Communists to renounce the use of
force while not giving up their "ambitions." Senator
Knowland, surprising no one, warned against a "Far Eastern
Munich" that would give the Red Chinese the Quemoy and
15Matsu islands.
Unfavorable reactions to the address unexpectedly 
came from the Democratic side. On February 23, James 
Richards, Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Com­
mittee, accused Dulles of a lack of clarity or candor on 
the policy toward Formosa. He told the House that Dulles
14President Eisenhower, Public' Papers, 1955, pp. 288-89.
15New York Times, February 19, 1955, p. 4.
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had led Congress to understand that the United States
"would assuredly defend" the offshore islands of Quemoy 
16and Matsu. But now, Richards said, "Confusion has re­
placed determination among some of our leaders in the
17executive branch." He continued, "The Communist dictators,
instead of being given notice that we would not acquiesce in
any further aggression in the area of Formosa, apparently
are being invited to bargain with us for territory held by
18the Nationalist Government of China." The House Demo­
cratic floor leader, John McCormack, said that he, too, had.
understood from Dulles that Quemoy and Matsu were going to 
19be defended.
Dulles1 Trip to Southeast Asia
Secretary Dulles was not available to answer these 
charges at the time, as he was in Bangkok for the first 
Council meeting of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO). On February 23, the opening day of the SEATO 
Council meeting, Dulles urged the member nations not to 
view their defense problems as isolated situations but on a 
broader basis. He set forth a "three-front" strategy to 
cope with Communist aggression. The Secretary declared:
16Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 2, p. 1963.
^ Ibid. , p. 1962.
Ibid.
19Ibid., pp. 1963-64.
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Asia is three fronts. It is unlikely any war 
started by Communist China would be confined only 
to Formosa or .South Korea. The forces of these 
two fronts exist as a common' part of the forces 
deterring possible Communist aggression in South­
east Asia. 0
Dulles gave indications that the concentration of
American air and sea forces in the Western Pacific were at
an all-time high since the end of the Pacific War, and
that these forces were prepared to meet any emergency with
great mobility. It was a warning to the Chinese Communists
that the United States was prepared to meet them on all
fronts, as Peking was prone to probe each front one by one
and then attack the weakest.
After the Bangkok conference, Dulles visited Burma,
Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam, and the Philippines before
proceeding to Taipei for the exchange of instruments of
ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Nationalist
China on March 3. In Taipei, he gave specific warning to
the Chinese Communists not to assume that the American
defense "would be static and confined to Taiwan itself, or
that an aggressor would enjoy immunity with respect to the
21area from which he stages his offensive." At the same
/
time, Dulles again expressed the hope that the Chinese 
Reds "will not insist on war as an instrument of their
20New York Times, February 24, 1955, p. 3.
21D.S.B., XXXII, No. 820 (March 14, 1955), p. 421.
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22policy." He stressed, however, that "The United States
will not enter any negotiations dealing with the territories
or rights of the Republic of China except in cooperation
23with the Republic of China."
Dulles' statement was meant to serve two purposes.
On the one hand, it served notice to the Communists that 
the United States would be flexible in the defense of For­
mosa, including possible attacks on the Chinese mainland as 
well as an all-out defense of Quemoy and Matsu. On the 
other hand, the United States would not use Quemoy and 
Matsu to bargain for a cease-fire, thus dispelling any 
doubts that might have been generated by his February 16 
speech.
The Chinese Communists were attentive to all the
American statements and moves. In response to Dulles'
Taipei statement. People's Daily, in an article on March 5,
said, "It is day-dreaming for Dulles to think that the
24
Chinese people would beg for peace." The paper declared,
"The Chinese people must liberate Taiwan to protect their
sovereignty and territory . . . This is the firm stand of
25the Chinese people."
2 2 , .Ibid.
23Ibid.
24Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1001 (March 5-7, 
1955), p. 25.
25T.. 1Ibid.
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Serving Warning
The Secretary brought back a gloomy picture from
his two-week tour in Asia. Despite repeated admonitions to
the Chinese Communists not to engage in further aggression,
Dulles was not sure of the effectiveness of these warnings.
While stopping over in Honolulu on his return trip, the
Secretary told reporters: "I am still concerned about
2 6intentions of the Chinese•Communists."
After arriving in Washington and twice conferring 
with the President, Secretary Dulles made a widely pub­
licized radio and television address to. the nation on 
March 8, formally announcing a new American strategy for 
resisting Communist expansion in Asia. He told the American
people: "Everywhere I found ominous evidence of Communist
27efforts to terrorize, to beguile, to subvert." In order
to cope with the situation, Dulles held that any aggressive
Communist move should be regarded as an attack on the whole
of Southeast Asia and should be met with a mobile striking 
28force. He pointed out particularly that American sea and 
air forces in the Western Pacific had now been equipped 
with "new and powerful weapons of precision, which can 
utterly destroy military targets without endangering related
2 6New York Times, March 5, 1955, p. 2.
27D.S.B., XXXII, No. 821 (March 21, 1955), p. 459.
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29 'civilian centers," Dulles was referring to tactical
atomic weapons which were then ready for use.
The "Paper Tiger" Image
During his tour of Asia/ Dulles was deeply impressed 
by the success with which the Chinese Communists had por­
trayed the United States as merely a "paper tiger," one 
that would always find reasons to fall back when faced by 
brutal and uncompromising power. The Secretary made a 
special effort in his address to point out the fallacy of 
this description. He emphasized, "We must, if occasion 
offers, make it clear that we are prepared to stand firm, 
and,’ if necessary, meet hostile force with the greater 
force that we possess."^
In the case of Formosa, Dulles said that the question 
was not what to defend but how to defend, and that the 
President would decide how to implement a flexible plan of 
defense. The Secretary observed that Peking seemed deter­
mined to conquer Formosa, and that the response of the 
United States to an outright aggressive move "will have
importance both to Formosa and to all the Southeast Asia
31and Pacific countries."
29Ibid., pp. 459-60. 
30Ibid., p. 463. 
31Ibid.
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The Communist propaganda machine tried to stir up 
anti-colonial feelings in the Asian countries by making use 
of Dulles* speech. Radio Peking, quoting the Tientsin 
Ta Kung Pao of March 12, said, "By stressing that the United 
States would only provide sea and air power, Dulles re­
vealed at the same time that the United States was attempt-
32ing to use Asians to fight Asians."
The British Suggestion
On the same day that Dulles made his radio and tele­
vision address, British Foreign Secretary Eden also reported 
to the House of Commons on Southeast Asian affairs. On
the topic of Formosa, Eden, observing that the Chinese
Communists had refrained from attacking Quemoy and Matsu, 
stated:
Her Majesty*s Government trust that it 
[the Peking Government] will continue to exercise 
this restraint and that . . . while maintaining
intact in all respects its position in regard 
to Formosa and the Pescadores it will not prose­
cute its claims by forceful means.^3
As to the Chinese Nationalists, Eden asserted that:
We would like to see them withdraw their armed 
forces from the other coastal islands. [Hopefully]
. . . they too, while maintaining their claims,
will not prosecute them by forceful means and will
abstain from all offensive military action. 4
^ New York Times, March 12, 1955, p. 3.
33The Times (London), March 9, 1955, p. 6.
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The British Foreign Secretary believed that if these
expectations could be realized, it would be possible to
3 5settle the whole Formosa problem internationally. While 
the main features of Eden's proposal were to urge both sides 
to renounce the use of force as a means to carry out their 
claims, the immediate step to be taken required the 
Nationalists to evacuate their forces from the offshore 
islands. It was implicit that after the Nationalist forces 
withdrew, the Communists would take over the islands. Eden 
tended to think that by doing so it would clarify the 
problem: Thereafter any communist military actions against
Formosa would be attempts at seizing territory whose legal 
status was undetermined.
The Chinese Communists, however, were not in the 
least interested in Eden1s proposal, which involved the 
Nationalist retreat from the offshore islands so as to 
facilitate a political settlement. In rebuffing the British 
Foreign Secretary's conciliatory approach, Radio Peking, on 
March 11 declared:
The substance of his proposal is to secure 
the withdrawal of the United States and traitor 
Chiang Kai-shek from China's offshore islands as a 
means to legalize the occupation of Taiwan in­
definitely by the United States and perpetuate 
the military threat against China. 6
3 fi
New York Times, March 12, 1955, p. 3.
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That the withdrawal of the Nationalist forces from
the offshore islands would be a forward step toward a
peaceful settlement'of the Formosa problem proved to be
wishful thinking on the part of the British. Peking was not
contented with the withdrawal of the Nationalists from
Quemoy and Matsu. This confirmed President Eisenhower*s
belief that "what they are really interested in is Formosa,"
37as he wrote to Churchill on February 19.
The Atomic Deterrent
When Secretary Dulles said in his address of March 8
that American forces in the Western Pacific possessed "new -
and powerful weapons of precision," he was referring in
veiled terms to atomic weapons. The matter was clarified
in a White House meeting on March 10. The President shared
Dulles* view that the Chinese Reds were determined to capture
Formosa and that surrendering Quemoy and Matsu to them
would not be an end to the matter. Therefore, Dulles said,
"If we defend Quemoy and Matsu, we*11 have to use atomic
weapons. They alone will be effective against the main-
38land*s airfields." The President approved a limited use 
of atomic weapons if necessary and stated this point publicly. 
In his news conference on March 16, President Eisenhower 
said that the atomic weapons would be used with "bullet"
37Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 473.
38Ibid., p. 476.
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precision against military targets in the event of 
39war.
As part of a concerted effort by the Administration 
to exploit the deterrent effect of atomic weapons, Vice 
President Richard Nixon, in a speech on March 18, stated 
bluntly:
It would be insanity and madness for them 
[the Communists] to embark upon an additional 
aggression in the face of the consequences we 
have made clear will follow.40
Nixon did not say whether the Administration would
aid the Nationalists in defending the offshore islands,
but he implied strongly the possibility. As he said,
Those who suggest we could get peace in 
the Pacific by giving up additional territory 
to the Communists simply do not know the kind 
of animal we are dealing with.4-*-
Meanwhile, Secretary Dulles stressed the dangerous
characteristics of the Chinese Communists. He told the
Advertising Club in New York on March 21 that the Chinese
42Reds "constitute an acute and imminent threat." He said
that they seemed to be "dizzy with success," and that they
had "a very exaggerated sense of their own power" while they
"gravely underestimate the power and resolution of the
43non-Communist world." Dulles maintained that the
^President Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1955, p. 332.
4 0|
41*
40New York Times, March 19, 1955, p. 16.
Ibid.
42D.S.B., XXXII, No. 823 (April 4, 1955), p. 551.
43ibid.
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"aggressive fanaticism" of the Chinese leaders "presents
a certain parallel to that of Hitler" and "contrasts with
44the past tactics of Soviet communism." The Secretary
concluded that the Chinese Communist tactics "may prove more
dangerous and provocative of war" in the immediate future
45than those of the Soviet Union.
Behind these declarations of the readiness to use 
tactical atomic weapons and the particular danger of the 
temperament of the Chinese Communists was a military appraisal 
that the period from March 15 to 25 was the time of "great­
est danger" during which the Chinese Communists might
46launch an all-out attack against Quemoy or Matsu. Playing
up the deterrent effect of atomic weapons was designed to
prevent the Communists from attempting such an adventure.
Peking simply called it a vain attempt at "atomic black- 
47mail." In fact, a reluctance on the part of the Adminis­
tration to actually plan to use atomic weapons in the 
Formosa area was reflected in the President*s news con­
ference on March 23. He said that the United States would 
not use atomic weapons in a "police action," although he 
declined to predict how he would characterize a possible
44Ibid.
Ibid.
46 .Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 477.
47New York Times, March 21, 1955, p. 5.
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fight over Quemoy and Matsu. He spoke unequivocally against
indiscriminate use of atomic weapons. The President said,
"I repeat, the concept of atomic war is too horrible for
man to endure and to practice, and he must find some way 
4 8out of it." A peaceful settlement of disputes was the
alternative. The President declared again, "Any just,
reasonable solution of the difficulty in the Formosa Strait
would receive our most earnest and sympathetic considera- 
.,49tion,
A New Trend in Cease-fire Ideas
The idea of a cease-fire, since its inception on 
September 12 at the National Security Council meeting, had, 
in fact, always haunted the thinking of the Administration 
despite the abortive attempt made by the United Nations. 
Dulles1 address to the Foreign Policy Association on 
February 16 was the first open American bid. The Secre­
tary's subsequent statements of March 3 and 8, while stress­
ing that the United States stood firm and would use atomic
t
weapons to deal with further Communist aggression, were 
mingled with a desire for a cease-fire expressed in varying 
terms.
In this respect, Secretary Dulles broke new ground 
in his news conference on March 15 when he was asked to
48President Eisenhower, Public Papers, 195 5, p. 358.
49Ibid., p. 362.
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comment on Eden*s assertion that a renunciation of the use
of force did not mean a renunciation of claims. He said:
Well, if there were a renunciation of the use 
of force-, that would meet the immediate require" 
ments of the situation and there would be no 
necessity that I can see for anybody, either on the 
Republic of China*s side or the Communist side, to 
renounce what they might call their legal preten­
tions , their legal c l a i m s .
During his first visit to Canada as the Secretary 
of State, Dulles reiterated this point. In a news conference 
held at Ottawa on March 18, Dulles said that the best way 
for the Chinese Communists to avoid misunderstanding of 
their aim in the Formosa Strait would be for the Peking 
regime to make a clear statement that it would not use 
force to achieve its goals. In this connection, he re­
marked that such a renunciation of the use of force would
entail no relinquishment of either Nationalist or Communist
51China*s conflicting claims of sovereignty.
The Canadian Attitude
A cease-fire of this nature had first been expressed 
by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs,
L. B. Pearson, in the House of Commons on January 25. In 
answer to parliamentary inquiries as to the cease-fire move 
proposed by President Eisenhower in his January 24 message
50D.S.B., XXXII, No. 822 (March 22, 1955), p. 527.
51New York Times, March 19, 19 55, p. 1.
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to Congress, the Canadian Foreign Secretary told the 
House:
My understanding of the basis of a truce or 
cease-fire is that neither the Nationalists, which 
we recognize, nor the Communists need be asked 
to give up their claims on the territory now held 
by the other side. What they would be asked to 
give up, of course, is the use of military means 
to achieve their aspirations.
On March 24, Secretary Pearson further explained
the Canadian Government’s attitude toward the tension in
the Formosa Strait. He told the House of Commons that
Canadian neutrality in any major war involving the United
States was impossible. However, Pearson held that he did
not consider a conflict over Quemoy and Matsu to be one
"requiring any Canadian intervention in support of the
53Chinese Nationalist regime." He expressed the fear that 
even limited American intervention in the Formosa Strait, 
defensive in purpose, might start a chain reaction that
54would cause the conflict to spread "even across the ocean." 
Thus, the situation became clear: neither Britain, America's
major ally in Western Europe, nor Canada, America's close 
neighbor, would participate in a war over the islands.
52Reprinted m  the Congressional Record, V. 101,
Part 1, p. 985.
53New York Times, March 25, 1955, p. 1.
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A War Scare
While the Administration played up the deterrent 
effects of atomic weapons, it also endeavored to express 
the American desire for a cease-fire to the extent of 
advocating the formula that a renunciation of the use of 
force did not mean a relinquishment of a claim. Unfor­
tunately, unexpected "war talk" from a high military official 
in the Administration blurred the picture. On March 24, 
Admiral Robert Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, at a 
luncheon party with Washington correspondents, reportedly
predicted an American war with the Chinese Communists over
55Quemoy and Matsu by April 15. Although it was an off-the-
record remark, the story was leaked out on March 25. Since
the Administration made no secret of its preparedness to
use tactical atomic weapons in the event of a war, it was
not hard to imagine the grim prospect of such a conflict.
Immediately after Carney's alleged prediction of war, the
White House purposely allowed a "news leak" saying that the
5 6President did not believe in any imminent danger of war, 
but this could not dispel the effects of a war scare. People 
were more inclined to believe the bad news than the good, 
as is usually the case.
55New York Times, March 26, 1955, p. 1. Later,
Admiral Carney denied that he had predicted war. Ibid.,
April 6, 1955, p. 16.
5 6Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 479.
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Following the propagation of Carney's war story, the 
right-wing Republicans publicly advocated American commit­
ment to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. On March 27,
Senator Knowland on the Columbia Broadcasting System's 
"Face the Nation" television program said that America's 
"active defense" of Quemoy and Matsu would be worth "what­
ever was necessary to do the job . . . unless we are prepared
57to see all of Asia go down the drain.11 On the same day,
Senator Styles Bridges, Chairman of the Senate Republican
Policy Committee, appeared on the "Meet the Press" television
program of the National Broadcasting Company. He said, "I
personally would hold Quemoy and Matsu. . . .  I think it
58will be done and I certainly am for that."
Talk of a "War Party"
In view of the scare that developed after Carney's 
alleged prediction of war, the Administration, hoping to 
clear the air, invited the leaders of both parties in the 
House and Senate to the White House on March 30 and 31. 
However, before the scheduled meetings took place, there 
was an open exchange in the Senate between Lyndon Johnson, 
the Democratic majority leader, and William Knowland, the 
Republican minority leader.
^ New York Times f March 28, 1955, p. 3.
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Senator Johnson, who had been absent during the 
debates on the Formosa Resolution due to illness, brought 
up the charge of a "war party" in the Senate on March 28.
He told the Senate:
. . . i t  would be folly to jeopardize our 
future through an irresponsible adventure for 
which we have not calculated all the risks. We
do not want a war party nor do we want an
appeasement party. 9
Jhonson praised the President and Senator George, 
saying that neither had joined a war party nor an appease­
ment party. The Senator*s remarks referred to the right-
wing Republicans who were regarded as favoring a preventive
6 0war against the Communists.
Knowland replied that the three wars in which the 
United States had been involved in his lifetime had come 
under Democratic Administrations. He declared that he knew 
of no "war party" or "war faction" in the United States. He 
posed a question:
After having taken a firm stand in January by 
passing the Formosa Resolution . . . are we to be
placed in position of marching up the hill, as soon 
as there are^some dire communist threats, marching
down again in the face of those threats?^1
59Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 3,(March 15- 
April 1, 1955), pp. 3784, 3789.
6 0For the assertion that there was a war party in the 
United States, see D. F. Fleming, "Our Brink-of-War Diplomacy 
in the Formosa Strait," Western Political Quarterly, LX, No. 3 
(September, 1956), pp. 535-52; and Richard H. Rovere, "Letter 
from Washington," New Yorker, April 30, 1955, pp. 103-0 8.
61Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 3, p. 37 89.
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Knowland said that all American people "desire our
policy to be not one of peace at any price but peace with 
6 2honor." The charge that there was a war party in the 
United States did not end with the Johnson-Knowland ex­
change. Senator Kefauver, who had been opposed to any 
reference to the offshore islands during the debates on the 
Formosa resolution, delivered a violent speech attacking the 
Administration over the offshore islands policy on March 30. 
He asserted:
That the United States should be plunged into 
a war over Matsu and Quemoy ought to be unthinkable. 
Yet there are those in high places in the present 
Administration who are plotting and planning to 
bring such a war about, whatever the risk involved.
President Eisenhower has wisely limited the 
final decision as to United States action to 
himself. But the conclusion is inescapable that 
the present war party is attempting to create a 
situation and an atmosphere in which the President 
would have no choice but follow them.
The issue was that the right-wing Republicans led 
by Knowland were pressing the President hard to make an 
unqualified public declaration that the United States would 
defend Quemoy and Matsu while the Democrats sought to 
reserve for the President full flexibility in decision­
making, should the occasion ultimately arise. Since a 
majority of the Democrats had voted for the Formosa Resolu­
tion under the appeal for national unity, they were deprived
63Ibid.,p. 4043.
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of the weapons of opposition at this stage. Trying to
mitigate the influence exerted by the Knowland group on
the President was the best that the Democrats could do
64under the circumstances.
Four days later, the Administration made a forceful 
rebuttal of the war-party charges through the person of 
Vice President Nixon. Taking the opportunity of speaking 
to a convention of the American Association of School 
Administrators on April 3, the Vice President: declared:
I know no one in the House or Senate— Democrat 
or Republican— no one in the Administration, no 
one of our top military leaders, who wants war.
Any one who charges that there is a war party 
in the United States is unfortunately beating the 
Communist propaganda mill which has been grinding 
out this big lie and trying to peddle it around 
the world for years.
Let us advocate vigorously the policies we 
think are best designed to avoid war and obtain 
peace. But let us do so without questioning the 
motives of those who disagree with us. We may 
disagree on the means but we all agree on the end.
Britain's New Peace Formula
While the charge of a war party in the United States 
was making headlines, Britain was seeking a new formula for 
peace in the Formosa area. According to a New York Times 
dispatch from London, the British cabinet on March 29 had
64William S. White in New York Times, March 29, 
1955, p. 1.
^ Ibid. , April 4, 1955, p. 1.
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discussed a guarantee of support for the United States in
Formosa and the Pescadores if and when Chinese Nationalist
forces were withdrawn from the Quemoy and Matsu Islands.
This guarantee would be of temporary duration, aimed at
emphasizing allied unity in opposing Communist aggression
against Formosa. The British also proposed that during the
period of the guarantee a plebiscite be taken in which
the people on Formosa could make a choice between the
6 6Nationalist and Communist governments.
The Chinese Communists would not agree even to dis­
cuss such a scheme. People's Daily, in a commentary on 
April 7, asserted, "It is quite clear that all suggestions 
of a 'plebiscite* on Taiwan are aimed at building up the
'two Chinas' myth and legalizing the U.S. seizure of Tai- 
67wan." "Whatever the United States may resort to," the
paper declared, "the Chinese people will never waver in
6 8their determination to liberate Taiwan." At the same
time, the People's Daily warned the British Government, "It
would not be hard to see what reaction and consequences
would follow such an interference [as an attempted plebi- 
69scite]." The implication was that if the British Government
66Ibid., March 30, 1955, p. 1. Owing to a labor dis­
pute in the newspaper industry, The Times (London) was not 
published between March 26 and April 26, 1955.
6 7Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1025 (April 8- 
10, 1955), pp. 51-52.
68Ibid.
69Ibid.
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pushed the idea of a plebiscite in Formosa, Peking could 
conveniently exert pressure against the British Crown colony 
of Hong Kong.
At this stage, the Communist attitude toward the 
Formosa issue became crystal clear. They were opposed to 
any kind of peaceful settlement that could be conceived of 
in a Western mind— no United Nations cease-fire, no two- 
China formula, no being bought off with Quemoy and Matsu, 
and no plebiscite in Formosa. The "liberation" of Formosa 
appeared to be the only solution that Peking, as it per­
sistently clamored, would accept.
Continued Speculation in the United States
President Eisenhower expressed his displeasure at
war talk in his news conference on March 30. He put the
Administration’s high military leaders on notice that the
cause of peace was not promoted by speculative talk of
war in the Formosa Strait. He remarked, "I cannot say that
there will not [be war], because I don’t know. But I do
say that if anyone is predicting it [will be] that soon, and
can give me logical reasons for believing it will be that
70soon, they have information that I do not have." The 
President still refused to say flatly whether or not the 
United States would defend Quemoy and'Matsu under any and 
all circumstances.
70President Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1955, p. 373.
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He expressed the same attitude during the scheduled
luncheon meeting with House leaders of both the Republican
and Democratic parties that day. House Speaker Rayburn
said he assumed that the United States would be unavoidably
involved in the event of a Communist attack on Quemoy and
Matsu. The President disagreed with his assumption and
told him, "We have not made that decision and will not make
it until we know the circumstances surrounding any given 
71attack." President Eisenhower said, "In any event, the
tricky business is to determine whether or not an attack
on Quemoy and Matsu, if made, is truly a local operation
72or a preliminary to a major effort against Formosa."
The President indicated that if there was a reasonable chance
for the Nationalists themselves to repel invading forces
from the offshore islands, he would not order American
73forces to come to their aid.
The next day, March 31, the President had another 
scheduled luncheon meeting with the Senate party leaders.
He maintained the same attitude toward the defense of 
Quemoy and Matsu that he had expressed to the House party 
leaders the previous day. The Senate Democrats did not 
intend to query the Administration’s policy on Quemoy and
71Quoted by Eisenhower in his Mandate for Change,
p . 4 8 0 .
72Ibid.
73Adams, Firsthand Report, pp. 131-32.
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Matsu in the White House meeting despite the fact that 
Senate majority leader Johnson had initiated the charge of 
a war party. Johnson had aimed it at the right-wing 
Republicans rather than at the President. As a matter of 
fact. Senator Johnson, after a meeting with the Senate Demo­
cratic Policy Committee, issued a statement on March 29, 
indicating the Democratic attitude toward the forthcoming 
White House meeting. The statement said in part:,
We do not take the position that we should 
usurp or arrogate to ourselves the constitutional 
responsibility of the President in foreign policy.
If we cannot agree with the President’s 
decision, we will treat him reasonably and not 
seek to use any disagreements for partisan pur­
poses.
It is our intention not to confront the 
President with any demand or any ultimatum; 
not to urge that he drop bombs here or use 
nuclear weapons there.
This pronouncement clearly indicated that the Demo­
crats at that time at least supported the constitutional 
theory that foreign affairs were a Presidential rather 
than a Congressional prerogative. After the White House 
meeting, Senator Johnson continued to hold the same atti­
tude. He told newsmen: "No policy decision of any kind was
arrived at. The Democrats asked for no commitments nor did
75the President; and none were made." He said, "The
^ New York Times, March 30, 1955, p. 1.
^ Ibid. , April 1, 1955, p. 4.
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Democrats felt that under his constitutional authority,
7 6the responsibility is the President's."
Perhaps it was this conception of constitutional 
theory that had prompted the majority of Democrats to 
approve the Formosa Resolution and call for national unity 
at a time of an international crisis. They were willing, 
even if with misgivings, to leave it to the President to 
appraise the situation and make the final decision on 
whether or not to intervene in case the Communists launched 
an attack on Quemoy and Matsu. As William S. White, con­
gressional correspondent of the New York Times, vividly 
described it, "the Democrats, in short, seem tied to the
President's Formosa policy with bonds as gossamer as the
77moonlight but as effective as steel."
A Policy of Flexibility
Since the Chinese Communists rejected the United 
Nations Security Council's invitation to talk over the 
question of the coastal islands around a conference table, 
the Eisenhower Administration had employed a "carrot and 
stick" approach with the hope that it might induce the 
Communists to agree to a cease-fire arrangement in the For­
mosa Strait. The "carrot" was the promise that a renuncia­
tion of the use of force would not mean a renunciation of
77William S. White in New York Times, April 10,
1955, Sec. IV, p. 7.
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"goals." This happened to be the attitude first entertained 
by Canadian Foreign Secretary Pearson and then advocated 
by British Foreign Secretary Eden. The "stick" was the 
threat that a further aggressive move would be met with 
atomic reprisal. While this alternative was not primarily 
intended, an unexpected and unwanted prediction of war 
undermined whatever chance the Administration had for 
securing its objective of a cease-fire. Furthermore, it 
prompted charges of a "war party" and it increased pressure 
on President Eisenhower to utter a clear-cut policy on 
Quemoy and Matsu. However, the President adhered to a 
flexible policy in the defense of Formosa, with possible 
intervention in the event of Communist attacks on Quemoy 
and Matsu. American reaction to a Communist assault on 
Quemoy and Matsu hinged on, in his judgment, whether or 
not it was a preliminary to an invasion of Formosa and also 
whether or not the Nationalists could repel invading 
forces. In this regard, a majority of Democrats in Congress 
had shown an abiding trust in the President.
CHAPTER VII
A SURCEASE
Depression in the Senate
President Eisenhower*s public repudiation of the 
war prediction and his subsequent meetings with congressional 
party leaders served the useful purpose of clarifying the 
Administration’s position regarding Quemoy and Matsu. These 
actions, however, could not silence a few Democrats who 
had been opposed to the Formosa Resolution since its in­
ception. A handful of dissenting Democrats also renewed 
their opposition to American involvement in the defense of 
Quemoy and Matsu. On April 1, Senator Morse, who had 
recently announced his affiliation with the Democrats, 
introduced a resolution expressing "the sense of Congress" 
to the effect that the Formosa Resolution "shall not be 
construed to authorize the President to employ any of the 
armed forces of the United States in military operations 
concerning Matsu and Quemoy."^ He asserted that the United
States had "not a single legal right" to intervene in the
2offshore islands for the Chinese Nationalists. Further,
^Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 3, p. 4218.
^Ibid.
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the Morse resolution would call on the President to 
request the United Nations to supervise the evacuation of 
Nationalist Chinese forces and civilians from Quemoy and 
Matsu, which was in effect the same idea advocated by 
British Foreign Secretary Eden. Republican Senator Knowland 
immediately denounced the Morse proposal. He said that such 
a resolution, if actually adopted by the Senate, would so 
undermine anti-Communist morale "that in a year or two
3most of Asia would be passing behind the Iron Curtain."
The Morse resolution, co-sponsored by Senators
Lehman, Long, and Humphrey, was referred to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, but it did not stand a chance
of success. Senator George was strongly opposed to any
attempt to force the President to declare definitely the
American attitude toward Quemoy and Matsu. Although he
did not voice it on the Senate floor, George told the Press:
"I do not believe it is wise for any group, right or left,
to press the President into a statement or rigidity which
4will leave no flexibility." The Senator said that the 
Foreign Relations Committee would take up the Morse Proposal 
"in due course, but I do not believe the Committee will
5
approve it." Such was the fate of the Morse resolution.
^Ibid., p. 4284.
4New York Times, April 3, 1955, p. 1.
^Ibid.
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While Senator George was an ardent supporter of the
Administration's Formosa policy, he had shown a change of
mood since Carney's prediction of imminent war with the
Chinese Communists. In late March, George told a reporter:
"We are burning daylight. The darkness is coming on in the
Far East." The Senator had a strong feeling that the
foreign policy orientation of the Democratic Party should
be directed by the leadership from "the Hill" and not from
elsewhere. His displeasure at the circulation of the Cohen
memorandum by the Democratic National Committee had forced
7
the latter to disavow that document. Although George had 
been, and was Supporting the Administration's Formosa policy, 
his worried expression.to the reporter indicated a somewhat 
different frame of mind..
Adlai Stevenson's Viewpoint
It is interesting to note that Adlai Stevenson, the 
titular head of the Democratic Party, had been silent since 
the debates on the Formosa Resolution. He had been kept in 
the dark by both his party's congressional leaders and the 
Administration. Stevenson had not been consulted by either 
party nor had he been given information on the Formosa policy. 
He did not like the Administration's policy on Quemoy and
g
James Reston in ibid., March 27, 1955, sec. IV,
p. 10 .
7
James Reston, "Democrats and Islands," ibid.,
April 4, 1955, p. 4.
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Matsu but he refrained from speaking out for an additional
reason,. Since the congressional leaders of his party had
supported the Administration's policy, his criticizing it
would at the same time be blaming the Democrats who had
supported it. At the urging of his supporters, however,
8Stevenson finally broke his silence.
In a radio address from Chicago on April 11,
Stevenson urged the Administration to consult America's 
allies promptly and ask them to join the United States in an 
open declaration condemning the use of force in the Formosa 
Strait and agreeing to stand together against any invasion 
until the final status of Formosa could be settled by "in­
dependence, neutralization, trusteeship, plebiscite, or
q
whatever is wisest." He declared that the policy of 
"extravagant words" from the Administration had "alarmed 
our friends a good deal more than it had deterred the 
aggressors. He questioned how the President could "read 
the mind of the enemy within a few hours" of an attack on 
the Quemoy and Matsu Islands to determine whether the enemy 
planned to go on to the invasion of Formosa.^ This
o
James Reston, "Stevenson's Dilemma," Ibid.,
April 13, 1955, p. 4. 
9Text in ibid., April 12, 1955, p. 4.
10,, .Ibid.
11TV^Ibid.
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utterance, in fact, challenged the judgement of the
President as the Commander-in-Chief in a critical situation.
In response to Stevenson's speech, Secretary Dulles
on the following day, April 21, said that what Stevenson
had suggested as "original ideas" were "the very approaches
which the Government has been and is actively exploring,"
but the result could not be advanced by "publicly prodding
12friendly governments." Dulles saw only one major point of 
difference between Stevenson and his own idea: "Mr. Steven­
son speaks feelingly about our Allies.1 However, he forgot
13one ally, namely the Republic of China." The Secretary 
held that the defense of Formosa primarily depended upon the 
Nationalist Government; therefore "that ally can not be 
ignored and rebuffed.
Eisenhower's Policy Directive
Indeed, the primary responsibility for the defense 
of Formosa relied upon the Nationalist Government itself. 
However, the Nationalist defense strategy was worrying the 
Administration because Chiang's government attached equal, 
if not more, importance to the remaining offshore islands 
than to Formosa itself. After the Nationalist Government 
was forced to evacuate the Tachens in early February,
12D.S.B., XXXII/ No. 826 (April 25, 1955), p. 677
13_, . ,Ibid.
Ibid.
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Generalissimo Chiang redeployed these forces on Quemoy and
Matsu, and sent additional troops to the islands to the
extent that one-third of all of his armed forces were
15stationed in Quemoy and Matsu. One critic regarded it 
as a sly move on the part of Chiang in that he took initia­
tive to "create an artificially manufactured tie between
the defense of the offshore islands and the protection of 
16Taiwan." Others interpreted it as deliberately posing a
dangerous situation that could touch off a major conflict,
the only chance that might fulfill Chiang*s aspiration to
17return to the mainland. Whatever the intention of Chiang, 
Washington did not like this Nationalist strategy.
Although it was not made known at the time, on April 5, 
President Eisenhower had issued a confidential policy direc­
tive, in the form of a memorandum, to Secretary Dulles, 
mapping out a definitive American policy toward the off­
shore islands. The confidential memorandum stated in part:
a) Without abandoning the offshore islands, make 
clear that neither Chiang nor ourselves is 
committed to full-out defense of Quemoy and 
Matsu, so that no matter what the outcome of 
an attack upon them, there would be no danger 
of a collapse of the free world position in 
the region . . .
15Elie Abel in New York Times, February 19, 1955, p. 4.
16Tang Tsou, "The Quemoy Imbroglio: Chiang Kai-shek
and the United States," Western Political Quarterly, VII, No. 4 
(September, 1959), p. 1078.
17C. L. Sulzberger in New York Times, April 11,
1955, p. 22.
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b) Initiate, immediately the process of bringing 
to Chiang*s attention the great advantage, 
political and military, that would result from 
certain alterations in his present military 
plans .3-8
The desired changes in the Nationalist defense plans
included: (1) ". . . regard the offshore islands as
outposts consequently to be garrisoned in accordance with
the requirements of outposts," and (2) "evacuation should
take place (if this finally becomes necessary) only after
defensive forces had inflicted upon the attackers heavy and
19bloody losses." What the Administration wanted the 
Nationalist Government to do was to take a flexible posture, 
so that it would be possible to withdraw from Quemoy and 
Matsu under overwhelmingly disadvantageous conditions without 
losing morale. Likewise, it implied that should American 
forces be employed to help defend the offshore islands when 
deemed necessary to the defense of Formosa, the commitment 
was by no means unlimited.
On April 20, Admiral Radford and Assistant Secretary 
Robertson went to Taipei, as representatives of the Adminis­
tration seeking "to induce the Generalissimo to propose
some solution to the Formosa-Quemoy-Matsu problem that will
20be acceptable both to him and to us." They hoped to 
18Excerpts reprinted in Eisenhower, Mandate for 
Change, pp. 611-12.
19Ibid.
20Quoted by Eisenhower in his Mandate for Change,
p. 481.
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arrive at an agreement that would "neither commit the
United States to go to war in defense of the offshore islands
21nor constitute an implied repudiation of the Generalissimo." 
However, Radford and Robertson failed in their mission in 
spite of the fact that, to Chiang, they were most welcome 
American dignitaries. The Generalissimo could not be 
persuaded to accept the concept of redeploying his forces 
and considering Quemoy and Matsu merely as "outposts."
There were good reasons for the Chiang Government to 
be adamant in this regard. For one thing, since President 
Eisenhower*s order deneutralizing Formosa in February 1953, 
the American military authorities had encouraged the National­
ist Government in one way or another to fortify the offshore 
22islands. For another, the Nationalist Government had been
persuaded to abandon the far-flung islands of the Tachens
and Nanchi groups with the expectation that the United
States would be committed to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu
23as Secretary Dulles had promised. Generalissimo Chiang, 
counting upon this moral obligation on the part of the 
Eisenhower Administration, felt that he could entrench on 
the remaining offshore islands.
Furthermore, the Nationalists had great political
^ Supra, Chapter III.
23Supra, footnote No. 1, this Chapter.
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stake in the remaining offshore islands. A firm grip on 
Quemoy and Matsu symbolized Nationalist authority on the 
Chinese mainland. The tiny islands were indispensable 
possessions upon which the raison d*etre of the Nationalist 
Government for a "return to the mainland" was built. Conse­
quently, the morale of the Nationalist Government hinged 
on the ability to hold Quemoy and Matsu.
President Eisenhower was disappointed in Chiang*s 
uncompromising attitude but showed some sympathy for the 
Nationalist leader. He wrote later, "Despite my disappoint­
ment, I could not help reflecting that if I had been in his
24position, I might have made the same decision."
The American Government made no further effort to 
"persuade" Chiang to revise his plan for the defense of 
Quemoy and Matsu. On the contrary, Washington indicated 
that "we understand his position" in connection with the 
defense of the offshore islands and some assurance on the 
matter was given to the Nationalist Government in early 
May. On May 3, Secretary Dulles sent a cable to American 
Ambassador Rankin, authorizing him to advise Chiang*s 
government of this American attitude. When Rankin gave the 
substance of this telegram to Chiang in a visit on that same 
day, the Generalissimo asked if it meant that President 
Eisenhower would actually commit American forces to help
24Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 482.
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defend Quemoy and Matsu. In Rankin*s account of the conversa­
tion, he wrote, "I thought not, but suggested if my previous
analysis was correct, this might not make much practical
*'25difference.
The Administration's public announcements were 
centered on renewed calls for a cease-fire and a renuncia­
tion of the use of force by the Chinese Communists. On 
April 5, Secretary Dulles declared, "We have made perfectly
clear our desire that there shall be no war . . . that there
2 6shall be a cease-fire." He said that if there was war 
in the Formosa Strait, it would be the Chinese Communists 
who started it. On April 13, Dulles again called upon Peking 
to renounce the use of force without giving up its claims 
on Formosa. He stated, "We hope to be able and are trying
Rankin, China Assignment, pp. 228-29. The story 
was mentioned by a Dulles biographer, John Beal, in a 
different version before the publication of Rankin*s book. 
Beal wrote, ". . . Chiang Kai-shek received a personal letter
from Mr. Eisenhower satisfying him that the United States 
would help defend Quemoy and Matsu. . . ." Beal, John Foster
Dulles, p. 221. Whatever the form and substance of that 
assurance might have been, American assistance to the 
Nationalist defense of Quemoy and Matsu later proved to be 
logistic support. In 1958 when the Communists resumed the 
heavy bombardment of Quemoy, they showed a more determined 
effort to take the island by firing on Nationalist supply 
vessels sailing to Quemoy. In that situation, President 
Eisenhower ordered the United States Navy to escort National­
ist vessels to Quemoy, thereby breaking the blockade.
26D.S.B., XXXII, No. 824 (April 11, 1955), p. 643.
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in many ways to bring about acceptance of some sort of
cease-fire situation where force will be renounced as an
27instrument for achieving national goals." The Secretary
elaborated his version of a cease-fire in these terms:
We don11 expect that the national goals will 
be themselves abandoned, just as it has been 
brought about in West Germany that Adenauer 
has agreed to renounce the use of force to 
unite Germany . . .
Dulles1 pronouncement was an indication that the 
Administration favored the maintenance of a de facto two- 
China situation, for this would be the obvious result of 
a cease-fire.
A Communist Propaganda Slowdown
While on the American domestic scene there were 
anxieties over possible United States intervention in the 
defense of Quemoy and Matsu, also among the Communists there 
were signs to show that they did not really want to press 
the issue to the extreme. The Administration's sources 
noticed a sharp decline in time spent on the "Taiwan Libera­
tion" theme by the Peking propaganda mouthpiece. In Novem­
ber and December, 19 54, up to twenty per cent of Radio 
Peking broadcast time was devoted to the question of Formosa
After that, toward early April 1955, time spent on the
29subject dropped to about five per cent. More attention
27Ibid., No. 826 (April 25, 1955), p. 676.
28t, . .Ibid.
29New York Times, April 7, 1955, p. 12.
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was paid to the forthcoming Asian-African Conference to be
30held at Bandung, Indonesia, on April 18, 19 55.
Impact of Bandung Conference
The Bandung Conference had been initiated by five
Colombo powers, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, India, and
Pakistan, and drew participants from twenty-nine Asian and
31African nations. The Conference was permeated with a
strong mood of anti-colonialism, not only in respect to
Western colonialism but also Communist colonialism. Attuned
to the prevailing mood of the Conference, Chou Eh-lai, who
headed the Chinese Communist delegation, decided not to
read his prepared rather stormy speech scheduled to be
delivered on April 19. Instead, he made an off-the-cuff
speech in a conciliatory tone and in defense of Peking's
policy. He stressed that his delegation had come to Bandung
32"to seek unity and not to quarrel." Chou said that the 
tension in the Formosa area was created "solely" by the 
United States and that, but for his desire to avoid con­
troversies, he would have submitted it for the delibera-
33tion by the Conference.
■^This has been derived from this writer's examina­
tion of the Survey of China Mainland Press.
31A. Appadadorai, The Bandung Conference (New Delhi: 
Indian Council of World Affairs, 1955) gives a succinct treat­
ment, while George McTurnan Kahin,- Asian-African Conference 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956) deals with
the topic in more detail.
32Kahin, Asian-African Conference, p. 52.
^ Ibid., pp. 51-52.
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Nevertheless, Sir John Katelawla, Prime Minister of 
Ceylon, after questioning the sincerity of Communist China's 
pronouncement of peaceful co-existence, brought up the 
question of Formosa in a speech on April 22, He suggested
t
an eight-power conference to discuss the issue. The Ceylonese
Prime Minister also proposed a five-year trusteeship for
Formosa by either the United Nations or the Colombo powers.
According to his proposal, the people on Formosa would vote
in a plebiscite to determine their future form of govern-
34ment at the end of the trusteeship.
Chou's Offer to Talk to the United States
In response to this challenge, Chou made a sudden and 
daring move on April 23. During a secret session of the 
Political Committee, he unexpectedly declared*, "The Chinese 
people do not want a war with the United States. We are
35willing to settle international disputes by peaceful means."
Shortly afterward, this Communist declaration was issued to
the press as follows:
The Chinese Government is willing to sit down 
and enter into negotiations with the United States 
Government to discuss the question of relaxing ten­
sion in the Far East and especially the question of 
relaxing tension in the Taiwan area. ®
34New York Times, April 22, 1955, p. 2.
35 ' -Kahin, Asian-African Conference, p. 62.
^ N e w  York Times, April 24, 1955, p. 1.
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A spokesman from the Chinese Communist delegation
was reluctant to elaborate on the statement. He revealed,
however, that the announcement referred to "direct bi-
37lateral talks" rather than a multipower conference. By 
implication, this excluded Nationalist China from any 
possible meeting.
The Administration’s Initial Response
In answer to Chou’s call "to sit down and enter 
into negotiations," the State Department issued a statement 
that same day, declaring that the United States would "in­
sist on" Chinese Nationalist participation as an equal in 
any discussion concerning the Formosa area. The statement 
expressed doubt about Communist sincerity in the offer but 
said that it could be proved by announcing an immediate 
cease-fire in the Formosa area, an immediate release of
unjustly detained American airmen, and prompt acceptance of
3 8the Security Council's invitation.
The statement was made during the absence of Secre­
tary Dulles, who was in retreat at Lake Ontario, Canada.
It was drafted under the direction of Undersecretary Herbert 
Hoover, Jr. The draft was read to the President at his 
Gettysburg farm and approved by him via telephone. After 
the official American statement was issued, the State
38D.S.B., XXXII, No. 827 (May 2, 1955), p. 738.
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Department took a wait-and-see attitude. On April 24, a
spokesman from the Department said, "Now it is up to Mr.
39Chou to formalize his proposal. . . . "
Congressional Reactions
Meanwhile there were reactions from Congress as
soon as the sensational news of Chou's offer was made
known. . Senator George's response was favorable. He said,
"I don't know what degree of sincerity lay behind the words
spoken by the Red Chinese leader today, but when he says
that he is willing to talk, I think it is high time that
the high officials of this Government indicate a willingness
40to talk also." George dismissed the thought that willing­
ness to talk with the Communists could be regarded as 
"appeasement." He observed, "It is never appeasement when
a powerful country such as the United States indicates a
41willingness to discuss problems." In the evening of that
day, the Senator reiterated this attitude in his address
before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. He
told the participants of the dinner party:
I unhesitatingly say that this nation should 
be big enough and great enough . . .  to sit down 
and talk. It is high time that we should relieve 
the tension of the world if we can.
39New York Times, Aprxl 25, 1955, p. 1. 
^ Ibid. , April 24, 1955, p. 3.
41Ibid.
42Ibid.
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Representative James Richards, Democratic Chairman 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, also felt that the 
Red Chinese proposal should be explored if bona fide pro­
posals for the talks were presented. He cautioned, "If 
Chou’s proposal appears to be an effort to get us to violate 
our treaty with Formosa, it should be rejected at the start. 
If it appears to be primarily propaganda, it should be 
exposed as such.
Republican Senator Knowland called Chou’s suggestion 
of bilateral talk an "invitation to Munich." He said that 
the Red Chinese proposal was "unacceptable" because the
United States would not "bargain away the rights of the
44Chinese Nationalists in their absence." Senator Alexander
Wiley, ranking Republican member on the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, said that Chou’s offer should be
approached promptly "but warily." He held that the sudden
change of heart in Peking "proves that Red China is very
definitely subject to pressure for peace by world opinion,
45such as has been expressed by the Bandung Conference."
Senator George’s attitude in favor of talking with 
the Chinese Communists received general support from Demo­
crats. On April 25, Senator Lyndon Johnson said that he
^ Ibid. 
Ibid.
45Ibid.
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hoped that George’s statement "will receive the careful
consideration of every policy-making official of our 
46government." He hailed George’s speech by saying that
it "should have far-reaching-effect" as a "challenge for
bold and courageous thinking on the vital issues of war 
47and peace." But Johnson also expressed doubt as to the
sincerity of Chou’s pronouncement. Senator John Sparkman,
Democrat from Alabama, maintained that the best way to test
the sincerity of the Communist offer was to renew the
efforts of the United Nations to obtain a cease-fire in
48the Formosa Strait.
Chou’s Qualified Statement
The Peking propaganda machine made no comment on the
49State Department declaration of April 23. The New China
News Agency treated the official American statement in the
form of a news report, saying that the State Department
avoided "definite clarification" of whether or not the
United States was willing to negotiate with Communist 
50China. Meanwhile, Chou En-lai, in a statement made at the
^ Ibid. , April 26, 1955, p. 4.
47t, .Ibid.
48tK . n Ibid.
49This writer's examination of the Survey of China 
Mainland Press coincided with a report by New York Times, 
April 25, 1955, p. 8.
50Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1033 (April 
23-25, 1955), p. 2.
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closing session of the Bandung Conference on April 24,
qualified significantly his previous offer to talk with the
United States. Chou said that any negotiations with the
United States "should not in the slightest degree affect
the just demand of the Chinese people to exercise their
51sovereign rights in liberating Taiwan."
According to an explanation given by a spokesman
of the Peking delegation, Chou1s stiffened attitude was
prompted by the statement of the State Department on the 
52previous day. The Peking press still made no comment 
or elaboration on Chou's offer to talk with the United 
States, but the New China News Agency issued a news item 
saying that the American Government raised many "unreason­
able prerequisites" so as to close the door to talk on the
53Formosa issue.
Chou's Interview With An American Correspondent
The fact that the Peking propaganda mouthpiece 
chose not to comment on Chou's peace offer was meaningful 
in that the Red Chinese regime's position on Formosa had 
not changed. Chou En-lai was merely repeating the persis­
tent Communist attitude toward Formosa in attractive but
^ New York Times, April 25, 1955, p. 7.
^ Ibid. , p. 1.
53Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1034 (April 26,
1955), p. 13.
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misleading language. As a matter of fact, on April 24, 
the same day that Chou qualified his peace offer at the 
closing meeting of the Bandung Conference, he gave an inter­
view to Sam Jaffe, a Nation correspondent, presenting 
Peking*s viewpoint on the question of Formosa in a nutshell. 
He told the American reporter:
The liberation of Taiwan is China*s internal 
affair. The Chinese people have the right to 
make the demand and to put it into effect.
As to the tension in the Formosa area, it 
has been caused by the U.S. intervention. This 
is an international question. In order to relax 
the tension in the Formosa area, China proposes 
that China and the U.S. sit down and enter into 
negotiations in order to seek a solution to 
this question.
Apparently, the solution that the Communists sought 
to obtain through bilateral talks with the United States 
was to remove the "cause of tension— U.S. intervention in 
the Formosa area." It meant the withdrawal of all American 
forces in the area. In contrast, the United States sought 
to have the Chinese Communists renounce the use of force 
so that a cease-fire in the area might be possible. The 
conflicting aims of the two sides doomed the subsequent 
bilateral talks to failure.
In that interview, Chou also explained why Peking 
would not permit Nationalist participation in his proposed
54The content of this interview, strange to say, was 
belatedly made known to the Western world on April 29. 
Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1037 (April 29, 1955), 
p. 20, and New York Times, April 30, 1955, p. 3.
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negotiations with the United States. He commented:
Relations between China and the United 
States is an international question. Relations 
between the People's Republic of China and the 
Chiang Kai-shek clique is a question of internal 
affairs. These two matters should not be mixed 
together.^5
In concluding his interview with the American corres­
pondent, Chou made a remark calculated to relieve the Com­
munists of the responsibility of stirring up tension in 
the Formosa area. "Whether the present situation will lead 
to a world war depends upon the United S t a t e s h e  said,
"because there is no war at present between China and the
56United States."
A Modified American Attitude
After returning to Washington on April 25, Secretary
Dulles conferred with the President. The next day, at a
momentous news conference, the Secretary indicated that
the Administration had decided to take a new approach
toward Chou's offer to talk. Dulles said that he did not
know whether Chou1s offer was a "sincere proposal" or a
"propaganda game" but that the United States would try to
"find out." "In doing so," he remarked, "we shall not, of
course, depart from the path of fidelity and honor toward
57our ally, the Republic of China." When asked whether or
55Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1037, p. 20.
56ibid.
57U.S. Department of State, Possibility of A Cease- 
Fire in the Formosa Strait, Questions and Answers, No. 9 
(May 1955), p. 1.
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not the United States would sit down and talk with Com­
munist China, he said, "that depends on what to talk about
. . . We are not going to talk about the interests of the
58Republic of China behind its back." However, the Secre­
tary made a distinction between talking with the Communists 
about a ceasei-fire and talking with them about other ques­
tions affecting the interests of Nationalist China. He 
took the view that the former did not necessarily require 
Nationalist participation. Dulles commented that the 
possibility of a cease-fire in the Formosa area "is a
matter which can be discussed perhaps bilaterally or at the
59United Nations or possibly under other circumstances."
He explained that American interest in a cease-fire was due 
to the fact that the United States had agreed to respond to 
an attack against Formosa.
Dulles' willingness to engage in bilateral talks 
with the Chinese Communists in actuality reversed the State 
Department pronouncement of April 23 which required the 
presence of the Nationalists in "any" discussions with the 
Peking government. Moreover, the Secretary apparently 
departed from the April 23 statement in another respect.
The statement had implied that an immediate cease-fire in the 
Formosa area, the immediate release of unjustly detained
59Ibid., p. 4.
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American airmen, and the prompt acceptance of the Security
Council's invitation were also prerequisites to Chou's
suggested meeting. Yet Dulles now commented, "Those are not
stated as conditions precedent. Those things were not
stated as conditions and were never intended to be condi- 
60tions." Dulles also pointed out that it would not be a 
new experience for the United States to talk with the 
Chinese Communists and that the talks had not and would not 
involve diplomatic recognition.
Dulles' Position Endorsed
The next day, April 27, President Eisenhower gave 
firm endorsement to Secretary Dulles' position on negotia­
ting with Peking by declaring:
If the Chi-Coms [Chinese Communists] wanted 
to talk merely about a cease-fire, we would be 
glad to meet with them and talk with them, but 
there would be no conferring about the affairs of 
the Chi-Nats [Chinese Nationalists].
The President deemed it "perfectly legitimate" to 
talk with the Communists without Nationalist participation 
on the question of a cease-fire in the Formosa Strait.
He explained that a cease-fire was mainly concerned with 
the Chinese Communists because the Nationalists were not 
firing on the Communists except in self-defense. A cease­
fire to the Nationalists, therefore, would be "purely
60Ibid., p. 2.
61Transcript in New York Times, April 28, 1955, p. 12.
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academic." President Eisenhower did not regard this willing­
ness to talk with the Communists as a reversal of the 
Administrations policy. He described the previous State
Department pronouncement as having "an error in terminology"
62or "a touch of overstatement."
Right-Wing Republicans Opposed
The right-wing Republicans in the Senate were un­
happy about the Administrations modified attitude toward 
talks with the Chinese Communists. After Secretary Dulles* 
news conference which marked this change, the Senate 
Republican Policy Committee discussed Dulles* remarks in 
private. Later, Senator Styles Bridges, the Chairman of 
that Committee, told reporters that it would be "a great 
mistake" to sit down at any conference with the Chinese
Communists while ignoring the Chinese Nationalists, "who
6 3have been our ally through thick and thin."
In a news conference on April 27, Senate Republican 
leader Knowland openly criticized the Administration *s 
willingness to negotiate with the Chinese Communists. He 
declared that it was hard for him "to comprehend how we 
could enter into direct negotiations with Communist China 
without the interests of the Republic of China being deeply
New York Times, April 27, 1955, p. 1.
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64involved." Know!and held; that there was no need for a
conference to bring about a; cease-fire. "All they need,"
he said, "is to stop: shooting and building up their aggres-
6 5sive forces in that area o f  the Formosa Strait." Know-
land did not believe: that Peking would change its aggressive
intentions. He declared', "X, for one, do not believe the
6 6Communist leopard has changed' its spots."
Following Know land'* s statement, another right-wing
Republican,. Senator William E. Jenner of Indiana, on
April 28 ashed the Senate: toe adopt a resolution to repudiate
in advance any territoriat. concession the Administration
might give to Communist: China:.. He maintained that the air
was "full of foreboding; that: a: carefully laid plan is
under way for the United' States" to give up bit by bit its
67commitment in the Formosa- Strait." He demanded that the
United States not "surrender, a: single square foot of free
638"land to Communist r u l e ~  However, the prevailing mood 
in the Senate was not to: consider his proposal seriously.
The objection of: right-wing Republicans to talk with 
the Peking regime was understandable in the light of their
64Text in ibid'.., April’. 28, 1955, p. 13. 
65lbid.
Ibid.
67Congressignal Record, V. 101, Part 4 (April 1- 
May 5, 1955) , p., 5220..
68Ibid., p. 5221.
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consistent opposition to "softness" toward Communists,
particularly the Chinese Communists. The publication of
the China White Paper by the Truman Administration in
August 1949 saw the beginning of the most vehement attacks
on the China policy of the Democrats. The Communist victory
in China became the theme that played a major role in the
691950 and 1952 national elections. The Republican Party 
during the 1952 Presidential election campaign had promised 
to launch a dynamic policy of "liberation" instead of 
"containment" in dealing with communism. The Eisenhower 
Administration, however, falling short of its professed 
goal of liberation, was willing to negotiate with the 
Chinese Communists. Although this was naturally unthinkable 
to the right wing of the GOP, the Administration ignored 
the voice of opposition within its own Party.
Toward Bilateral Talks
After the United States gave a favorable response to 
Chou's offer to negotiate, the tension in the Formosa 
Strait was lessened. In May, the press reported that a 
de facto cease-fire prevailed in the area. On May 3.7, Chou 
En-lai, in his report to the Standing Committee of the 
National People*s Congress on the achievements of the Asian- 
African Conference, renewed his offer to "sit down and enter
69Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., Bipartisan Foreign Policy,
Myth or Reality? (White Plains, N.Y.: Row Peterson &
Co., 1957), pp. 110-11.
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into negotiations'" with the United States. Meanwhile he
declared that: the Peking regime was 'Willing to strive for
the liberation of: Taiwan by peaceful means so far as it is 
70possible." Oh May, 30, Peking announced the release of
four imprisoned" American airmen as deportees, the first
concrete indication, of;'Communist willingness to negotiate
seriously.. With' Britain and, to a lesser degree, India
acting as intermediaries, agreement was finally reached
between the United' States and Communist China to begin
71bilateral talks on.August 1, 1955, at Geneva.
As a matter; off fact, talks between the two sides had
been going on. for-some; time on a consular level. Since June
1954 the American Consulate General at Geneva had been in
contact with; the;- Chinese Communist representatives there
in an effort tor: secure- the release of American citizens
imprisoned or: otherwise;detained in Communist China. After
the failure of the United Nations Secretary General in his
trip to Peking in January 1955 to negotiate the release of
American airmen.captured"during the Korean War, American
consular officers resumed contact with their Chinese Red
72counterparts" for; the: same purpose without success. It was 
^^New York Times , May 17, 1955, p. 1.
^ % o r  a detailed study of American negotiations with 
Peking, see Kenneth TV Young, Negotiating with the Chinese 
Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967 (New
York; McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968). For developments lead­
ing to the. bilateral.' talks after the Bandung Conference, 
see particularly'pp.. 4 4-5 2.
State Department Announcement on U.S. Representa­
tions to Secure the Release of Americans Held Captive by
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not until August I.,, 195:5:,, however, that the bilateral talks 
were elevated from consular; to ambassadorial level. It 
was indeed a gain in prestige;for the Peking regime.
The End of An Episode;
After a statement, was; issued simultaneously by 
Washington and Peking on;July_ 25:to announce the forth­
coming Geneva talks, Secretary Dulles reiterated the 
American position.. He; said: that-the bilateral talks did 
not imply "any dipiomaticr recognition whatsoever" of Com­
munist China and that: the; United"States was not prepared to 
negotiate "in any way"'! to: prejudice the rights of National­
ist China. The Secretary, declared, "We shall hope to find 
out in the forth comings talk's- whether the Chinese Communists
accept the concept of a: cease-fire in accordance with the
73United Nations principle;. .. . V In addition, he remarked
that the United States was; veryymuch concerned with the
release of the American; civilians still detained in Com- 4
munist China. The; United: States was true to its declared
principles and the Geneva; talk's on a cease-fire in the
74Formosa area ended in a deadlock. While the talks produced
((cont'd) Communist: China. Text in Documents on
American Foreign Relations, 1955 (New York: Harper &
Brothers for the Council, on;Foreign Relations, 1956), p. 307.
73A  statement made: by Secretary Dulles on July 26,
1955. Text in ibid..,. p.. 312:.,
^ Y o u n g , Negotiating; with the Chinese Communists, 
pp. 93-115.
209
no concrete results,. the: de facto cease-fire was to last 
for three years., Hr. August: 1958 the Communists started 
all over again with' a: heavy bombardment of Quemoy, but 
that is another story.
An Evaluation
The Administration:1 s: policy toward the 1954-1955
crisis in the Formosa: Strait has been criticized as one
that brought the nation.to: the brink of a general war and
that alienated all, off America 's allies with the exception
75of the "trigger:—happy"' Chinese Nationalists. However, 
Secretary Dulles was: so pleased with his diplomacy in 
simmering down the crisis: that he claimed it as one of the 
three instances during: which his "brinkmanship, had been 
successful. The Secretary affirmed that he had said in 
substance the following:::
The; ability to get to the verge without 
getting into" the war is the necessary art. If 
you cannot master' it you inevitably get into 
war. if you try to run away from it, if you are 
scared to go: to: the: brink, you are lost. We 
had to look: it: square in the face— on the question 
of enlarging_ the:. Korean War, on the question of 
getting into: the: Indochina War, on the question of 
Formosa. W e  walked to the brink and we looked it 
in the face., We: took strong action. ^ $
Dulles also toasted of: himself: "Of course, of all the
75Fleming,, "Our Brink-of-War Diplomacy in the Formosa
Strait."
7
January 15, 19^ 55', pv 78..
5James Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," Life,
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things I have done, I think the most brilliant of all has
✓
77been to save Quemoy and Matsu."
On the other side of the coin, the United States
was still painted as a "paper tiger." Chou En-lai was
quoted as having often said with pride:
We have attacked America bluntly several 
times, every time the attack was effective.
Through the Korean War, we forced her to attend the 
Panmunjom truce conference; out of the battle of 
Dienbienphu, there came the Geneva Conference and 
peace for Indo-China; the internment of American 
civilians compelled her to agree to a conference 
at ambassadorial level.^
Nevertheless, Dulles was credited with having a
better understanding of the Chinese Communists than the
British and French statesmen, and he caused a lot of
"headaches" for Peking. "The trouble was," Chow Ching-wen,
a high ranking defector from the Chinese Communist Party,
said, "many Americans who were not themselves familiar with
the realities of the Chinese Communist regime sought to
hinder Dulles from carrying his policy decisions, which, not
79unnaturally, pleased the Chinese Communists."
77Cited by Emmet J. Hughes in his The Ordeal of 
Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years (New 
York: Atheneum, 1963), p. 208.
78Cited by Chow Ching-wen in his Ten Years of Storm 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), p. 287. Chow
Ching-wen, a well-known Chinese scholar and former president 
of National Northeast University, had served for eight years 
in high-ranking positions in the Chinese Communist Party 
before his escape to Hong Kong in 1957.
^ Ibid. , p. 288.
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The fact of the matter was that the United States
had dealt with a wily antagonist whose strategy, as
President Eisenhower had been aware, was: "Enemy advances,
we retreat; enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack;
80enemy retreats, we pursue." The United States did not
retreat in the face of a display of force, nor did it yield
over a conference table. Although both sides claimed a
victory, the Chinese Communists, being true to Mao Tse-
tung's theory of guerrilla warfare that they would "on no
81account fight" if not "sure of victory," temporarily 
suspended their ambitions of "liberating" Formosa, and ten­
sion in the Formosa Strait was eased.
80Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 483.
81Tang Tsou, "Mao’s Limited War in the Taiwan 
Strait," Orbis, III, No. 3 (Fall, 1959), p. 337.
CONCLUSION
Formosa was written off in the American policy 
planning in early 1950. At the outbreak of the Korean con­
flict, however, the United States reversed its attitude and 
developed a "passive" interest in Formosa: the island should
not fall into "unfriendly" hands. Meanwhile, the Nationalist- 
held offshore islands, such as Quemoy and Matsu, had served 
as advance bases from which some American intelligence 
activities directed at the mainland China were conducted.
The beginning of a series of heavy bombardments of 
Quemoy by the Chinese Communists on September 3, 1954, posed 
a problem for Washington. The United States had made a 
voluntary commitment to defend Formosa since the Korean War, 
but this commitment did not extend to the offshore islands.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff interpreted the Communists' 
shelling of Quemoy as a preliminary to an attempt to 
capture the island, which might be an operational scheme 
to facilitate the invasion of Formosa. Thus, a case was 
made for the American military participation in the defense 
of Quemoy. President Eisenhower made no immediate military 
decision on that score, but accepted a proposal Of Secre­
tary Dulles that the United States should ask the United 
Nations to arrange a cease-fire in the Formosa area.
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However, the idea of a cease-fire was shelved 
temporarily due to strong objections from Chiang's Govern­
ment. Instead, the United States signed a mutual defense 
treaty with the Chinese Nationalist Government. The prac­
tical effect of the treaty from the American point of view 
was to restrain the Nationalists from taking offensive 
military action against the Chinese mainland. At the same 
time, it allayed Nationalist fears by putting the American 
commitment to the defense of Formosa on a solemn legal 
basis. A cease-fire restraint was in actuality imposed upon 
the Nationalists by the treaty. To the Communists, the 
treaty was a source of aggravated resentment against the 
United States, as it made the "liberation" of Formosa a more 
difficult task than ever.
However, the Treaty did not mention the offshore 
islands as included under its protection. The Chinese 
Communists saw this as a chance to probe the American atti­
tude toward the offshore islands. After seizing Yikiang 
Island by force, the Communists openly professed that they 
had taken a step toward the "liberation" of Formosa. Since 
Peking linked the offshore islands with Formosa as its 
ultimate objective of conquest, the United States could not 
but react to meet this Communist challenge. President 
Eisenhower made an unprecedented move in requesting Congress 
in advance to sanction the use of American forces in the 
defense of Formosa and related positions. Meanwhile, the
214
President asked the United Nations to take appropriate 
actions leading to a peaceful settlement in the Formosa 
Strait. With bipartisan support for the President, the 
requested Formosa Resolution was promptly adopted by Congress, 
although some Congressmen were opposed to American involve­
ment in the defense of the offshore islands. Subsequently, 
Congress approved the Mutual Defense Treaty with Nationalist 
China with equal promptness.
With two pieces of legislation in hand, President 
Eisenhower maintained a flexible position in the defense of 
Formosa, including the possible defense of Quemoy and' Matsu.
It was a guessing game for the Chinese Communists as well 
as for the American public. While the need for American 
defense of Formosa was not questioned, a controversy arose 
over the possible defense of the offshore islands. The 
opposition to American involvement in the defense of Quemoy 
and Matsu was voiced not only by members of Congress but 
also by America's allies. In spite of pressure from various 
quarters upon the Administration to state clearly its policy 
on Quemoy and Matsu, President Eisenhower maintained his 
attitude of deliberate inscrutability throughout the crisis.
The President was in a very difficult position. The 
Nationalists had been forced to evacuate the far-flung 
offshore islands of the Tachens and Nanchi groups. What­
ever the merits in asking the Nationalist Government to give 
up the remaining offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, it
would not have been a good policy to retreat while the 
Communists advanced by force. Furthermore, it was 
Eisenhower's conviction, which proved to be right, that a 
mere surrender of Quemoy and Matsu would not solve the real 
problem— the avowed Communist objective of "liberating" 
Formosa. On the contrary, the coercion of the Nationalist 
Government that would have been necessary to execute such a 
surrender and the subsequent impact on the morale of the 
Nationalist forces and the people on Formosa would have 
produced very undesirable effects.
Under the circumstances, if the President stated 
flatly that the United States would not help defend Quemoy 
and Matsu, as some Democrats and the British Government 
desired, it would have been tantamount to inviting Communist 
seizure. The Nationalist Government could not possibly hold 
the islands under a major Communist attack without American 
air and sea support, if the President declared American 
commitment to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, as the 
right-wing Republicans and the Nationalist Government hoped, 
it would have, among other things, the most undesirable 
consequence of a public manifestation that the United States 
was involved in a Chinese civil war. In this connection, 
it must be recalled that the American Government, as well 
as the British, took the position that the legal status 
of Formosa was as yet undetermined. Therefore, American 
commitment to the defense of Formosa would not constitute
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an intervention, although the diametrically opposite position 
was taken by the Chinese Communists.
Caught between the horns of a dilemma, President 
Eisenhower decided that the only tenable position was to 
adopt a wait-and-see attitude. In the event of a Communist 
attack on Quemoy or Matsu, the American forces would react 
only if the President, as the Commander-in-Chief, judged 
it to be a preliminary to an invasion of Formosa. Never­
theless, this was an unenviable position from which the 
United States desired to be extricated whenever feasible. 
While the United States did not intend to intervene or 
mediate in the unfinished Chinese civil war, a cease-fire 
in the Formosa Strait would be in the best interests of 
the United States.
American interest in a cease-fire, the maintenance 
of the status quo in the Formosa area, was not difficult 
to comprehend. Since the June 1950 outbreak of the Korean 
conflict, the United States had had a commitment, which 
subsequently became a treaty obligation, to defend 
Formosa against Communist invasion. To fulfill an inter­
national obligation of a military nature was not a pleasant 
prospect even if the situation dictated it.
Following the Communist rejection of the United 
Nations effort to conduct a peaceful settlement, the United 
States had endeavored to seek a cease-fire in the Formosa 
Strait by the“carrot-or-stickvapproach but without success.
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Chou En-lai’s gesture of peace at the Bandung Conference, 
though a self-serving manoeuver on his part, opened the door 
for talking rather than fighting. As originally conceived, 
the United States took the view that the United Nations was 
the most desirable channel through which a cease-fire in 
the Formosa area could be arranged. Chou's daring offer 
caught the State Department unprepared, especially in the 
absence of Secretary Dulles.
The initial American response indicated doubt as to 
the sincerity of the Communist peace offer. In fact, the 
State Department's reply set forth certain pre-conditions 
before talking could begin. This attitude might well have 
hampered a cease-fire which all along had been the Adminis­
tration's policy objective. However, with the support of 
Democratic leaders in Congress and with the concurrence of 
the President, Secretary Dulles on his return made a 
courageous move to modify substantially the previous State 
Department response and a dialogue with the Chinese Com­
munists was finally established.
The Administration's ardent desire to achieve a 
cease-fire did not mean it was ready to surrender to the , 
Communists at a conference table, as the right-wing Repub­
licans had feared. Due to American adherence to its declared 
principles on negotiation, the Geneva talks did not result 
in a cease-fire agreement. Although the Administration had 
not achieved its primary policy objective through the
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bilateral talks, the tension in the Formosa area was reduced 
and a state of de facto cease-fire existed until 1958.
Throughout the 1954-1955 crisis in the Formosa 
Strait, the Americans desired only the maintenance of the 
status quo. Although the basic tension in the area could 
not be eliminated as long as the aims of Washington and 
Peking remained in conflict, the Eisenhower Administration 
weathered the storm in the Formosa Strait without military 
intervention or concession. A policy that was firm in 
principle and conciliatory in attitude had achieved the 
desired objective.
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